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I.

Introduction and Executive Summary
The Independence Standards Board (the “ISB”) was established in May 1997 with the

mission of developing “a conceptual framework for independence applicable to audits of public
entities which will serve as the foundation for the development of principles-based independence
standards.” This White Paper is submitted to the ISB on behalf of the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (the "AICPA”) in response to Chairman Allen’s request for
educational materials bearing on the conceptual framework for protecting and enhancing auditor
independence.
The conclusions of this White Paper are guided by one overarching imperative—serving
the public interest in assuring auditor independence.

Auditor independence is of critical

importance to the efficient functioning of our capital markets, which depend on a continuous
flow of reliable financial information.

Moreover, independence is one of the most deeply

ingrained values of the accounting profession. No one has a greater interest in upholding the
independence of auditors of public entities than members of the profession, as the reputation of
all professionals engaged in auditing public entities depends on it. Indeed, the issue is not
whether independence standards and policies should be “strengthened” or “relaxed,” but rather
what approach best advances the public interest in the highest quality of independent audits of
public entities.
It is particularly timely that the ISB has been formed now to consider this issue.
Dramatic changes in the world economy, in combination with astonishing breakthroughs in
information technology, are redefining the audit function, placing new demands on auditors and
permanently altering the relationships between accounting firms and their clients.

These

dynamics suggest a need to replace the existing command and control regulatory system with a
more responsive, principles-based model.
Building on the profession’s long experience of self-regulation, the new paradigm for
auditor independence should embrace the enforced self-regulation model that has now become a
key element of regulatory reform. In place of the current system of rigid “one-size fits all” rules
and micro-management, the new model would have the ISB establish core principles of
independence, identify appropriate safeguards, and challenge firms to design effective
independence codes. To assure transparency and foster conformity with the core principles, the
codes would be filed with the ISB, subject to ISB review. Since the codes would be available to
the public, investors and others who rely on audited financial information would be informed
about each firm’s independence policies and practices. Compliance with the independence codes
would further be assured by the peer review process. In addition, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”), AICPA, and state boards of accountancy would
retain their oversight and enforcement authority. This new model should better serve the public
interest by enabling firms to adapt to market transformations, while at the same more fully
protecting auditor independence.
A F resh L ook at Independence for a C hanging W orld
A fresh look at auditor independence standards is necessitated by the forces of
globalization, enterprise transformation and rapid and continuous technological change that are
reshaping the business community. As discussed in Section III, the information revolution is
likely to change the very nature of the audit function, as well as the role of the auditor. While the
precise impact of these changes cannot be predicted, it is certain that auditors will be called upon
in the future to (i) possess even greater skills and expertise in information technology, (ii)
-2-

develop the knowledge necessary for a sophisticated understanding of their clients’ increasingly
complex financial and organizational affairs and (iii) bring to bear a wide range of expertise in
conducting audits. These imperatives place a premium on diversification in terms of the range of
skills and technology that auditors must develop or access within their firms. Efforts to impede
the establishment of multidisciplinary professional service firms (which offer both audit and non
audit services), based upon conjecture that a broad range of services impairs independence, thus,
are detrimental to the goal of achieving the highest quality audits.
In recent years, the accelerating pace of technology-driven change has also led to the
emergence of an increasing variety of business relationships between professional services firms
and other entities seeking to respond flexibly to the demands of the intensely competitive global
market. These relationships take many forms, the common denominator being an alliance in
which the special skills and expertise of one entity are combined with the different competencies
of another to bring to the market a range of diverse services with maximum efficiency. For
example, an accounting firm and a computer software company may decide to develop jointly an
electronic tax return filing system for the Internal Revenue Service or contract to install a system
for a commercial client. These business ventures capture important efficiencies by sharing costs
and risks, drawing upon complementary knowledge bases, combining competencies, reaching a
global market and bringing the service to market in the shortest time. The new conceptual
framework proposed herein would adopt a pragmatic approach that allows such business
relationships with audit clients — providing adequate safeguards exist to protect auditor
independence.
In designing a new paradigm for the regulation of auditor independence, the ISB should
consider the economic and other determinants of auditor independence, as well as the key
-3 -

elements of successful regulatory strategy.

As explained in Section III, the overwhelming

economic interest of accounting firms in their reputational capital provides a powerful incentive
to safeguard independence. Non-audit services increase the firm’s investment in reputational
capital, contribute importantly to the quality of audit services and provide other benefits to
clients and the public. An enlightened regulatory and standards-setting approach would take
advantage of this incentive structure and enlist the firms in an effective regulatory partnership
with the ISB and the SEC.
The economic analysis set forth in Section III also recognizes the need to consider
individuals, as well as firms, in designing effective safeguards to mitigate threats to
independence. The interests of audit firms and their members are closely aligned through their
common investment in reputational capital. While unlikely, it is possible that an individual
prepared to advance his or her self interest at the expense of the firm may engage in what
economists call “free riding” on the reputation of the firm. This possibility is addressed in the
present system through a variety of existing safeguards, including policies that encourage
professionals to bring disagreements over audit issues to the attention of the appropriate partners
in the firm, second partner review, partner compensation and performance review policies that
align the audit partners’ interest with those of the firm, and other measures designed to assure
that audit partners are accountable for their decisions. The proposed new framework for auditor
independence should effectively address this potential “free rider” issue as well.
Also relevant to the design of an effective regulatory system is the fact that exposure to
legal liability provides a powerful deterrent to compromising independence. Indeed, because
severe sanctions may be imposed on individual partners as well as firms, they represent a
particularly significant constraint.

These sanctions include (i) common law civil liability,
-4 -

(ii) federal securities law civil and criminal liability, (iii) civil liability under state securities law,
(iv) loss of state license to practice, (v) suspension of the right to practice before the SEC, and
(vi) other professional sanctions, such as suspension of AICPA membership.
As explained in Section III, liability is no theoretical risk. In recent years, the costs
associated with actual or threatened litigation have reached staggering levels for accounting
firms.

While often found to have no basis, aggregate legal claims against the six largest

accounting firms (the “Big Six”) exceeded $30 billion at the end of 1992. Similarly, auditors
who have compromised their independence have been the subject of disciplinary action by the
SEC, the AICPA and state regulators. The economic incentives and liability deterrents are
reinforced by the psychological and ethical determinants of the behavior of audit firms and
auditors.

Shaped by a culture that fosters the internalization of ethical norms and rewards

compliance with firm policies, the pervasive value of professionalism provides organizational
support for independent auditor behavior.
Section III enumerates the important economic efficiencies benefiting the audit captured
by multi-disciplinary professional service firms of all sizes. In particular, these firms are able to
lower the relative cost of audit services because the fixed costs associated with the technological,
organizational and physical infrastructure of such entities are spread over a larger base than
would be possible in audit-only firms, or firms precluded from providing non-audit services to
audit clients. Further, transactional costs are reduced when clients are able to receive multiple
services from the same firm, because of the significant economies associated with the
development of a body of knowledge specific to a client. Similarly, the potential exists for
substantial economies associated with a professional service firm providing multiple services in
regard to complex transactions with which it is already familiar. These gains are recognized by
-5 -

the market, which increasingly looks to accounting firms in the interest of cost effectiveness and
an integrated understanding of the client’s business, for a range of non-audit services and
business relationships.
A M ore R esponsive M odel B ased on E nforced S elf -R egulation
As discussed in Section IV, in recent years an extraordinary consensus in favor of
regulatory reform has led to replacing “command and control” micro-regulation with “enforced
self-regulation.” The new approach assigns regulators the responsibility of defining the desired
regulatory goals, providing appropriate guidance, directing the regulated industry or profession
to adopt a compliance program, monitoring performance and sanctioning offensive behavior.
This model offers manifold advantages as compared with the command and control
regulation of auditor independence:
•

informational efficiency, since the participants in the regulated profession
possess detailed knowledge not available to the regulators and standardssetters;

•

a dynamic response to changing market realities;

•

an effective means of harnessing the motivation of the regulated entities in
support of relevant and necessary regulation;

•

a basis for a pragmatic balancing of risks and benefits in the public
interest;

•

a greater commitment to the achievement of clear goals which commend
themselves to those being regulated; and

•

solutions tailored to the needs of the particular entity (rather than a “onesize fits all” approach).

This philosophy of enforced self-regulation has been applied successfully by agencies as
diverse as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the SEC. Indeed, the SEC has required
investment companies and investment advisers to implement their own, individually-tailored
-6 -

personal trading rules to detect and prevent conduct the SEC has determined to be detrimental to
the public interest. The same approach should also be applied to the regulation of auditor
independence, reinforcing existing economic and other determinants of independence. Further,
enforced self-regulation would build on the profession’s extensive experience of self-regulation
described in Section II.
T he N ew C onceptual F ramework

The new conceptual framework proposed in Section V is based on the enforced self
regulation model discussed in Section IV and reflects the economic and other determinants of
auditor independence discussed in Section III.

For purposes of the new framework,

independence would be defined as an absence of interests that create an unacceptable risk of bias
with respect to the quality or context of information that is the subject of an audit engagement.
Consistent with this definition, the ISB would adopt core principles of independence, promulgate
guidelines on how those principles would be applied to situations that raise a threat to
independence, identify appropriate types of safeguards and require firms to draft independence
codes implementing the system, subject to ISB review. The SEC, the AICPA and state boards of
accountancy would retain appropriate oversight and enforcement roles. The relationship of the
SEC, ISB, AICPA, state boards and firms envisioned by the new accountants is depicted in
Figure 1.1.
Section V suggests that the ISB adopt the following core principles, which reflect a broad
consensus of views within the profession regarding the primary considerations bearing on auditor
independence:
•

Auditors and firms should not be financially dependent upon an audit client;
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•

Auditors and firms should not have conflicting interests that would impair their
objectivity with regard to matters affecting the financial statements; and,

•

Auditors and firms should not have relationships with, or engage in activities for,
clients that would entail making managerial decisions or otherwise serve to impair an
auditor’s objectivity.

Recognizing that risks or threats to the core principles of auditor independence may be
averted or mitigated in many instances by compensating controls, the ISB guidelines would
identify the types of safeguards considered most effective with respect to particular threats to
independence.

Further, the guidelines would recognize the importance of materiality as a

threshold consideration in applying the core principles. By identifying the specific risks or
threats that firms should address in implementing the core principles of independence, the
guidelines would challenge firms to develop safeguards designed to counteract or mitigate
whatever threat to independence the particular activity may present. If the threat cannot be
overcome in this way, the practice would be proscribed, unless overridden by important public
interest benefits as determined by the ISB.
A principal advantage of the proposed independence codes is that they will allow each
firm to craft a compliance regime that reflects its culture, organizational structure, compensation
system, practice priorities, quality controls and personnel policies. Each firm would be required
to address aggressively the major threats to auditor independence — by crafting and
implementing safeguards to protect and enhance the independence of the firm and the audit
partner. Thus, the codes would be developed by the institutions best positioned to recognize the
risks and threats, and which also possess incentives to achieve an appropriate solution.
The codes would be filed with the ISB, thus ensuring “transparency” and fostering
compliance with ISB guidelines. The codes, which would take effect upon filing, would be
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subject to review and possible disapproval by the ISB.

Filing with the ISB would enable

investors and others who rely on audited financial information to inform themselves about each
firm’s independence policies and practices. Moreover, public availability of the codes would
further public understanding of what accounting firms are doing to protect auditor independence
and spur firms to adopt and implement best practices. That objective would be furthered by a
periodic review of firm codes by the Independence Issues Committee (the “IIC”) in order to
develop a set of best practices that might be incorporated in the guidelines issued by the ISB. An
important supplemental element of this self-regulatory model is the testing of compliance with
the codes through the peer review process.
Anticipating that many small and mid-sized firms may want assistance in drafting
independence codes, the IIC would produce a drafting guide for their use. For the same reason, it
is proposed that a transition period of up to three years be established to enable firms to take the
steps needed to come under the new system.
The proposed new system of principles, guidelines and independence codes is depicted in
Figure 1.2.
I nadequacy of the C urrent S ystem

The proposed framework responds to widespread concern that the current regulatory
approach does not serve the public interest as well as it might. As detailed in Section II of this
White Paper, former officials of the SEC, a variety of panels and committees, expert
commentators and members of the profession have identified a range of shortcomings with the
current system, as well as unresolved issues. Indeed, the SEC on more than one occasion has
indicated that it planned to conduct a comprehensive review of the present system of
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independence rules, standards and requirements relating to public entities. The creation of the
ISB is a decisive and promising response to this shared dissatisfaction.
The problems with the present system are readily apparent. As is made clear in Sections
II and III, however, these problems do not relate to audit quality or a lack of independence on the
part of auditors. Indeed, there is no evidence that audit failure has been caused by a lack of
independence. The concern, rather, is that the current approach fails to serve the public interest
because it is inefficient, inflexible and imposes social costs without compensating benefits.
As explained in Section II, since the federal securities laws were enacted in the 1930’s,
the independence rules have evolved in a piecemeal fashion, and now encompass a large body of
miscellaneous interpretations. There are more than 200 pages of published interpretations and
“no-action” letters by the staff of the SEC (the “Staff’), supplementing more than 50 pages of
rules, plus interpretations and ethics rulings of the AICPA, and a few additional independencerelated requirements imposed by the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section on its member firms that
audit public entities. Detached from their ethical moorings, these interpretations and rulings tend
to foster compliance with specific requirements or proscriptions, rather than assist auditors to
focus on the purpose of independence — to ensure that audits in fact are conducted in an
objective and bias-free manner.
Further, many of these requirements are based on outmoded assumptions relating to the
types of services clients customarily look to accounting firms to provide, the manner in which
companies generate financial data and financial statements and the size and internal organization
of accounting firms, while disregarding the growing involvement of spouses and other family
members in the workplace and recent developments, such as the prevalence of teaming
arrangements in the economy.
- 10-

As discussed in Section II, the bulk of requirements focus on situations that are perceived
by the Staff to impair the appearance of independence.

But these perceptions embody

assumptions that are highly subjective, lack any empirical foundation (although research by
academics and practitioners suggests that investors and other stakeholders perceive non-audit
services to have, at most, minimal effects on auditor independence) and result in arbitrary and
unduly restrictive regulation.
Moreover, detailed appearance-based regulations may be seen as at odds with Congress’
original intent. As is made clear in Section II, auditors have always provided non-audit services
to their audit clients.

In enacting the federal securities laws, Congress was aware that

independent auditors were selected and paid by audit clients in return for their auditing services,
and expressed no concern about audit firms providing non-audit services to audit clients or the
appearance of independence. Thus, Congress did not entertain some abstract notion of “perfect”
independence but, rather, envisioned that auditors should maintain the highest level of actual
independence that was realistically attainable.
In addition, the actual behavior of shareholders demonstrates that knowledge regarding
the non-audit fees paid to audit firms was of limited interest to them. Indeed, the mandate to
disclose such information imposed in 1978 by the SEC’s Accounting Series Release (“ASR”)
No. 250 was withdrawn in 1982 because the Commission concluded it was “not generally of
sufficient utility to investors to justify continuation.” Subsequent studies have found that the
required disclosure had no discernible effect on auditor retention rates or decisions by audit
clients (in the aggregate) to procure non-audit services from audit firms, despite the SEC’s strong
admonition (set forth in ASR No. 264) to boards of directors and audit committees to exercise
special care in making such decisions. If key users of audited financial information had actually
- 11 -

perceived a threat to auditor independence resulting from the provision of non-audit services,
surely the outcome during this period would have been different.
Similarly, the behavior of an industry which has a major economic stake in auditor
liability — the insurance industry — refutes the theory that non-audit services are perceived to
impair independence. Insurers do not perceive that non-audit services provided to audit clients
increase the risk of audit failure. This view is consistent with the fact that few claims against
accounting firms even allege audit failure resulting from a breach of independence. Since there
is no empirical basis for suggesting a connection between non-audit services and the impairment
of independence, there is no reason to continue to focus on this issue.
E xpert O pinions

We have submitted as appendices to this White Paper the views of leading experts on
issues relevant to auditor independence. These experts, whose views are reflected in the White
Paper, have addressed the economic, behavioral, methodological and ethical contexts of auditor
independence. In particular:
Gary Orren, Professor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Management,
Harvard University, and a nationally recognized analyst of public opinion research engaged in a
methodological analysis of prior empirical work on auditor independence and set out a
methodology for future research;
Oliver E. Williamson, David J. Teece, Rick Antle and Paul A. Griffin provided an
economic analysis of auditor independence, all under the auspices of the Law and Economics
Consulting Group, Inc. Oliver E. Williamson is Professor of Law and Economics at University
of California, Berkeley, and is an eminent economist. David J. Teece is Professor of Business
Administration at the Walter A. Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley, and
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has written numerous articles on the impact of technological innovation on firms, competitive
markets, and regulatory policy. Rick Antle is Professor of Accounting at the Yale School of
Management, and has written extensively on accounting and auditing issues. Paul A. Griffin is
Professor of Management at the University of California, Davis, holds a Ph.D. in Accounting and
has written extensively on accounting and auditing issues;
W. Warner Burke, Chair of the Department of Organization and Leadership, and
Professor of Psychology and Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, and a leading
authority on behavioral science, analyzed the behavioral determinants of auditor independence;
and
Gary Edwards, founder and President of Meritas Consulting, Inc., and former chief
executive of the Ethics Resource Center in Washington, D.C., addressed the ethical context of
auditor independence.
Detailed biographical information about each of these experts is provided in the relevant
appendix. Their reports are attached as Appendices A through D, respectively.

II.

Historical and Institutional Framework
A.

Overview
Historically, the concept of auditor independence has been defined as the ability

of the auditor to act with integrity and objectivity1— that is, an independence in mental attitude.2

1 Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 601.01, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶73,251, at
See
62,881 (1997). The concepts of integrity and objectivity are closely intertwined with the concept of
independence. Integrity essentially describes the “trustworthiness” or “honesty” of the auditor - the idea
that the auditor will put the quality of the audit before any possible self-interest. See Robert K. Elliott &
Peter D. Jacobson, Audit Independence: Concept and Application, CPA J. 35, 38 (Mar. 1992). Objectivity
refers to the absence of bias in performing an audit, meaning that the auditor does not, in fact, have any

-1 3 -

Early American practitioners believed that independence could not successfully be reduced to
rules, but rather constituted an habitual state of mind.2
3 More recently, the focus has been on
appearance in relation to independence. While the appearance of auditor independence plays an
important role in fostering public confidence in the integrity of financial markets, any regulation
on the basis of appearance must be grounded in an empirically-based determination of the actual
perceptions of financial statement users.
For purposes of this White Paper, independence is defined as an absence of interests that
create an unacceptable risk of bias with respect to the quality or context of information that is the
subject of an audit engagement.4 In operational terms, independence ensures that those who
perform an audit or other assurance engagement will be mentally objective when obtaining,

interest in the audit other than its reliability. Id. at 35; see also, John L. Carey, Professional Ethics o f
Public Accounting, New York: American Institute of Accountants, 1946, at 7.
2

One of the most widely quoted formulations of the concept, by former AICPA Executive Director John
Carey, noted that:
Independence is an abstract concept, and it is difficult to apply either generally or in its peculiar
application to the certified public accountant. Essentially it is a state of mind. It is partly
synonymous with honesty, integrity, courage, [and] character. It means, in simplest terms, that
the certified public accountant will tell the truth as he sees it and will permit no influence,
financial or sentimental, to turn him from that course.
Carey, supra note 1, at 7.

3

See Gary John Previts, The SCOPE OF CPA Services 43 (John Wiley & Sons ed. 1985).

4

This formulation is consistent with the broader definition adopted by the AICPA Special Committee on
Assurance Services (the “Elliott Committee”) with respect to all types of assurance services. See Special
Committee on Assurance Services, Report o f the Special Committee on Assurance Services (visited Aug. 8,
1997) <http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/comstud/assind/index.htm>. The Elliott Committee was
created by the AICPA to “analyze and report on the current state and future of the audit/assurance
function” and to examine “trends shaping the audit/assurance environment.” In addition, the committee
was charged with investigating, among other things, “the implications of potential changes in the
audit/assurance function for independence, professional skills, and professional education.” Id. at
<http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/about/charge. htm>.
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examining, and reporting on information.

Independence, therefore, constitutes one of the

cornerstones of the accounting profession.
Auditors serve the public interest by reporting on the reliability of financial statements
issued by public companies. Financial statements are prepared in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”) and reported upon in accordance with generally
accepted auditing standards (“GAAS”), which require that “[i]n all matters relating to the
assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.”5
The responsibility for maintaining independence rests with individual auditors, their
firms, and the accounting profession as a whole. Independence is a hallmark of the accounting
professional, who continually evaluates his objectivity as he provides audit services to a client.
The auditor’s firm also has a critical interest in preserving independence, because its reputation
for integrity is its most important asset.6 Moreover, the profession as a whole, recognizing
independence as the mainstay of its existence, remains dedicated to the enhancement and
protection of auditor independence.

Because individual auditors and their firms address

independence issues on a day-to-day basis, they must exercise, with guidance from the
profession, front-line responsibility for interpreting independence requirements.
However, the framework within which auditors address independence issues needs
improvement. The accounting profession and representatives of the SEC have acknowledged the
need for a more principled approach — one that responds to the real-world experience and
incentives of accounting firms and individual accountants. For years, leaders of the profession

5

General Standard No. 2, Generally Accepted Auditing Standards, AU § 150.02.

6

For a discussion of the importance of reputation to accounting firms, see infra Section III.
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have advocated a new system in which individual firms would establish policies consistent with
broad principles of independence.7

The SEC Staff has acknowledged the perception of

shortcomings in the current system and indicated its intent to re-examine independence issues.
In 1990, Jim Doty, the SEC’s then-General Counsel, observed that:
[t]he Commission’s standards of independence * * * now are perceived by the
accountants as either too vague to be of any use, or too detailed and specific to be
workable in today’s business climate. I would expect that a concept release,
addressing the difficult question of “Accountants’ Independence,” might be issued
in the near term.8
While the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant (“OCA”) concluded in 1994 that
fundamental changes in the Commission’s regulations were not necessary,9

Former SEC

Commissioner Steven Wallman recently voiced concerns about the current approach to

7

AICPA, Scope of Services by CPA Firms, Report of the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice
Section, Division for CPA Firms, Mar. 1979; Elliott, supra note 1, at 38-39 (Mar. 1992); Robert Mednick,
Independence: Let’s Get Back to Basics, J. OF ACCT. 86 (Jan. 1990). Mednick argued that:
when rules and regulations grow more minute and arbitrary, individuals and organizations
find it easier to avoid making ethical judgments - the “tough calls” that rules may not cover.
We merely comply or fail to comply with the rule. But rules, in the final analysis, are hollow
rituals unless they have the underpinning of known and accepted rationale.
Id at 93.

8

Remarks of General Counsel, Securities & Exchange Commission, James R. Doty, ABA Federal
Regulation of Securities Comm., Annual Fall Meeting (Nov. 9, 1990). Similarly, in a 1990 letter to Arthur
Andersen & Co. in which the SEC’s Office of the Chief Accountant (“OCA”) indicated that it would not
object on independence grounds to the formation of business relationships between Andersen Consulting
and Arthur Andersen attest clients, the OCA stated that:
OCA’s position is based upon the Commission’s current independence interpretations. As
you know, the staff is in the process of reviewing those interpretations. This study may
include a general review of the effects of firms' structures on the classification of direct
versus indirect business relationships, and on other relationships with audit clients.
Arthur Andersen & Co., SEC No-Action Letter (pub. avail. July 9, 1990).

9

Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the Chief Accountant, Staff Report
Independence 55 (1994).
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on

A uditor

independence questions, concluding that it “fails in a number of respects and may well be
contrary to the public interest.”10

Wallman stated that “the framework for resolving

independence issues that has arisen is, in many instances, not obviously apparent”*11 and that “the
lack o f a clear framework undercuts the foundation for analysis and calls into question the
validity o f the rules themselves.”12 These acknowledgments of the deficiencies of the current
system underscore that the SEC and the profession have a common interest in the success of the
ISB’s efforts to develop a principles-based approach to independence issues.
B.

Early Development of the Concept of Independence
From the inception of the accounting profession in the United States in the late

nineteenth century, accountants have offered a wide array of audit and non-audit services.13
Early practitioners were frequently retained by promoters of corporate mergers to investigate
companies under consideration.14 Accountants commonly advised audit clients on subjects such

10

Steven M.H. Wallman, The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and Auditor Independence, ACCT.
Horizons, Dec. 1996, at 77.

11

Id. at 85.

12

Id. (emphasis added). Former Commissioner Wallman further noted that the lack of conceptual clarity
“causes a misperception on the part of the public as to whether independence exists in situations where
there may be little reason for concern.” Id. (emphasis added).

13

See Previts, supra note 3, at 34 (noting that from the outset of the profession, “consulting and acting as a
business advisor was considered a typical activity for public accountants”); John L. Carey, The
Independence Concept Revisited, Ohio CPA J. 5, 8 (Spring 1985) (“[f]rom the time the profession first
organized in the United States, * * * CPAs have been advising and assisting clients in matters other than
auditing, financial reporting and tax work”).

14

See Previts, supra note 3, at 35. In 1912, Robert Montgomery described such investigations as follows:
Investigations are usually undertaken in connection with the sale of a business to a corporation
or other purchaser for the purpose of obtaining special information relative to finances or
general affairs or with respect to alleged fraudulent transactions or into the profits derived from
the manufacture of infringing articles, etc.
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as financial management, cost controls, inventory control and credit management.15 Indeed, the
first accountants depended heavily on consulting work for their economic livelihood.16
Contemporaneous professional literature often noted the diversity of services provided by
accountants, whose broad knowledge of business practices and expertise in accounting and
auditing suited them naturally to the role of management adviser.17 From the very founding of
the profession, therefore, public accountants fulfilled multiple roles.
As evidenced by the broad scope of services performed, early practitioners did not view
the provision of non-audit services as incompatible with audit independence. Indeed, the very
concept of independence arose at a time when accountants already were performing a broad
range of non-audit services for clients.18 Accountants endeavored to exercise independent
judgment with respect both to audit services and non-audit services.

Thus, Charles Waldo

Haskins and Elijah Watt Sells, the original American-born partners of a prominent public
accounting firm, wrote in 1895 that “in making independent audits, in revising accounts, or
investigating corporate affairs” public accountants should exhibit “integrity, appreciation of the

Id. at 49-50.
15

See Carey, supra note 1, at 8.

16

See Previts, supra note 3, at 34.

17

Frederick Cleveland, an early observer of the accounting profession, noted in 1905 that accountants were
particularly competent to advise business clients on matters relating to the “efficient and economic control
and management of the work force.” Frederick A. Cleveland, The Scope o f the Profession o f Accountancy,
J. OF ACCT. 53, 56 (Nov. 1905). Similarly, Herbert Stockwell described the scope of the accounting
profession in 1912 as “bounded only when we reach the legitimate realm of the lawyer on one side and the
engineer on the other.” Herbert G. Stockwell, The Broader Field for Certified Public Accountants, J. OF
ACCT. 21, 23 (Jan. 1912).

18

See Previts, supra note 3, at 41 (“[i]n the midst of all the discussion over services to be offered, the
business community had not only focused on the special expertise of the accountant, it had focused on
another and more important difference — the accountant’s impartial posture”).

- 18-

gravity and confidential character of the responsibility * * * and strength of purpose, in order that
the results of their work would be properly and fearlessly stated.”19
There was no fixed notion of the types of non-audit services that accountants should
provide. Instead, accountants performed different types of services at different times, depending
on business and technological developments and the evolving needs of clients.20 Through the
period prior to enactment of the federal securities laws, there was relatively little concern that the
development of new non-audit services might impair the accountant’s ability to perform audits
with integrity and objectivity. Public accountants vigorously pursued a wide range of services
and expressed confidence in their ability to preserve independence.21

19

Id. Sells remarked further in 1908 that “[t]he position of the public accountant in respect to corporations
and their management is always an independent one.” Id. at 42.

20

Recognizing the effect of market forces on the young profession, W.C. Heaton wrote in 1925 that “the
accountant cannot always limit completely the character of work he does.” Id. Similarly, Arthur
Andersen, a pioneer of the profession, commented in 1925 that:
In the experience of the past 10 years the businessman has found that advice
from an accounting viewpoint may have high cash value in the form of taxes
saved or refunded, war contracts liquidated, in recapitalizations and refinancings
effected advantageously.. . . The present-day accountant who is alert will grasp
every opportunity to foster this attitude by increasing the constructive value of
all normal work and seeking newer and broader fields of service to business
management.
Id. at 45.

21

As stated by Frederick Hurdman in 1931:
There can be no disputing the fact that in relations with clients the accountant
should maintain his independence, and yet some of our best clients are those
who depend upon us to a very large extent for guidance in the conduct of their
business. It requires a very fine sense of balance at all times to preserve that
independence and still maintain the closest of business and perhaps social
relationships.
Id. at 43.
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Significantly, Congress, when it enacted the securities laws in the 1930s, saw no reason
for concern that the performance of non-audit services by public accountants on behalf of audit
clients might impair auditors’ independence.22 Simply stated, advisory and other non-audit
services were widely recognized both as within the professional competence of public
accountants and consistent with the principle of independence.
C.

The Concept of Independence in the Securities Laws
In connection with the passage of the federal securities laws, Congress considered

imposing a requirement that audits of public companies be performed by a corps of government
auditors.23

Ultimately, Congress rejected this proposal in favor of a requirement that

“independent” public accountants conduct the audits24

22

Congress was made aware that

The record preceding the adoption of the federal securities laws demonstrates that Congress understood the
role then played by independent public accountants. For example, Colonel A.H. Carter, President of the
New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, in explaining the benefit of having independent
public accountants rather than government employees conduct audits of public companies, stated, “[w]e
know the conditions of the accounts; we know the ramifications of the business; we know the pitfalls of the
accounting structure that the company maintains.” Securities Act: Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate
Comm, on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1933) (hereinafter "Hearings on S. 875”).
Similarly, Congress was informed that:
The method of audited accounts which involves in the first instance the
preparation of accounts by the officers of the company who are most familiar
with its operations, and the examination thereof by qualified independent
accountants possessing a wide general knowledge of business and able to take a
disinterested and objective view of the position is, I believe, now generally
recognized as the best combination that has been evolved for producing
satisfactory accounts.
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. 2693 Before the Senate Comm, on Banking and Currency, 73 d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7184-85 (1934) (written statement of George O. May, Price Waterhouse).

23

Hearings on S. 875, supra note 22, at 57-60.

24

For example, registration statements under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) must be
accompanied by financial statements certified by an independent public accountant or certified accountant.
See
25 and 26 of Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25) and (26) (1994). In addition, Sections 12(b) and
13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b) and 78m(a)
(1994), provide that the Commission may require registrants by rule or regulation to file financial
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independent accountants would be selected and paid by clients, but did not view this arrangement
as impairing the accountants’ integrity or objectivity.25

Congress understood auditor

independence in this context.
At the time the federal securities laws were adopted, the term “independent public
accountant” was understood to refer to an accountant who acted with integrity and objectivity and was therefore independent “in fact” - but did not encompass the added notion of the
appearance of independence.

The American Institute of Accountants, a predecessor of the

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”), for example, had not adopted
formal rules on independence before the adoption of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act

statements and annual reports certified by independent public accountants. References to independent
public accountants also occur elsewhere throughout the federal securities laws. See Section 314 of the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require indenture
obligors to file annual reports certified by independent public accountants); Section 15C of the Exchange
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1994) (directing the Department of the Treasury to adopt rules requiring
government securities brokers and dealers to file with the agency financial statements certified by
independent public accountants); Section 17(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78qe (1994) (requiring
registered brokers and dealers to file annually with the Commission financial statements certified by
independent public accountants); Section 11 of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78ggg (1994) (requiring the Securities Investor Protection Corporation to submit annual reports to the
Commission containing financial statements examined by independent public accountants); Section 5 of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 (the “PUHCA”, 15 U.S.C. § 79(e) (1994) (authorizing the
Commission to require public utility holding companies to file registration statements containing financial
statements certified by independent public accountants); Section 10 of the PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79j (1994)
(authorizing the Commission to require persons applying for approval to acquire securities or utility assets
to file financial statements certified by independent public accountants); Section 14 of the PUHCA, 15
U.S.C. § 79n (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require registered holding companies to file annual
and other periodic reports certified by independent public accountants); Section 17 of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (the “ICA”), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1994) (authorizing the Commission to require
periodic inspections of the securities and investments of registered management companies by independent
public accountants); Section 30 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 (1994) (authorizing the Commission to
require investment companies to file annual reports certified by independent public accountants); Section
32 of the ICA, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-31 (1994) (establishing a procedure for the selection and approval by
stockholders of independent public accountants certifying financial statements of a registered management
company); and Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “IAA”), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1994)
(authorizing the Commission to require investment advisers to file financial statements certified by
independent public accountants).
25

Hearings on S. 875, supra note 22, at 57-60.
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because independence was considered a state of mind incapable of reduction to rules.26
Similarly, when Colonel A.H. Carter, President of the New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants, testified before Congress in 1933 regarding the function of public
accountants, he explained in response to questioning that accountants were guided in their work
by “[their] conscience.”27 In comparison, when Congress has enacted statutes with the intent of
requiring both the fact and the appearance of independence, it has included express language to
that effect.28
Congress did not define the attributes of an “independent” public accountant; rather, it
authorized the SEC to define “accounting, technical and trade” terms used in the federal
securities laws 29 The Exchange Act and its legislative history suggest that Congress granted the
Commission broad, but not unlimited, definitional authority. In particular, Congress recognized
that legislative intent would serve as an inherent limit on the Commission’s authority.30

26

See Previts, supra note 3, at 43 (noting that practitioners in the early 1900s “felt that to condemn all who
participated in activities which were described as potentially compromising would be as foolhardy as
concluding that those who simply followed the rules were, in fact, independent”).

27

Hearings on S. 875, supra note 22, at 58 (1933).

28

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994) (requiring a federal judge or magistrate to disqualify himself “in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned”).

29

Section 19(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77s(a) (1994), Section 3(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(b) (1994), Section 20(a) of the PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. § 79t(a) (1994), and Section 38(a) of the ICA, 15
U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (1994), grant the SEC authority to define “accounting, technical and trade terms” used
in each Act.

30

Section 3(b) of the Exchange Act requires that the SEC exercise its definitional authority “consistently with
the provisions and purposes o f this title.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(b) (1994) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the
Conference Report and the record of debate reflect Congress’ expectation that courts would recognize
legislative intent as a limit on the Commission’s definitional and rule-making power. For example, the
Conference Committee observed that “courts commonly give the force of law to administrative
interpretations of statutory terms, unless clearly inconsistent with the legislative intent.” H.R. Rep. No.
1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1934), reprinted in 1 FEDERAL SECURITIES Laws LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
1933-1982 1169, 1198 (1983) (emphasis added). Similarly, Representative Sam Rayburn, then-Chairman
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While it has never defined the term “independence,” the Commission has adopted Rule
2-01 of Regulation S-X, which provides that “[t]he Commission will not recognize any certified
accountant or public accountant as independent who is not in fact independent.”31 By its express
terms, this rule, first adopted in the mid-1930s, has always required independence “in fact,” a
standard similar to the requirement under GAAS that an auditor maintain his “independence in
mental attitude.” Indeed, the SEC’s adoption of Rule 2-01 shortly after Congress enacted the
federal securities laws in the 1930s suggests the Commission understood that the basic standard
established for “independent public accountants” under the federal securities laws was, as noted
above, independence “in fact.”
Rule 2-01 identifies two situations in which the Commission will deem an accountant not
independent in fact. The Commission will not consider an accountant to be independent from a
client if the accountant (i) has a direct financial interest or material indirect financial interest in
the client, or (ii) acts as a promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or employee of
the client.32 Rule 2-01 also provides that, “[i]n determining whether an accountant may in fact be
not independent with respect to a particular person, the Commission will give appropriate

of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in addressing the concern that the
Commission might use its rulemaking authority to impose proxy requirements that Congress itself had
considered and rejected, stated his belief that courts interpreting the Commission’s power “would certainly
take into consideration the proposition that the committee considered those very sections and struck them
out and wrote other sections in their stead.” 78 CONG. REC. 7920, 7924 (May 2, 1934), reprinted in 1
Federal Securities Laws Legislative History 1933-1982 861, 865 (1983).
31

17 C.F.R. §210.2-01(a) (1997) (emphasis added). Rule 2-01 is the only rule formally adopted by the
Commission which establishes qualifications for accountants practicing before the Commission or
addresses the independence required of public accountants.

32

See 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (b) (1997).

-23 -

consideration to all relevant circumstances.”33 According to former SEC Chairman Ganson
Purcell, this language was intended to underscore that “independence was a question of fact, to
be determined after examining all the evidence that might bear upon the existence or non
existence of that fact.”34
Consistent with the legislative and regulatory framework established under the federal
securities laws and Rule 2-01, the SEC for many years issued interpretations and administrative
rulings that reflected attempts to determine whether a particular set of circumstances involving
an accounting firm and its audit client would impair the firm’s independence in fact.
Specifically, the Commission generally took the position that advisory and other relationships
between an accountant and an audit client should be taken into account in assessing whether an
accountant was in fact independent, but that such relationships did not necessarily impair
independence. For example, the Commission observed in a 1941 proceeding that evidence of
various business relationships between an accountant and the principal officers of an audit client
“taken by itself, has little probative value, but * * * must be considered together with the facts
heretofore discussed.”35
In the 1970s, however, the SEC began to issue releases that increasingly focused on the
appearance of independence.36 The Staff, too, has issued detailed interpretations and “no

33

17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c) (1997).

34

Ganson Purcell, Cooperation Between SEC and Public Accountants, J. OF ACCT. 155-56 (Aug. 1943).

35

A. Hollander & Son, Inc., 8 S.E.C. 586, 616 (1941).

36

See, e.g., Accounting Series Release No. 126, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 72,148, at 62,305 (July 5, 1972) (setting forth “guidelines and illustrations” of “typical situations which
have involved loss of independence, whether in appearance or in fact," in order to place a practitioner on
notice “of these and similar potential threats to his independence”) (emphasis added). In issuing ASR No.
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action” letters setting forth its views as to a wide variety of situations involving auditors and their
clients that might compromise the appearance of independence.

The Staff's guidance has

“mushroomed,” and the independence requirements now encompass a large and complex body of
miscellaneous rules and interpretations. Indeed, the Staff's published guidance alone now takes
up more than 200 pages of one prominent loose-leaf service.
D.

Self-Regulation by the Profession
The SEC, however, is not the sole source of regulatory measures designed to

protect auditor independence. In fact, accounting has long been a self-regulated profession.
Since accounting’s inception, the profession and individual firms have recognized the
fundamental importance of independence to audit quality and have employed a broad array of
measures to counteract threats to such independence. These self-regulatory measures, designed
to protect and enhance audit quality, form the backdrop for the profession’s recommendations set
forth in Section V for a new conceptual framework of enforced self-regulation for auditor
independence. The profession’s self-regulatory measures have evolved over time, as have the
institutions responsible for formulating relevant professional standards for auditors. From the
standpoint of the profession, the creation of the ISB and its development of principles-based
independence guidance represents the next logical step in the evolution of a coherent system of
self-regulation with respect to auditor independence.

126, the SEC did not purport to exercise its formal rulemaking authority under the federal securities laws.
Instead, the SEC characterized ASR No. 126 as an “interpretive release” that merely “set forth presently
existing guidelines employed by the Commission in resolving the various independence questions that
come before it.” Id. at 62,305. In practice, however, the SEC Staff treats the “guidelines” set forth in ASR
No. 126 and similar releases, many of which were subsequently “codified” as Section 600 of the
Commission’s Codification OF Financial Reporting Policies, as strict requirements, rather than
informal guidelines to be employed by auditors of public companies in resolving independence issues.
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1.

Early Development: 1880-1945
Accounting established itself as a profession during the latter part of the

1800s, when the need for accountancy education was recognized37 and the American Association
of Public Accountants, predecessor of the AICPA, was created.38 In 1896, the first statute to
regulate the profession of public accountancy was enacted in New York, and, during the same
year, the first CPA examination was given.39 Thus, by the turn of the century, the foundations of
the profession were in place.
In those early years, public accountants operated largely without the benefit of
professional guidelines.40 During that time, examinations of corporate accounts were conducted
without a set of professional standards, and corporate accounting and reporting practices were
virtually unrestricted.41

Given this lack of standards, audit quality control was, at best,

uncertain 42 Accounting’s early leaders recognized that unless the profession took an active role
in developing a conceptual framework of auditing standards, audit quality would suffer, and the
profession’s reputation, and thus its very existence, would be at risk.
By 1916, the American Institute of Accountants (“AIA”) had become the focal point for
the profession’s standards-setting efforts. The AIA initiated a program to raise the quality of

37

See Lee J. Seideler and D.R. Carmichael, ACCOUNTANTS HANDBOOK 3-4 (6th ed. 1981).

38

Id.

39

Id

40

See John C. Burton, Russell E. Palmer and Robert S. Kay, HANDBOOK OF ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING
39-4(1981).

41

Id.

42

Id.
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practice by establishing an extensive professional library, publishing a bibliography (the
“Accountant’s Index”) and developing its own uniform CPA examination, which it offered for
use by any state licensing board.43 Conflicts within the membership of the AIA, however, led to
a splintering of that body in 1921, when a group of CPAs formed the American Society of
CPAs.44 The break-up of the AIA created serious problems for the profession, “because it
created confusion in the public mind about whose authority prevailed in accounting matters.”45
Moreover, following the 1929 stock market crash and a major financial fraud in the 1930s,46
public pressure to assure the quality of audits intensified.
In 1936, following the enactment of the federal securities laws, the AIA and the
American Society of CPAs merged. The recombining of these rival bodies led to the SEC’s
acceptance of the AIA (subsequently, the AICPA) as the promulgator of standards for financial
accounting and auditing.47 This acceptance “reflected the government’s willingness to accept a
degree of professional self-governance, provided the public interest was protected.”48 In 1939,
following an initiative to formulate uniform accounting policies, the AICPA established the
Committee on Auditing Procedure, which issued pronouncements relating to audit quality that
served as the nucleus of subsequent statements on auditing procedure.

43

Dale L. Flesher, Paul J. Miranti and Gary John Previts, The First Century o f the CPA, J. OF ACCT. 51 (Oct.
1996).

44

Id. at 52.

45

Id. at 52-53.

46

Id. at 53.

47

The AIA changed its name to the AICPA in 1957. For ease of reference, all subsequent discussion of the
AIA between 1936 and 1957 will refer to it as the AICPA.

48

Flesher et al., supra note 43, at 53.
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2.

The Maturing Profession: 1945-1980
After World War II, auditing began a period of sustained change. The

profession was enriched by the introduction in 1948 of the first of 13 specialized industry audit
guides.49 When the Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”) came into existence as an
organization independent of the AICPA in the early 1970s, the AICPA created the Auditing
Standards Division.50 In 1972, the Auditing Standards Executive Committee (“AudSEC”) took
over the work of the Committee on Auditing Procedure. Turning its attention from procedures
to standards, AudSEC and its successor, the Auditing Standards Board (“ASB”), have issued 82
Statements on Auditing Standards (“SASs”) since 1973.51
This period also witnessed a rising sensitivity to the need for effective practice
management in the delivery of high-quality professional accounting services.

In 1974, the

AICPA officially codified a definition of “preventive control” to reduce proactively the risk of
defective final products. The basic quality controls codified in 1974, which have subsequently
been modified, related to:
•

hiring;

•

professional development (training);

•

advancement;

•

acceptance and continuance of clients;

49

Id. at 55.

50

Handbook of accounting and Auditing, supra note 40, at 11-3.

51

See Larry P. Bailey, 1997 Miller GAAS Guide (1997).
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•

independence;

•

assigning personnel to engagements;

•

consultation;

•

supervision (including review); and

•

inspection (monitoring the design and implementation of the other quality
controls).52

In 1974, the AICPA appointed an independent study group, the Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities (the “Cohen Commission”) to consider whether there was any “gap” between
what the public expected of auditors and what auditors reasonably could accomplish. Chaired by
former SEC Chairman Manuel E. Cohen, the Cohen Commission found that such an expectations
gap in fact existed.53 The Cohen Commission recommended, among other things, that AudSEC
be replaced by a smaller standards-setting committee, and that participation in the setting of
auditing standards by people outside the profession should be encouraged.54 Responding to the
recommendations of the Cohen Commission, the AICPA created the ASB to replace AudSEC

52

See AICPA STATEMENT ON QUALITY CONTROL STANDARDS NO. 1 (1974).

53

The Cohen Commission also found that no prohibition of non-audit services was warranted. See Section
II.H, infra. Indeed, the Cohen Commission recommended that professional standards should require that
public accounting firms establish policies and procedures to assure that knowledge gained from other
services is made available to the partner in charge of the audit so that the partner can consider its
implication for the audit function. Consistent with auditors’ strong incentive to protect and enhance their
reputational capital, the profession adopted this recommendation. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 22
includes as an audit planning procedure a discussion of matters that may affect the audit with firm
personnel responsible for the provision of non-audit services to the client. In addition, an interpretation,
AU § 9311.01-.03, addresses that subject.

54

Handbook of Accounting and Auditing, supra note 40, at
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and established an advisory council appointed from the ranks of financial analysts, corporate
managers, bankers, academics, government employees and accountants in public practice.55
In 1977, the AICPA established the SEC Practice Section (“SECPS” or “Section”) as a
voluntary membership organization within the AICPA with the objective of improving the
quality of practice by CPA firms before the SEC. Member firms are required to participate in (i)
peer review, through which SECPS members every three years review the quality control
policies and procedures of other SECPS members,56 and (ii) quality control inquiries, which
review allegations of audit failure in litigation involving publicly traded clients and certain other
entities to determine if the firm’s quality control systems require revision or if stricter
compliance with the firm’s quality control policies and procedures and/or the SECPS’
membership requirements is needed. The activities of the SECPS are overseen by the Public
Oversight Board (“POB”).57
Peer review was arguably “the single most important element of the accounting
profession’s response to the various recommendations for self-initiated reform made by the
Congress, the Commission and others.”58 During the peer review process, a review team

55

Handbook of Accounting and Auditing, supra note 40, at 11-3 - 4.

56

Since 1990, the AICPA has required that all of its member firms that audit public companies join its peer
review program.

57

The POB’s primary responsibility is to represent the public interest when (i) the SECPS sets, revises or
enforces standards, membership requirements, rules or procedures, and (ii) SECPS committees consider the
results of individual peer reviews or the possible quality control implications of litigation alleging audit
failure. The POB also reports annually on whether the public interest is being protected. See AICPA
Online, <http://www.aicpa.org>.

58

Securities Act Release No. 6695, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) | 84,122, at 88,638
(Apr. l, 1987) (citing SEC Report to Congress on the Accounting Profession and the
Commission’s Oversight Role, 94th Cong., 2d Sess (1978)).
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(comprised of individuals either appointed by the Peer Review Committee59 or selected from
another member firm engaged to conduct the review) evaluates whether (i) the reviewed firm’s
quality control system is appropriate, (ii) the firm’s policies and procedures are adequately
documented and communicated to its personnel, (iii) the firm is complying with such procedures
so as to provide reasonable assurance of conformity with professional standards, and (iv) the firm
is in compliance with the membership requirements of the Section.60 At the completion of the
peer review, the review team provides the reviewed firm with a formal report and, if applicable, a
letter of comments on matters that may require action by the firm.61
With respect to SECPS member firms, a procedure has been established to enable the
SEC to evaluate the adequacy of the peer review process and the POB’s oversight of that
process.62 This procedure permits the SEC access, during a period following the issuance of the
peer review report, to certain of the peer review working papers.63 After its review of the
working papers, the SEC’s representatives discuss with representatives of the POB and the Peer
Review Committee any matters that they believe the Committee should consider.
The Quality Control Inquiry Committee (“QCIC”) determines whether allegations of
audit failure against SECPS member firms involving SEC registrants indicate a need for those
firms to take corrective actions to strengthen their quality control systems or address personnel

59

The SECPS Peer Review Committee administers the peer review program. See Vincent M. O’Reilly, et al.,
Montgomery’s Auditing (11th ed. 1990), at 71 (hereinafter “Montgomery’s Auditing”).

60

Id. at 70-71.

61

Id. at 71.

62

Id.

63

Id.
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deficiencies.64 This quality control inquiry process complements the peer review process. The
QCIC’s work may also raise questions that suggest the need to reconsider or interpret
professional standards or identify audit practice issues where practical guidance would benefit
practitioners. The QCIC refers such matters to those bodies responsible for issuing professional
guidance.65
In 1979, the AICPA’s Quality Control Standards Committee (“QCSC”) — the senior
technical committee of the AICPA designated to issue pronouncements on quality control
standards — issued its first Statement on Quality Control Standards (“SQCS”), SQCS No. 1,
which superseded SAS No. 4. SQCS No. 1, now itself superseded, set forth the nine elements of
quality control listed above, and required firms to consider each of them, to the extent applicable
to their practices, in establishing quality control practices and procedures.

3.

1980-Present
During the 1980s, a series of highly publicized financial frauds led to

increased public pressure to review the system of financial reporting.66 One of the profession’s
responses was the creation of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the
“Treadway Commission”), which was charged with investigating the cause of fraudulent
financial reporting.67 Although the Treadway Commission report, issued in 1987, made a

64

See AICPA Online, <http://www.aicpa.org/members/div/secps/report/quality.htm>.

65

Id.

66

See Previts, supra note 3, at 142.

67

The Treadway Commission was a private sector initiative jointly sponsored by the AICPA, the American
Accounting Association, the Financial Executives Institute, the Institute of Internal Auditors and the
National Association of Accountants. Report o f the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, Oct. 1987.
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number of recommendations to reduce the potential for such frauds, one of its main conclusions
was that corporate audit committees should play a more active role in the audit process.68 Since
that time, the AICPA has indicated that SEC registrants and other publicly accountable entities
should be required to have independent audit committees whenever practicable.69

Such

committees reinforce auditor independence by overseeing the activities of the auditors and
protecting them from management influence.70
In 1994, the POB appointed the Advisory Panel on Auditor Independence, chaired by
Donald J. Kirk, a POB member and former Chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (the “Kirk Panel”), to determine whether “the SECPS, the accounting profession or the
SEC should take steps to better assure the independence of auditors and the integrity and
objectivity of their judgments.”71

Among other things, the Panel recommended that

independence would be enhanced if public entities established stronger, more accountable boards

68

Flesher, supra note 43, at 56. After the Treadway Commission issued its report, the SEC wrote to the
national securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), encouraging
them to review their audit committee requirements. The Accounting Profession: Major Issues: Progress
and Concerns, GAO Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce, House of
Representatives (Sept. 1996) (hereinafter “ 1996 GAO Report”), at 32. The SEC did not write to the New
York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), as its listing requirements already mandated independent audit
committees as of the time of the Treadway Commission’s recommendations. In response, the NASD
strengthened its prior recommendation that all national market system companies have audit committees
with a majority of independent directors, transforming it into a requirement, and the American Stock
Exchange (“AMEX”) adopted a similar requirement. Id

69

Id. (citing June 1993 AICPA Board of Directors policy statement). In 1991, Congress passed the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act, Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991). Among other
things, the statute requires independent audit committees for large banks and savings and loans, and sets
audit committee membership requirements for the largest of the institutions. 1996 GAO Report supra note
68, at Appendix I, at 55.

70

See Montgomery’s Auditing, supra note 59, at 76-78.

71

D onald J. K irk and A rthur Siegel, P rofessional Issues: H o w D irectors a n d A uditors C an Im prove
C orporate G overnance, J. OF ACCT. 53 (Jan. 1996).
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of directors. The Kirk Panel also proposed that the SEC and the profession develop a more
cooperative relationship, since both share the objective of providing the public with relevant and
reliable information.72 In this regard, the development of the ISB is the logical extension of the
SEC’s and the profession’s ongoing efforts to develop a comprehensive and effective means of
safeguarding auditor independence and a more cooperative regulatory approach.73
In large measure, the effectiveness of the profession’s efforts to assure audit quality,
including auditor independence, are grounded in the profession’s commitment to objectivity and
integrity. The AICPA’s Code of Professional Ethics begins by stating that “[a] distinguishing
mark of a professional is his acceptance of responsibility to the public.”74 CPAs are expected to
strive for standards of conduct beyond the prescribed minimums:
The principles call for an unswerving commitment to honorable
behavior, even at the sacrifice of personal advantage.75
As professionals, auditors dedicate themselves to these principles, and strive to ensure that the
firms with which they are associated maintain a strong culture of professionalism. In this regard,
firms have implemented, and continue to develop, increasingly comprehensive measures to
realize these principles.

72

Douglas R. Carmichael, Strengthening the Professionalism o f the Auditor: An Interview with Donald Kirk,
65 CPA J. 18 (Feb. 1995).

73

As discussed in Sections IV and V, infra, this kind of cooperative relationship is at the core of fulfilling the
policy goals of a regulatory regime in which “complex regulations are applied to complex organizations in
order to prevent harm from occurring rather than merely to identify and punish violators.” Douglas C.
Michael, Cooperative Implementation o f Federal Regulations, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 535, 547 (1996)
(hereinafter “COOPERATIVE IMPLEMENTATION”).

74

AICPA Professional Standards, ET § 53.01.

75

Id. at ET § 51.02.
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Firms employ a variety of safeguards to address their various professional and risk
management goals. One category of safeguards is directed at instilling values in all employees
and maintaining a culture of professionalism. Other categories focus on managing independence
and other professional risks and ensuring that concerns relating to independence are
communicated and appropriately addressed during an engagement.

Another category of

safeguards assures that auditors are accountable to their partners for their decisions. A final
category provides for external review of the firm’s quality controls. Within these categories,
firms tailor specific safeguards to meet their particular needs and concerns. Examples of internal
safeguards presently in place at all or some of the major auditing firms are set forth in the table
below.

-35 -

T ypes o f S afeguards E mployed by
Big S ix Firms ___________
Safeguard
C ategory
Instilling Professional Values as
Part of Firm Culture

Risk Management

Communication

Internal Accountability

External Review

•

Training

•

Firm Policies on Independence

•

Annual Confirmation of
Compliance with Firm
Independence Policies

•

Firm-Wide Partner
Compensation Methods

•

Monitoring Investments

•

Client Acceptance and
Continuance Policies

•

New Service Line Acceptance
Policies

•

Independence List (Client
Securities)

•

Consultation Requirements

•

Audit Team Disagreement
Resolution Process

•

Separate National Consultation
Function

•

Partner Rotation

•

Second Partner Review

•

Internal Inspection Programs

•

Audit Quality Review

•

Analysis of Litigation
Experience

•

Internal Disciplinary Actions

•

Peer Review

•

QCIC Review (Audit Failures)
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These safeguards, which reflect firms’ efforts to implement and expand upon
independence standards set by the profession, enable firms to manage effectively any
independence risks that may arise.

The general success of these firm-level safeguards in

protecting and enhancing auditor independence is demonstrated by the fact that QCIC inquiries
in connection with alleged audit failures have identified no cases where independence was
compromised, and that peer reviews rarely, if ever, identify significant independence concerns.
The profession, through the AICPA, has also developed a body of independence
guidelines that apply to audits (of both public and non-public entities) performed by members.
In so doing, the AICPA has stated that public confidence in the independence of auditors would
be “impaired by evidence that independence was actually lacking,” and might also be impaired
“by the existence of circumstances which reasonable people might believe likely to influence
independence.”76 The AICPA’s independence guidelines comprise over 50 pages of rules,
interpretations and ethics rulings. In addition, since 1990, AICPA member firms that audit
public entities must belong to the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section, which imposes quality control
requirements that, among other things, protect independence. In general, the restrictions set forth
in the AICPA’s guidelines are less stringent than the Commission’s.77 Auditors of public

76

Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, Independence, AU § 220.03.

77

For example, Section 602.02.g of the CODIFICATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES, 7 Fed. Sec. L.

Rep. (CCH) 73,272, at 62,905 (1997), states that auditors of public companies should not enter into
“[d]irect and material indirect business relationships” with their clients or their affiliates. The SEC has
interpreted this rule as precluding an accounting firm from entering into a prime/subcontractor arrangement
with an audit client (or vice versa) to provide services to unrelated third parties, regardless of the
materiality of the arrangement to the firm or its client. See, e.g., Letter from Clarence H. Staubs, Ass’t
Chief Accountant, Securities & Exchange Commission to A. Clayton Ostlund, Touche Ross & Co. (May
18, 1981). In comparison, AICPA guidelines prohibit a member from entering into a “cooperative
arrangement” with a client only if it is “material to the member’s firm or to the client.” See Interpretation
101-12 under the AICPA Code o f Professional Conduct, ET § 101.14.
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companies, however, must comply with both SEC and AICPA requirements and, therefore, are
held to the most restrictive standard.
E.

Relative Advantages and Disadvantages of Today’s Approach
The approach to assuring independence which has arisen over the past few

decades is characterized by a proliferation of miscellaneous, detailed interpretations reflecting
the views of the SEC, the SEC Staff, and the AICPA.

This “rule-oriented” approach to

independence provides two benefits. First, it gives clear guidance in some situations.

For

example, extensive guidance is provided on direct and material indirect financial interests in
audit clients, and on permissible activities for retired partners of accounting firms.78 Some
practitioners, therefore, may take comfort in their ability to rely on the detailed guidelines that
exist in these areas. Second, as described above, today’s approach has fostered the adoption by
accounting firms of numerous safeguards designed to ensure independence. Recognizing the
advantages of today’s system, the OCA concluded in 1994 that additional rules were not
necessary to protect independence.79

Nevertheless, the current system has a number of

shortcomings and needs improvement.
First, current requirements are not clearly derived from any underlying set of established
principles considered necessary to protect the public interest in reliable financial statements.
Rather, they represent an assortment of interpretations issued since the 1930s. The absence of

78

See Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02.b (financial interests), 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 73,258, at 62,886 (1997), and § 602.02.f (retired partners), 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,271, at
62,903 (1997).

79

Securities & Exchange Commission, Office of the Chief Accountant, Staff Report
Independence 55 (1994).
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on

Auditor

any clear, consistent rationale undermines the current rules and, in many respects, renders them
arbitrary.
Second, current requirements are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive in scope. They
are under-inclusive insofar as they tend to foster compliance with specific rules, rather than
adherence to an underlying set of core independence principles. They are over-inclusive insofar
as they proscribe more activity than reasonably necessary to ensure that audits are in fact
performed with integrity and objectivity.80
Third, current requirements are based on assumptions that, in many cases, are now
outdated.81 Examples of such assumptions include those relating to (i) the types of services that
corporate clients “customarily” look to professional service firms to provide;82 (ii) the manner in
which companies generate financial data and prepare financial statements;83 (iii) the size and

80

For example, prohibiting a firm from auditing a public entity in which any member of the firm has any
direct interest - material or immaterial - proscribes significantly more activity than necessary to ensure
independence in fact.

81

While all independence standards rest upon assumptions as to whether an individual will act with sufficient
objectivity in a particular situation, such assumptions should arise out of the profession’s actual experience,
as well as from study of the incentives and disincentives that shape the behavior of auditors.

82

For example, § 602.02.c.i of the CODIFICATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)¶ 73,263, at 62,890 (1997), notes that independent public accountants “often advise management
and offer professional advice on matters dealing with financial operations,” but asserts that an accountant
may lack independence when a client appears to be “substantially dependent upon the accountant’s skill
and judgment in its financial operations,” rather than “reliant only to the extent of the customary type o f
consultation or advice” (emphasis added). As a result, when accounting firms are requested to provide
non-audit services in connection with new business or technological developments that affect their clients,
questions may arise as to whether the services represent a “customary” type of consultation or advice.

83

Companies today rely upon increasingly sophisticated, state-of-the-art computer and data processing
systems to generate financial data and prepare financial statements. The Commission’s independence
requirements that bear upon the scope of an accountant’s permissible assistance with clients’ computer and
data processing systems and operations, however, are derived from a 1972 release that dealt primarily with
“bookkeeping” services and addresses such issues as whether an auditor’s independence would be impaired
if he or she transmitted computer tapes to a “service bureau” on behalf of a client for processing. See §
602.02.C of the Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,263, at
62,890 (1997).
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internal organization of accounting firms, which today can range from sole practitioners to firms
with thousands of widely dispersed personnel;84 (iv) family relationships, including certain
assumptions reflecting a gender-based bias concerning the participation of women in the
workplace;85 and (v) the idea that geographic separation (i.e., physical distance alone) between
an accountant and a relative connected with an audit client is a significant factor in determining
whether the relative could exert an improper influence over the accountant.86

These

assumptions, which no longer reflect the reality of increasing organizational sophistication and
current technology in the areas of management information systems, communications and travel,
hinder effective responses to market demand for increased professional services.

84

Under current AICPA requirements and the laws of many states, accounting firms may establish
subsidiaries or affiliates that provide non-audit services to clients and engage in other activities. The SEC’s
independence rule (Rule 2-01), however, does not acknowledge that accounting firms may have affiliates
or subsidiaries that engage in activities different from those of the accounting firms, nor does Rule 2-01
expressly indicate whether the Commission’s independence requirements apply to such entities. 17 C.F.R.
§ 210.2-01 (1997).

85

For example, the SEC’s independence requirements on “family relationships” provide that the
Commission’s “restrictions * * * against [an accountant’s] holding official positions and associations with
the client * * * are also applicable to relatives of the accountant in varying degrees depending on the
closeness of the relationship” and that the “relationships of an accountant’s immediate family or other
dependent relatives with an audit client generally would be ascribed to the accountant and would
accordingly impair his or his firm ’s independence with respect to that client.” Codification of Financial
Reporting Policies § 602.02.h, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,273, at 62,908 (1997) (emphasis added).
These requirements date back decades and were drafted at a time when women only infrequently held
senior positions at accounting firms or client organizations. This situation no longer exists, as a result of
which the SEC’s requirements may serve to limit the career opportunities of both men and women whose
spouses hold positions of responsibility at an accounting firm or a firm client, even if the spouse employed
by the accounting firm plays no role in the audit o f the other spouse’s company.

86

The SEC’s requirements addressing family relationships provide that “[t]here would be a presumption of
impairment of independence when * * * close relatives of the accountant [not in the accountant’s
immediate family] * * * hold important positions with a client,” but that the impairment could be mitigated
“where there is adequate geographical separation of the accountant from the relative and the audit
engagement to preclude the possibility of contacts and influence that could cause a conclusion that the
accountant’s or his firm’s independence appeared to be impaired.” Id. As discussed in Section IV, this
restriction is no longer meaningful in today’s world in which geographical separation has so little impact
on an accountant’s ability to communicate with relatives and other persons.
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Fourth, the existence of separate SEC and AICPA independence requirements, all of
which apply to auditors of public companies, is burdensome and confusing, and raises
compliance costs. For example, the distinctions between AICPA and SEC requirements may
create hardships where, in the years immediately before a company first issues shares to the
public, its auditors have also provided services — such as data processing assistance — that are
permissible under AICPA standards but not under SEC requirements.87 In this situation, the
company might not be able to continue its relationship with its auditors when it goes public. If
the SEC Staff challenges the audit firm’s independence, the company may be required to retain a
new firm to “re-audit” its prior financial statements.
Fifth, the existence of detailed independence requirements in the United States
exacerbates the conflicts that exist between U.S. and foreign independence standards, at a time
when auditors’ reports are increasingly used in cross-border transactions.88 The multitude of
rules makes it difficult to harmonize U.S. independence requirements with those of other

87

Compare Interpretation 101-3 under the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, ET § 101.05, with the more
restrictive position set forth in Section 602.02.C of the Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, 7
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶73,263, at 62,890 (1997).

88

Increasing numbers of foreign companies are offering securities in the United States. Between 1981 and
1986, foreign debt and equity issues offered in the U.S. increased from approximately $4.4 billion to $6.4
billion. See Report of the Staff of the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission to the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs and the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on the
Internationalization of the Securities Markets, at 1-4 (1987). Between 1990 and 1993, foreign
companies registered approximately $95 billion of securities with the SEC. See Simplification o f
Registration and Reporting Requirements for Foreign Companies:
Safe Harbors for Public
Announcements of Unregistered Offerings and Broker-Dealer Research Reports, Securities Act Release
No. 7029, [1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,252, at 84,683 (Nov. 3, 1993). As of
October 1996, more than 850 foreign companies from 47 countries had registered securities with the
Commission. See Remarks of the Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities & Exchange
Commission William R. McLucas, “Self Regulation, Consulting Services and Auditor Independence,” 24th
Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (Dec. 10, 1996).
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nations.89 The SEC has recognized that differing auditor independence standards create an
impediment to multi-jurisdictional offerings and international capital formation,90 and is
currently participating in the efforts of the International Federation of Accountants (“IFAC”) and
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) to harmonize international
accounting, auditing, and independence requirements.91

A more principled approach to

independence would facilitate these harmonization efforts.92
Sixth, the SEC’s independence requirements fail to respond to the accelerating pace of
technological change and the corresponding emergence of a variety of business relationships
between business entities. These relationships involve alliances in which the special skills and
expertise of one entity are combined with complementary skills or resources of another to bring
to the market a range of professional services.

Current SEC requirements permit such

89

Nevertheless, the SEC applies its independence requirements to auditors of all SEC registrants, even
though audits of large multinational clients and the growing number of non-U.S. registrants may be
performed by many different foreign firms in addition to U.S.-based firms.

90

See Regulation o f International Securities Markets, Securities Act Release No. 6807, [1988-1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶84,341 at 89,576, 89,578 (Nov. 14, 1988) (“Differences in auditing
standards and auditor independence standards also present obstacles to achieving a mutually acceptable
worldwide disclosure regime.”).
The SEC has also made numerous statements recognizing the importance of harmonization of accounting
and auditing standards generally. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Commission, Office of the Chief
Accountant, Staff Report on A uditor Independence, at 47 (1994); Remarks of the Chairman,
Securities & Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, “The Accountant’s Critical Eye,” 24th Annual National
Conference on SEC Developments, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Washington, D.C.
(Dec. 10, 1996).

91

See Securities & Exchange Commission, Office of the Chief Accountant, STAFF REPORT ON A uditor
Independence, at 47-48 (1994).

92

In its recent Green Paper on the role of the statutory auditor, the European Commission noted that
“agreement on a common core of essential principles” would constitute “an important step” in developing
harmonized European standards of auditor independence. See European Commission, The Role, the
Position and the Liability of the Statutory auditor Within the European Union § 4.16 (1996).
The identification of essential principles would facilitate the establishment of a basic framework from
which individual nations would derive specific rules.
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relationships between accounting firms and audit clients only if they are “indirect” and
“immaterial.”93 Yet many direct business relationships pose little, if any, threat to independence,
particularly in light of the safeguards described above.94 As discussed further in Section III, the
indiscriminate proscription of such relationships prevents accounting firms and their clients from
achieving important efficiencies and responding to market demands for integrated services.
Finally, the current system reflects a proliferation of independence interpretations based
in large part upon concerns regarding the need to maintain the appearance of independence.95
While the accounting profession itself recognizes the importance of avoiding “relationships that
may appear to impair [an auditor’s] objectivity,”96 the proliferation of “appearance-based”

93

See Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02.g (prohibiting auditors of public
companies from entering into “[d]irect and material indirect business relationships” with their clients or
persons associated with their clients in a decision-making capacity, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶73,272, at
62,905 (1997)).

94

The indiscriminate treatment of business relationships is perhaps best exemplified by the SEC’s blanket
prohibition of prime/subcontractor arrangements between accounting firms and audit clients. In
comparison, AICPA guidelines prohibit such arrangements only if they are material to the firm or the
client. Id.

95

See, e.g., Scope o f Services by Independent Accountants, Accounting Series Release No. 264, 17 SEC
Docket (CCH) 877, 880, n.14 (June 14, 1979) (in which the SEC asserted that the specific restrictions set
forth in Rule 2-01(b) reflect its position that “[cjertain situations exist where the potential for an
appearance of a conflict of interest is so great that the Commission or the profession has prohibited them”)
(emphasis added); Section 602.02.C of the CODIFICATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES (justifying
restrictions on the performance of certain bookkeeping and related professional services for audit clients on
the grounds that they would cause an accountant “to develop, or appear to develop, a mutuality of interest
with his client which would differ only in degree, but not in kind, from that of an employee”) 7 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶73,263, at 62,890 (1997) (emphasis added); Section 602.02.e.i of the CODIFICATION OF
Financial Reporting Policies (stating that accountants may not engage in other occupations in addition
to public accounting where “the relationships and activities customarily associated with [the] occupation
are not compatible with the auditor’s appearance of complete objectivity”) 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
73,267, at 62,903 (1997) (emphasis added); Section 604.01 of the Codification of Financial Reporting
Policies (noting that the SEC’s review in the 1970s of the performance by accountants of management
advisory services for their audit clients reflected concerns that “accountants who performed such services
could, or could appear, to have a conflict of interest which would impair their independence”) 7 Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,295, at 62,921 (1997) (emphasis added).

96

See AICPA Code of Professional Conduct, Objectivity and Independence, ET § 55.01.
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standards has many shortcomings. These include apparent broadening of the original focus in
Rule 2-01 on independence in fact, susceptibility to subjective application, and the difficulty of
discerning the perceptions of financial statement users.97 These drawbacks are described below.
F.

The Problem of Appearance-Based Regulation
The present approach to appearance-based regulation of auditor independence

creates a number of difficulties. As an initial matter, the promulgation of appearance-based
standards arguably is inconsistent with the SEC’s only substantive rule on independence, Rule 201 of Regulation S-X, which establishes as its standard only independence “in fact.” Having
purported to exercise its statutory rulemaking authority when it adopted and subsequently
amended Rule 2-01, the Commission (and its Staff) may not issue appearance-based
“interpretations” of Rule 2-01 that effectively redefine, rather than simply interpret, the rule,
without at least undertaking rulemaking procedures. Even then, questions would arise as to the
Commission’s legal authority to propose an appearance-based standard under the federal
securities laws, since the legislative history of those laws suggests that Congress understood the
concept of “independence” to refer to independence “in fact” when they were adopted.98

More fundamentally, appearance-based regulation is limited by the notorious inaccuracy of perceptions.
By perception alone, for example, it was hardly unreasonable for the ancients to suppose that the sun
revolved around the earth. Only when armed with sophisticated instruments could scientists refute this
perception. See Gary Orren, The Appearance Standard for Auditor Independence: What We Know and
Should Know, Oct. 20, 1997, at 2-3 (hereinafter “Orren Report”), attached as Appendix A.
98

As a matter of statutory construction, the Supreme Court has held that terms used in a statute are to be
construed in accordance with their ordinary meaning at the time the statute was adopted, unless expressly
defined to the contrary in the statute. See, e.g., Securities Industry A ss’n v. Bd. o f Governors, 468 U.S.
137, 149 (1984). Accordingly, the SEC may be precluded from adopting and enforcing appearance-based
independence standards.
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Another widely acknowledged problem with all appearance-based standards is their
susceptibility to subjective application. For example, the American Bar Association feared that
an “appearance of impropriety” standard would cause disciplinary proceedings against attorneys
to degenerate “from the determination of the fact issues specified by the rule into a determination
on an instinctive, ad hoc, or even ad hominem basis.”99 Accordingly, the ABA declined to adopt
the appearance of impropriety standard in its Model Rules of Professional Conduct, considering
it too vague and subjective to serve as the express test of lawyer misconduct.100 The ease with
which nebulous allegations of appearance-based violations can be made may ultimately breed
cynicism and distrust, costs that far exceed any reasonably anticipatable benefits.101
As noted by Gary Edwards in his report appended as Appendix D:
Not only is it difficult to assess how particular conduct will be
viewed by an individual or group, but even the logically prior
question of identifying the relevant community of observers poses
a formidable challenge. Whose opinion should count? Even more
to the point, whose opinion counts so heavily that society should
tolerate the cost of “false positives,” that is, of barring situations
that might appear to be ethical problems but in fact are not?
Even in the context of government service, where the need to
maintain public confidence presumably is at its peak,
commentators have criticized too great a focus upon appearances

99

ABA Comm, on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 342, n.17 (1985), quoted in Peter W.
Morgan, The Appearance o f Propriety: Ethics Reform and the Blifil Paradoxes, 44 STAN. L. REV. 593,
602 (1992).

100

See 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, THE Law OF LAWYERING § 1.7:101, at 224 (2d ed.
1997); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts o f Interest from the Administration o f Justice: Conflicts of Interest
and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Government Act, 79 GEO. L. J. 1, 56 (1990) (citations
omitted).

101

In a recent book, the authors argue that reigning ethical standards — the appearance of impropriety —
result in public cynicism in spite of a seemingly obsessive attention to proper conduct. See Peter W.
Morgan and Glenn H. Reynolds, The Appearance of Impropriety in America: H ow the Ethics Wars
Have Undermined A merican Government, Business, and Society (1997).
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and noted the need to appropriately limit the use of appearancebased ethics rules for past and present government employees.
Thus, for example, when the Office of Government Ethics (OGE)
promulgated Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the
Executive Branch in 1992, it explicitly chose to adopt a
“reasonable person” test.102

In short, appearance-based regulation of auditor independence requires a regulator to
substitute his own judgment as to the appearance of particular types of relationships and services
for that of fully informed, reasonable users of financial statements, or, alternatively, to engage in
the difficult task of attempting to discern what such users perceive. While researchers have
attempted to identify the types of relationships and services that create appearance issues in the
eyes of some survey participants, most of the empirical studies on the perceptions of financial
statement users conclude that the performance of non-audit services by accounting firms for audit
clients has minimal impact on users’ perceptions of auditor independence.103 If regulation is to
continue on the basis of appearance, it will be necessary to determine the actual perceptions of
reasonable users of financial statements on a basis that utilizes relevant professional
methodologies.
G.

Proposed Research Methodology
As described more fully in Appendix A to this White Paper,104 a sophisticated

research methodology intended to capture perceptions of auditor independence might provide a

102

See Gary Edwards, Auditor Independence Through Self-Regulation and Professional Ethics, Oct. 20, 1997,
at 23-24 (hereinafter “EDWARDS REPORT”), attached as Appendix D (citations omitted). See also, ORREN
Report, supra note 97, at 12.

103

See Orren Report, supra note 97, at 2.

104

See Orren Report, supra note 97.
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principled basis for making regulatory judgments regarding the appearance of independence.
Such a design must recognize that public opinion on any issue cannot reliably be captured in a
single question. Rather, the determination of public perceptions requires a multifaceted approach
— a variety of questions asked in different ways at various times.
First, the methodology should incorporate several means of data collection, including (i)
traditional surveys such as mail questionnaires and telephone surveys, (ii) experimental designs
that isolate the effects of various factors, (iii) focus groups to uncover nuances that elude mass
surveys, and (iv) aggregate data studies that focus on individuals’ behavior rather than
perceptions.
Second, the methodology should feature several “dependent” and “independent”
variables.

The dependent variables, or key questions, would examine (i) confidence in the

independence of auditors generally and auditors who provide non-audit services, specifically, (ii)
perceptions of financial statement accuracy and reliability, and (iii) discretionary decision
making by financial statement users. Independent variables, or background factors, would help
explain how users of financial statements arrive at their perceptions. Factors such as the type of
non-audit service, the materiality of the non-audit engagement or relationship, and the period of
association between the accounting firm and the audit client would be included.
Third, a diverse sample of financial statement users should be surveyed, including
financial analysts, lenders, insurers, fund managers, shareholders, and audit firm clients.
Particularly important would be the opinions of sophisticated market participants who depend on
financial information to make real-world decisions.
Finally, data should be collected at regular intervals. This feature would ensure that
research results reflect the evolving experience of accountants, clients and third parties.
-4 7 -

Perception is not static; any realistic system of determining appearance must reflect the dynamic
impact of a continuous flow of information about financial statements, the role of audit firms and
actual experience.
The intersection of these four methodologies would yield an accurate picture of public
perceptions of auditor independence. This research design, therefore, would enable regulators to
assess the need for appearance-based regulation. It would also provide, if appropriate, proper
underpinnings for such regulation.
H.

The Misplaced Regulatory Focus on the Performance of Non-Audit Services
One area where the existing approach to independence has created serious

difficulties for both the profession and those who utilize its services is the area of non-audit
services.105 The SEC has declined to propose rules “to proscribe particular [management
advisory] services,”106 and has “expressly recognized” that the benefits resulting from the
performance of management advisory services (“MAS”) by accountants for audit clients “could
be significant in many cases.”107 Nevertheless, other statements included in SEC independence
requirements raise questions as to whether the performance of certain types of MAS complies
with the Commission’s requirements. For example, some of the language in Section 602.02.C of

105

Certain types of traditional non-audit services, in particular tax services, have not been the focus of
independence-related concerns. For this reason, this White Paper normally will address non-tax non-audit
services when dealing with the topic of “non-audit services.”

106

Codification of Financial Reporting Policies §604.01, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,295, at
62,921 (1997). See also, Securities & Exchange Commission Report to Congress, The A cco u n tin g
P rofession a n d the C o m m issio n ’s O versight R ole (Aug. 1980) at 12 (stating that “the Commission * * *
consciously determined not to proscribe particular types of MAS engagements”).

107

Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 604.02, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
62,922(1997).
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73,296, at

the Codification may invite questions as to whether an accountant is providing a “customary”
type of consulting service, assuming managerial responsibilities, or exercising decision-making
responsibility.108 Moreover, SEC representatives have made speeches in recent years raising
questions as to the propriety of the performance of non-audit services for audit clients.109 Yet
empirical research, history and current experience all suggest that such questions create

108

Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02.c.i provides in part that:
[M]anagerial and decision-making functions are the responsibility of the client and not of the
independent accountant. * * * [M]anagerial responsibility begins when the accountant becomes,
or appears to become, so identified with the client’s management as to be indistinguishable from
it. In making a determination of whether this degree of identification has been reached, the
basic consideration is whether, to a third party, the client appears to be (i) substantially
dependent upon the accountant’s skill and judgment in its financial operations, or (ii) reliant
only to the extent of the customary type of consultation or advice.
§ 602.02.c.i., 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,263, at 62,890 (1997). This restriction is based on the
Commission’s view that “[i]f the independent accountant were to perform functions of this nature, he
would develop, or appear to develop, a mutuality of interest with his client which would differ only in
degree, but not in kind, from that of an employee,” in which case “it may be logically inferred that the
accountant’s professional judgment toward the particular client might be prejudiced in that he would, in
effect, be auditing the results of his own work.” Id.

109

See Remarks of the Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, “The Accountant’s
Critical Eye,” 24th Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 1996) (“[t]wo recent private sector studies
expressed concern that auditing firms are becoming more focused on consulting and other services, at the
expense of the audit function. I share those concerns. The auditing function should be the very soul of the
public accounting profession - not a loss-leader retained as a foot in the door for higher-fee consulting
services”); Remarks of the Director, Securities & Exchange Commission Division of Enforcement,
William R. McLucas, “Self Regulation, Consulting Services and Auditor Independence,” 24th Annual
National Conference on Current SEC Developments, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 1996) (“because accounting as a discipline embodies so much judgment, the
seduction of the accounting profession to ‘lean’, if not ‘bow’ to the pressure of the clients and, indeed, the
firm’s own economic interests, will escalate dramatically. That is why the complex of entanglements with
the clients poses such a subtle, but clear, threat”); Remarks of the Chief Accountant, Securities & Exchange
Commission, Michael H. Sutton, “Auditor Independence: The Challenge of Fact and Appearance,”
Meeting of the American Accounting Association (Aug. 14, 1996) (“[a]t what point does the auditor
become so involved in the success of the company and its management - as a consultant or an advisor or a
provider of a variety of newer services - that there is a risk that private interests might be placed ahead of
those of investors, or that the public will perceive it that way?”); Remarks of the Chief Accountant,
Securities & Exchange Commission, Michael H. Sutton, 1996 AICPA Conference on Current SEC
Developments, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 1996) (“[a]uditor independence issues continue to receive a lot
of attention, particularly issues relating to perceptions about auditor independence as the result of providing
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confusion and unnecessary uncertainty as to the permissibility of the services that firms can
offer.

1.

There is No Evidence that the Performance of Non-Audit
Services by Accounting Firms for Audit Clients Impairs
Independence in Fact.
Study groups including the Cohen Commission, the POB, the major

accounting firms, the AICPA’s Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for
Certified Public Accountants (the “Anderson Committee”), the Treadway Commission and the
SEC Staff have examined the potential effect on the auditor-client relationship of accounting
firms’ performance of non-audit services for audit clients.110 According to the United States
General Accounting Office (“GAO”), “[n]one of these studies reported any conclusive evidence
of diminished audit quality or harm to the public interest, or any actual impairment of auditor
independence, as a consequence of public accounting firms providing advisory or consulting
services to their audit clients.”**111

Similarly, former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman

certain non-audit services to audit clients, and the impacts on auditor independence of certain business
relationships, financial arrangements, organizational structures, and so on”).
110

See AICPA, THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS’ RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT, CONCLUSIONS AND
Recommendations (Cohen Commission), 1978; AICPA, Scope of Services by CPA Firms, Report of
the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section, Division for CPA Firms, Mar. 1979; The FUTURE
R elevance, Reliability, and Credibility of Financial Information, Recommendations to the
AICPA Board of Directors by Seven Major Accounting Firms, Apr. 1986; AICPA RESTRUCTURING
Professional Standards to Achieve Professional Excellence in a Changing Environment,
Report of the Special Committee on Standards of Professional Conduct for Certified Public Accountants
(Anderson Committee), Apr. 1986; and Report of the N ational Commission on Fraudulent
Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission), Oct. 1987; Securities & Exchange Commission, Office of
the Chief Accountant, Staff Report on Auditor Independence (1994).

111

1996 GAO Report, supra note 68, at 41-42. Consistent with the GAO report is the statement of POB
Chairman A.A. Sommer, Jr. in 1986 that there is no known “instance in which it can be demonstrated that
the provision of [management advisory services] to an audit client interfered with independence in
performing the audit function.” Public Perceptions o f Management Advisory Services Performed by CPA
Firms for Audit Clients, Report prepared for Public Oversight Board, SEC Practice Section, Division for
CPA Firms, AICPA, by Audits & Surveys, Inc., 1986.
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recently observed that “a prohibitive approach focusing on the provision of non-audit services to
audit clients * * * appears to be wholly without any empirical support indicating any lack of
objectivity in fact resulting from the provision of non-audit services to audit clients.”112 Given
this lack of evidence, one reasonably can question the continued utility of many of the current,
appearance-based requirements. As Wallman has said, “[i]f we keep saying that we must guard
against appearances being tainted even though there is no tainting in fact, then we confuse the
public and * * * promote bad public policy.”113
2.

ASR No. 250 and ASR No. 264 Indicate an Absence of Investor
Concern Over Non-Audit Services.
The SEC adopted two releases in 1978 and 1979 which raised questions

about public companies’ engagement of auditors to provide non-audit services. The first of these
releases, Accounting Series Release No. 250 (“ASR No. 250”), generally required public
companies to disclose in their proxy statements: (i) the percentage of fees for non-audit services
in relation to the audit fee, (ii) whether the board of directors or its audit committee had approved
such non-audit services, and (iii) in instances where the percentage for a particular non-audit
service exceeded 3% of the audit fee, the percentage for that specific service.114 The subsequent
release, Accounting Series Release No. 264 (“ASR No. 264”), cautioned that “the impact on
auditor independence of potential MAS engagements should be of direct concern to the issuer

112

Wallman, supra note 10, at 92. Moreover, Wallman observed that, given all the attention focused on
“nontraditional activities” and the appearance of independence, “there should have been some data to
support this concern if it is to continue to be held out as a significant issue.” Id. at 79 n.5 (emphasis in
original).

113

Id. at 79.

114

Accounting Series Release No. 250, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,272, at
62,739 (June 20, 1978) (item 8(g) in proxy statement).
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and especially its independent audit committee.”115 In addition, ASR No. 264 set out four
general factors to guide auditors in determining whether their independence would be impaired
by providing a non-audit service, and indicated that an auditor should provide such service only
if “none of the factors tilts strongly against performance of the non-audit work involved.”116
The net effect of these two releases was to impose an additional cost upon those public
companies that had to assess and report the relative significance of non-audit fees,117 and,
especially after ASR No. 264 urged managements and audit committees “to give careful attention
to the performance of non-audit services for audit clients,”118 to put public companies on notice
that the SEC viewed non-audit engagements as potentially impairing auditor independence.
However, less than four years after the adoption of the disclosure requirements mandated by
ASR No. 250, the Commission withdrew them.119 Concurrent with its proposal to withdraw the
disclosure requirements, the Commission rescinded ASR No. 264.120

115

Accounting Series Release No. 264, supra note 95, at 885. Audit committees, boards of directors, and
managements were encouraged to consider criteria for potential non-tax non-audit engagements in four
areas: (i) the degree of economic benefit from the provision of non-tax non-audit services, (ii) the need to
avoid having the auditor supplant management’s role, (iii) the need to avoid self-review by the auditor, and
(iv) the auditor’s financial dependence upon management advisory fees. Id. at 885-886.

116

Id. at 884. Auditors were to consider the following four factors, many of which are similar to the criteria
that clients were to consider: (i) the auditor’s financial dependence upon management advisory fees, (ii)
the need to avoid having the auditor supplant management’s role, (iii) the need to avoid self-review, and
(iv) impact upon an audit’s quality. Id. at 881-883. Again, this release did not apply to tax-related non
audit services.

117

See comment letters to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange Commission re: supporting rescission
on grounds of cost from Astrid Pfeiffer, Florida Power & Light Company (Oct. 22, 1981); from J.K.
Ramsey, The Timken Company (Nov. 16, 1981); and from Richard Koch, Whirlpool Corporation (Nov.
24, 1981).

118

Accounting Series Release No. 264, supra note 95, at 880.

119

See Accounting Series Release No. 304, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶72,326
(Jan. 28, 1982); see also, Accounting Series Release No. 296, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
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The experience regarding the disclosure of non-audit services in the wake of these
releases is noteworthy because it demonstrates the actual degree to which relevant communities
of real stakeholders (e.g., investors, audit committees, company management) reacted to
information regarding the provision of non-audit services to audit clients.

With regard to

investors, for example, an empirical investigation of shareholder reaction to the proxy disclosure
mandated by ASR No. 250 found that auditor approval ratios were unaffected by the availability
of information regarding auditors’ provision of non-audit services.120121 This finding confirms the
widespread anecdotal evidence which led the SEC to conclude that detailed information
regarding non-audit services was “not generally of sufficient utility to investors to justify
continuation of the disclosure requirement.”122
It is also significant that, after three proxy seasons, over two-thirds of those who
commented on the SEC’s subsequent proposal to eliminate the ASR No. 250 disclosure
supported its elimination. Not only were most of the comments supporting rescission received
from public companies, but various comments by these corporations specifically noted the lack

Rep. (CCH) ¶72,318, at 62,934 (Aug. 20, 1981) (inviting comments on whether the disclosure rule should
be withdrawn).
120

See Accounting Series Release No. 297, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,319, at
62,941 (Aug. 20, 1981).

121

See G. William Glezen and James A. Millar, An Empirical Investigation o f Stockholder Reaction to
Disclosures Required by ASR No. 250, 23 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 859 (1985). As an absolute matter, auditor
approval ratios are always high, but relative changes can be statistically significant. No statistically
significant relationship was found between non-tax non-audit services and declining auditor approval
ratios. Id. at 869. See also, Letter from Charles Schwartz, United States Steel Corporation to George
Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange Commission (Oct. 13, 1981). Indeed, the direction of change over
the proxy seasons studied, though statistically insignificant, was toward higher rates of shareholder
approval of auditor renewals. See Glezen and Millar, at 869.

122

Accounting Series Release No. 304, supra note 119, at 62,985; see also, Accounting Series Release No.
296, supra note 119.
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of investor interest in information regarding auditor provision of non-audit services.123 By
contrast, almost all of the comments supporting ASR No. 250 were from commercial competitors
of the accounting firms, such as management and data processing consultants. The SEC found
that those competitors’ “claims of shareholder interest in the non-audit service disclosure [were]
outweighed by the absence of evidence that investors want or use the disclosure.”124 Thus,
experience suggests not only that investors were not concerned about the provision of non-audit
services by auditors, but also that the perception that investors consider non-audit services
inconsistent with auditor independence is not well-grounded.125
It is also revealing that managements and audit committees of public companies did not,
in the aggregate, change significantly the mix and volume of non-audit services provided by their
auditors, even in the face of ASR No. 250 and ASR No. 264 (and even though incurring an
additional, albeit minor, cost in connection with preparation of their proxy statements). For
example, one study concluded that, based on the 1979 and 1980 proxy seasons, “[f]or total non

123

See, e.g., Letters to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange Commission, from Michael F. Mee,
Monsanto (Nov. 25, 1981); from D.E. Rose, New England Electric (Nov. 30, 1981); from P. Blaine
Clemens, Lukens Steel Company (Nov. 25, 1981); and from C. J. Lause, Mobil Corporation (Nov. 13,
1981). Monsanto, for example, noted in 1981 that it “has not received a single question from analysts or
investors about our disclosures.” Certain accounting firms also noted the clear lack of investor interest in
this area; for example, KMG Main Hurdman stated that “nothing has come to our attention which would
indicate that the information required to be set forth * * * has been used effectively by investors, analysts,
or other interested parties.” Letter from Main Hurdman to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange
Commission (Oct. 12, 1981).

124

Accounting Series Release No. 304, supra note 119, at 62,987.

125

While it is true that this evidence relating to Accounting Series Release No. 250 is now almost twenty years
old, almost all of the studies that suggest there might be some investor concern regarding non-audit
services are at least as old. See Orren, supra, note 97, at 5 n.9. More recent studies suggest that the
investing public and other market participants do not view the provision of non-audit services as damaging
to the appearance of auditor independence, perhaps because the later studies applied improved
methodologies and/or because market participants may have become more informed about, and
comfortable with, these non-audit services. Id. at 8.
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audit services and most specific non-audit services the major public accounting firms did not
significantly reduce the quantities provided to clients between years.”126 Thus, while ASR No.
264 created confusion in the marketplace, and in some instances may have discouraged
individual registrants from retaining their auditors to perform useful non-audit services, its
overall impact was muted.127 The fact that the extent to which auditors were asked to provide
non-audit services did not change significantly not only confirms the lack of pressure from
investors (regarding appearance-based concerns), but also underscores the economic benefits that
managers and directors perceive to exist in connection with the auditors’ provision of non-audit
services128 (as discussed more fully in Section III below).
3.

Insurers Today Perceive No Independence Problem Associated with
Non-Audit Services.
There currently is no reason to believe that non-audit services being

performed today raise different issues or pose a greater risk to independence than the types of
services performed by auditors in the past. Significantly, neither insurance brokers nor insurance
companies — entities with particular interest in potential liability issues — associate increased
liability risk with accounting firms that perform non-audit services for audit clients.129 If the
performance of such additional services were believed to, or did, impair independence, one

126

Jam es H . Scheiner, An Empirical Assessment o f the Impact of SEC Nonaudit Service Disclosure
Requirements on Independent Auditors and Their Clients, 22 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 789, 794 (A utum n 1984).

127

See Accounting Series Release No. 297, supra note 120, at 62,941.

128

Letter from Frank Gamevicus, MidLantic Banks, Inc. to George Fitzsimmons, Securities & Exchange
Commission (Nov. 19, 1981).

129

See Letter from Peter S. Christie, Vice Chairman, Aon Group Inc., to David E. Birenbaum, Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver & Jacobson (Oct. 8, 1997).
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would expect as a result flawed audits, increased litigation exposure and higher insurance
premiums, none of which has occurred.
Data on insurance claims made by the six largest U.S. accounting firms confirm the
absence of any increased liability exposure associated with the provision of non-audit services to
audit clients. The insurance broker for the six largest firms130 maintains a risk management
database that includes, among other things, information on 610 claims made by the firms.131 The
information is obtained from reports prepared by representatives of professional liability
underwriters insuring the firms.132 In only 24 of the 610 claims did underwriters’ representatives
note that an accounting firm provided management advisory services in addition to audit
services.133 This suggests that in the vast majority of cases, plaintiffs and underwriters’
representatives viewed management advisory services as unimportant or tangential to the alleged
audit failure. Plaintiffs appear to have alleged lack of independence in only five of the 24 cases
in which management advisory services were noted, and they asserted that such services
contributed to the alleged breach of independence in only three of those five cases.134 Thus, the
data reflect extremely few instances in which plaintiffs alleged lack of independence resulting

130

Minet, Inc. (“Minet”) is one of the top insurance brokers to the professional services industry worldwide,
and, in particular, places professional liability coverage for the Big Six accounting firms. Minet recently
was acquired by Aon Group, Inc.

131

These 610 claims comprise all claims of $1 million or more and certain other claims for which sufficient
information has been provided to permit analysis. See Letter from Barry A. Mathews, Senior Executive
Director, Minet, Inc., to David E. Birenbaum, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson (Oct. 10, 1997).

132

The information is subject to some interpretation and is not independently verified by the firms. Id.

133

Id. at 2.

134

Id.
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from the provision of non-audit services. Moreover, this leading insurance broker is aware of no
instance in which the provision of such services was acknowledged as contributing to a loss.135
Ironically, the federal government itself has not seen any need to restrict the type of non
audit services that accounting firms provide when they also provide auditing and accounting
services to the federal government. In this regard, the 1977 report by the Metcalf Committee
Staff recommended that the federal government retain accounting firms that act as independent
auditors only to perform auditing and accounting services, and not to perform MAS or other
consulting services.136 The federal government, however, took no action in response to this
recommendation.137
4.

Regulatory Focus on the Performance of Non-Audit Services
Obscures Independence Issues and Disserves the Public Interest.
Ultimately, criticism of the performance of non-audit services by

accounting firms may divert attention from more significant independence issues. As then-SEC
Commissioner Wallman recently noted, “significant attention is [already] focused on the impact
that non-audit services may have on auditor independence,” whereas less attention is directed to
the more direct independence implications that might arise if individual partners or officers of a
firm were to receive a material portion of their revenues, or derive their status within the firm,
from a single audit client.138

135

Id.

136

See1996 GAO Report, supra note 68, Appendix II, at 17.

137

Id.

138

Wallman, supra note 10, at 85.
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Moreover, limitations on the ability of accounting firms to perform non-audit services, or
even lingering concerns as to the permissibility of providing such services, may have
consequences that are both unintended and contrary to the public interest. One has to ask why
independence policies should favor, or even tolerate, this result, when, as explained further in
Section III:
•

the performance of a range of non-audit services aids the audit function by
improving client knowledge, increasing access to technical, industry and
general business skills, and enhancing the overall sophistication of the firm;

•

the ability of accounting firms to draw upon broader sources of revenues
should make the firms less dependent on any single client;

•

forcing firms to choose between the performance of audit and non-audit
services might foster the development of an environment in which the bulk of
audit work is handled by firms that are more dependent on fees from
individual audit clients and less equipped to perform complex audits; and

•

as indicated, there is no empirical evidence that the performance of non-audit
services for audit clients has any adverse effect on the quality of audits.

As these points demonstrate, regulatory concern over non-audit services is, at best, unfounded.
At worst, it is contrary to the public interest. A more principled framework that responds to the
real-world experience and incentives of accounting firms and individual accountants is both
needed and, as discussed in Sections IV and V of this White Paper, achievable.

III.

Economic and Other Determinants of Auditor Independence
As demonstrated in this Section, accounting firms’ stake in their reputational capital

provides a powerful incentive to safeguard independence. Further, the synergies and other
benefits derived from providing an array of non-audit services contribute importantly to audit
quality. This analysis also recognizes the problem of the “free rider” — the putative auditor who
may perceive an individual advantage in substandard conduct that risks the firm’s reputational
-5 8 -

captial.

Other non-economic determinants of auditor independence — organizational,

professional and ethical influences — reinforce these economic incentives. On the other side of
the ledger, the consequences of compromising independence, including exposure to massive
liability, and a host of other severe sanctions, provide real and effective constraints. A special
economic study of auditor independence provided by the Law and Economics Consulting Group
and located in Appendix B should be read in conjunction with to this Section.139
A.

The Economic Interest of Accounting Firms in Their Reputational Capital
Provides a Powerful Incentive to Safeguard Independence
Establishing the auditor-client relationship entails substantial start-up costs.140

This results in what economists refer to as a “bilateral” relationship — a situation where a single
buyer deals with a single seller.141 While the market for providing accounting services is
intensely competitive, once an auditor-client relationship has been established, the incumbent
firm has a significant advantage over other firms that lack the client-specific knowledge
developed in the course of the audit engagement.142 Reflecting that reality, an audit firm can

139

Law and Economics Consulting Group, An Economic Analysis o f Auditor Independence for a Multi-client,
Multi-service Public Accounting Firm (hereinafter “An ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE”
or “LECG Report”), Appendix B.

140

In exercising due professional care in the performance of an audit and the preparation of the audit report,
the auditor must learn a great deal about the client’s business. This, of course, is very costly.

141

Paul A. Samuelson & William D. Nordhaus, ECONOMICS 644 (12th ed. 1985) (hereinafter “ECONOMICS”).

142

To be sure, the market for renewals remains competitive, albeit tempered by the initial auditor’s advantage.
See, e.g., Daniel A. Levinthal and Mark Fichman, Dynamics o f Interorganizational Attachments: AuditorClient Relationships (hereinafter “A uditor-Client Relationships”) 33 Admin. Sci. Q. 345,346 (1988)
(client-specific investments in auditor-client relationships “tend not to be so great that they effectively
ensure the continuation of the relationship.”)
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expect to receive a return on its investment in client-specific knowledge over the life of the
stream of engagements.143 Economists refer to these returns as client-specific quasi-rents.144
Client-specific knowledge constitutes productive capital for the auditor, the returns from
which are captured through the provision of future audit and non-audit services.145 In the context
of an auditor with a single major client, part of the auditor’s capital may be said to be held
“hostage” to the relationship.146 This introduces the possibility of bias on the part of the auditor
— or improper influence on the part of the client147 — given the potential for losing the quasi
rents associated with this relationship. This model is applicable, however, only in the context of
an auditor who is financially dependent on a single client.
In the multi-client context, it is precisely the auditor’s drive to maintain relationships with
many clients — and thus to protect the multiple sources of its quasi-rents — that enhances and

143

See, e.g., id. at 345-69 (consistent with notions that assets specific to the auditor-client relationship develop
over time, the termination rate decreases both with measured audit complexity and time.)

144

See, e.g., Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Size and Audit Quality, 3 J. ACCT. & ECON. 183-189 (1981).

145

Initial competition among potential auditors to secure a relationship with a client may take the form of
below-cost pricing for the initial audit, a practice known as “lowballing.” Competition in the market for
initial audits results in lowballing, because the competitive price of the initial audit reflects not only the
cost of the initial audit, but also the value of future quasi-rents associated with the engagement. By
discounting the initial audit price, auditors are merely bidding for the future quasi-rents. See Linda
Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Independence, “Low Balling, ” and Disclosure Regulation, 3 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 113 (1981) at 113-15 (“Tow balling’ [on initial audit engagements] does not itself impair auditor
independence”).

146

This is an economic term of art and is not intended to have negative connotations. In some economic
contexts, the term “hostage” may refer to mechanisms employed to ensure integrity within an exchange
and safeguard against quality shading. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using
Hostages to Support Exchanges, 83 AM. ECON. Rev . 519 (1983) (hereinafter “ CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS”).
As is shown below, setting aside audit firms dependent on a single client, that is exactly the role clientspecific knowledge serves here. See also, Oliver E. Williamson, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF
Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting 180-82 (1985) (hereinafter “Economic
Institutions”).

147

Other things being equal, the greater the cost to the client of terminating the relationship, the less power the
client can wield over the auditor.
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reinforces its independence. Each and every one of these relationships represents an expected
flow of quasi-rents to the firm, all of which would be put at risk by compromising audit integrity
in the hope of preserving any particular audit client relationship. Whatever benefit may be
thought to flow from such substandard conduct would pale in comparison with the potential loss
of quasi-rents from other audit clients.148
In short, the very factor which may be thought to provide a threat to auditor independence
in the single client context — i.e., the existence of quasi-rents tied to the client — reinforces
independence in the multi-client context.149

The auditor confronts a certain economic

predicament with respect to each client — that while client-specific knowledge constitutes part
of the auditor’s productive capital, the auditor cannot obtain a return on that capital without that
client. In a multi-client context, however, the significance of this fact is reversed, because the
firm’s aggregate expected returns are not captive to a single client, but rather to all its clients.150
In other words, total expected return is tied to the firm’s reputation among a multitude of clients
(actual and potential). To protect its collective client-specific quasi-rents, the firm must protect
its reputation.

148

See An Economic Analysis of Auditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 16 (“[engaging
in an institutional-level abrogation of independence would put the firm’s entire stream of audit revenues at
risk.”).

149

See D. Jordan Lowe and Kurt Pany, CPA Performance o f Consulting Engagements with Audit Clients:
Effects on Financial Statement Users’ Perceptions and Decisions, 14 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 35
(Fall 1995) (“auditors, particularly those from large firms (i.e., Big Six firms), may be constrained not to
compromise their independence on a given client so as not to forfeit their quasi-rents from numerous other
audit clients.”) Id.

150

See, e.g., AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 16 (“an
abrogation of independence with one client threatens the revenue stream derived from the entire client
pool”).
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Clients have an obvious interest in hiring an audit firm with a solid reputation, which
serves to lower their cost of capital.151 From an economic perspective, an auditor acts as a
reputational intermediary, in essence “lending” its reputation to the client for this limited
purpose.152 If an audit firm fails to maintain a reputation for independent attest services, it
devalues one of its most valuable assets.153 Indeed, an auditor can protect its full array of client-

151

It should be noted, in this connection, that fully 94% of the companies traded on New York Stock
Exchange had audited financial statements before the enactment of the federal securities laws requiring that
they do so. See Arthur Andersen & Co., et al., THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING PROFESSION: MEETING THE
NEEDS OF a CHANGING WORLD 3 (Jan. 1991). See also, Christine A. Botoson, Disclosure Level and the
Cost o f Equity Capital, 72 ACCT. Rev . 323 (July 1997). The cost of capital is lowered through a reduction
in “information risk,” which is the risk to investors that information about the company is incorrect. As the
authors of Montgomery’s Auditing explain:
Reducing the information risk in financial information reduces the risk premium that must be paid
by an enterprise. This lowers the audited enterprise’s cost of capital, thereby promoting the
efficient allocation of scarce economic resources among competing uses.
Montgomery’s A uditing, supra note 59, at 13. See also, Financial Accounting Standards Board,
Statement of Financial A ccounting Concepts No . 1, Objectives o f Financial Reporting by Business
Enterprises 1011 (Nov. 1978) “[ i ]ndependent auditors commonly examine or review financial statements
* * * those who use that information often view an independent auditor’s opinion as enhancing [its]
reliability or credibility.”

152

See Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin, Symposium on the Law Firm as a Social Institution: Sharing
Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 Stan . L. Rev . 313 (1985) (hereinafter “Economic Inquiry”) (lawyers as reputational
intermediaries). Cf. Srikant M. Datar, Gerald A. Feltham, and John S. Hughes, The Role o f Audits and
Audit Quality in Valuing New Issues, 14 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 3 (1991) (in context of initial offerings, the
value of an audit increases as a function of audit quality while the demand for higher-quality audits
increases with firm-specific risk.)

153

Clients retain accounting firms for a broad array of services based on their reputations for objectivity,
professionalism and probity. While a reputation takes years to build, it can be lost very quickly. See, e.g.,
Arthur Andersen & Co., et al., The Public A ccounting Profession: Meeting the Needs of a
Changing World 13 (Jan. 1991) (“All services delivered under the umbrella of a public accounting firm
are subject to the same high professional standards of objectivity, integrity, competence and due
professional care required of audit services * * * Managements have come to expect this standard of
quality, and all service providers are increasingly held to the same high standard”); Stanley R. Klion, MAS
Practice: Are the Critics Justified?, J. ACCT. 72, 73 (June 1978) (“There is nothing sinister or devious in a
businessman’s seeking [MAS] from his CPA * * * [the CPA’s] reputation and livelihood depend on his
ability to advise clients in confidence and with competence”); Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., Management
Services: A Challenge to Audit Independence?, ACCT. REV. 721, 724 (Oct. 1966).
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specific quasi-rents only by being a tough watchdog and carefully guarding its reputation for
quality.
Some argue that accounting firms have an economic incentive to develop a reputation as
an advocate of client management even at the expense of objectivity and integrity. There are a
number of reasons why this is not the case.
First, and foremost, as discussed above, an accounting firm that compromises
independence in order to curry favor with management puts at risk its reputation for integrity and
objectivity, and is apt to suffer vis-a-vis other actual and potential clients as a consequence.
Second, whatever information managements can discover about a firm’s reputation will also be
available to the investing public. Hence, if an accounting firm did establish a reputation for “cooptability,” any company that retained the firm would pay a price in terms of its cost of capital.
Very few companies are apt to want to do this. Simply put, there is no market in third-party
attestation services for known prevaricators.154 Third, boards of directors and audit committees
oversee the process of auditor selection and have an incentive to hire an auditor with a sound
reputation. Fourth, the market sets executive compensation in light of the monitoring problems
that shareholders confront with respect to management and the intrinsic conflicts of interest that
may exist. Because executives share in the these “agency costs,” they have an incentive to
minimize them by choosing a quality auditor. Thus, even though management ultimately selects

154

Indeed, in an empirical study of qualified audit opinions and auditor switching, “it was not found that firms
that have received qualified opinions switch systematically to audit firms with a history of rendering
proportionally fewer qualified opinions;” moreover, there was support for the proposition that “qualified
firms which switch auditors do not tend subsequently to receive more clean opinions.” Chee W. Chow and
Steven J. Rice, Qualified Audit Opinions and Auditor Switching, 57 ACCT. REV. 326 (Apr. 1982).
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the external auditor, its choice is directed by expected investor reactions.155 Finally, it is costly
for companies to change auditors, both because of the signal this may send to markets and
because they may have to absorb some of the start-up cost incurred by a new auditor. This
creates an incentive for management to have a durable relationship with a credible auditor.156
Indeed, the very fact that public companies are “credibly committed” by these cost structures to
their auditors — who, in turn, have an incentive to protect their own reputations for integrity and
objectivity — permits the companies to send a stronger message to markets about the soundness
of their financial statements.157
To the extent that other services, such as consulting, benefit from a firm’s reputation as a
provider of high quality audit services, the incentive to protect that reputation through the
maintenance of high audit quality is enhanced.158 Indeed, the greater the average quasi-rents
associated with the auditor’s client base, the greater the incentive to maintain independence. It
follows that, in the context of multiple clients, the provision to audit clients of non-audit services
increases auditor independence, precisely because it increases average quasi-rents.
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See Chee W. Chow, The Demandfor External Auditing: Size, Debt and Ownership Influences, ACCT. REV.
272, 274 (A pr. 1982). See also, AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, supra note 139,
Appendix B, at 3. C f. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory o f the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 323 (1976) (discussing the role of
monitoring and bonding activities in reducing agency costs.)
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See, e.g., AUDITOR-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 142.

157

See, e.g., Credible Commitments and Economic Institutions, supra note 146.

158

Partners engaged in providing non-audit services share with their audit partners a common interest in
enhancing the reputational capital represented by the accounting firm’s “brand” name. For example, the
market may read a quality audit service as evidencing a predisposition toward quality control, competency,
expertise and integrity in non-attest service lines. While accounting firms have an incentive to maintain
quality standards in all service lines, this is especially so with respect to auditing. Audit failures, because
they may involve numerous stockholder and class-action suits, tend to generate a great deal of negative
publicity. The potential of audit failure to damage all lines of the firm’s business, thus, reinforces its
already-strong incentive to maintain and protect quality.
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Arguments to the contrary fall victim to the classic fallacy of composition.

As is

explained in introductory economics textbooks:
This is the fallacy of contending that “what is true for the individual or part is
necessarily also true for the group or whole.” * * * The validity of a particular
generalization for an individual or part does not necessarily ensure its accuracy for
the group or whole.159
For example, if an individual suddenly stands up at a football game, the view is improved for that
individual. But the same does not hold for the group.160 An excessively narrow focus on the
auditor-client relationship, taken in isolation, results in a similar fallacy. If an auditor has a
single audit client that commands a large proportion of its resources, the provision of non-audit
services to that client may have ramifications for independence by increasing the auditor’s
dependence on that client. But the same does not hold in a multi-client context. Far from
impeding auditor independence, in the multi-client context, non-audit services strengthen the
incentive for firms to safeguard their reputations for integrity, objectivity and overall
professionalism.
The evidence supports this view. Accounting firms, since the inception of the profession,
have combined non-audit with audit services.161 Yet, as previously discussed, numerous studies
have concurred that there is no known instance in which it can be demonstrated that the provision
of non-audit services to an audit client impaired independence in performing the audit
function.162 This conclusion is especially impressive in light of the continued growth in non

159

Campbell R. McConnell, ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 14 (6th ed. 1975).

160

Id.

161

See Section II at 17.

162

See Section II at 50.
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audit services in recent years,163 which has not been accompanied by a surge in claims of
impairment of independence, let alone findings to that effect.164 It is particularly noteworthy in
this regard that the insurance industry does not appear to consider the issue of whether non-audit
services are provided to either audit or non-audit clients relevant to the development of risk
profiles for accounting firms.165 Moreover, as LECG observed:
[T]he growth in the consulting revenues of the Big Six firms has
not been the result of a disproportionate growth in the consulting
services consumed by their SEC clients. This suggests that the
growth in consulting revenues has been driven by the value of
those services in the market, and not by increasing attempts to
undermine the independence of auditors by tying lucrative
consulting contracts to audit outcomes.166

B.

Firms Have Economic Incentive to Address The “Free Rider” Issue
While a multi-disciplinary professional service firm has a strong economic

incentive to uphold its independence and protect its reputation, accomplishing these tasks
presents a classic “common goods” problem. A common good is a good that benefits all, while
not allowing for the exclusion of those who do not contribute to it.167 A firm’s reputation
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See An Economic Analysis of Auditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 20.

164

Indeed, LECG’s analysis indicated that “consulting fees have been going up while the number of claims
and/or suits has been declining.” An ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, supra note 139,
Appendix B at 24.

165

See Section II at 56. Moreover, as stated in the LECG report: “there are no known covenants in existing
liability insurance contracts which restrict an [audit] firm’s ability to offer non-audit services.” An
Economic Analysis of Auditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 25.

166

An Economic Analysis of A uditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 20-21.

167

For example, defense of a nation is a common good, in that once provided its benefits cannot be withheld
from any citizen. As economic theorist Mancur Olson puts it:
[T]he achievement o f any common goal or the satisfaction o f any common interest means
that a public or collective good has been provided for that group. T he very fact th at a goal
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constitutes such a common good for the firm’s partners. A principal function of the firm is to
solve these kinds of collective action problems.168 While it is in the partners’ collective interest
to protect the firm’s reputation by maintaining impeccable standards, the same does not
necessarily hold for each individual partner, some of whom may have clients that loom much
larger to them than to the firm as a whole.169 As a consequence, some may be tempted to “free
ride” on the firm’s reputation by pursuing their self-interest, narrowly perceived, in maintaining
client relationships even at the expense of compromising audit integrity.
The best way to protect a firm’s reputation, of course, is to make certain that it is based in
reality. To this end, accounting firms employ a variety of safeguards (discussed in Section II)
designed to deter free riding.170 In addition, there are a variety of other checks on the free-riding
partner. For example, compensation can be structured to align the individual partner’s interest
with those of the firm in protecting its reputation. Also, the audit team itself— when combined
with policies that encourage junior ranking professionals to take differences of professional
opinion to senior firm personnel not on the audit team — constitutes a safeguard. Each and

or purpose is common to a group means that no one in the group is excluded from the benefit
or satisfaction brought about by its achievement.
Mancur Olson, The Logic
(1971).
168

of

Collective Action: Public Goods

and the

Theory

of

Groups 15

As Mancur Olson observes:
[T]he essence of an organization [is] that it provides an inseparable, generalized benefit. It
follows that the provision of public or collective goods is the fundamental function of
organizations generally.
Id.

169

See An Economic Analysis of Auditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 8-10
(discussion of auditors’ incentives).

170

See id. at 9-10.
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every member of an audit team — not just the partner — has a responsibility to be satisfied with
the integrity of the audit. The provision of non-audit services to audit clients acts as a similar
check on the potential rogue partner, since personnel in addition to the audit partner and his or
her team will be involved. Clients also provide a check on free riding. Boards of directors and
audit committees may review all aspects of an accounting firm’s relationship with a company.
Finally, free-riding partners face a host of penalties, including in-firm sanctions, regulatory
action, litigation, and loss of reputation.171

These help explain why there is such wide

compliance with independence standards.
C.

A Broad Scope of Practice Enhances Audit Quality
The optimal regulatory framework must focus on the underlying purpose of the

audit — to minimize the risk to investors that information about the company is incorrect.172 To
that end, enlightened regulation should strive to improve audit quality through enhanced audit
sophistication, a goal advanced by the performance of non-audit services for audit clients.173 The

171

See Section III. H.

172

As SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt stated in a recent speech:
I have valued the information provided by financial statements; and I have used those
statements as the basis for my investment decisions. I place a premium on information that
has been audited - because, like so many millions of investors, I have had confidence in the
independence and professionalism of auditors.
Remarks of the Chairman, Securities & Exchange Commission, Arthur Levitt, “The Accountant’s Critical
Eye,” 24th Annual National Conference on Current SEC Developments, American Institute Of Certified
Public Accountants, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 10, 1996).

173

As the Cohen Commission noted in 1978:
An audit requires considerable knowledge about a company, its operations and its industry.
Providing management advisory services for an audit client may increase the auditor’s
understanding and knowledge and prove advantageous in conducting the audit.
AICPA, The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations 95
(1978).
Similarly, in Accounting Series Release No. 264, the SEC observed:
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performance of non-audit services improves audit quality by providing the audit team with a
deeper understanding of significant business issues.

The greater an auditor’s insight into a

client’s operation, the more likely it is that key audit risks will be identified and business
complexities and transactions fully understood.174 Where the non-audit services are provided by
other partners, similar benefits are obtained through a variety of techniques175 designed to
communicate relevant information concerning the client.176 Either way, “smarter” auditing is the
consequence.

The broader base of knowledge about, and a greater understanding of, the [client’s] business,
which often results from the performance of non-audit services may improve the efficiency
and thoroughness of the audit. This broader perspective on the audit is healthy and
desirable.
Scope o f Services by Independent Accountants, Accounting Series Release No. 264, supra note 95, at 883
(June 14, 1979).
174

This also lessens the likelihood that auditors will be deceived by clients. Of the 106 SEC enforcement
actions between 1972 and 1989 citing violations of GAAS, 20 involved client deception of the independent
auditor. See David R. Campbell and Larry M. Parker, SEC Communications to the Independent Auditors:
An Analysis o f Enforcement Actions, 11 J. OF ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y. 297, 309 (1992) (hereinafter “An
Analysis of Enforcement Actions”).

175

When separate teams provide audit and non-audit services to a client, there are normally channels for
communication to the audit engagement team of information relevant to the conduct of the audit work. For
example, it is standard practice for the audit partner and manager to maintain contact with the tax or
consulting team to facilitate knowledge transfer. Some accounting firms accomplish this through joint
client service planning, or through client service teams that meet periodically and include not only audit
and tax engagement personnel, but also those responsible for the performance of any non-audit services to
the audit client. In some accounting firms, a partner may be charged with coordinating the services
rendered to a particular client. In this role, the partner would monitor the execution and delivery of all
services to that client. To the extent that this involves additional individuals, it further reduces the
likelihood of eroded independence. The growth and deployment of ever richer knowledge sharing tools is
widely predicted.

176

The accounting profession has recognized the desirability of communication between personnel providing
audit and non-audit services in GAAS. Under AU § 311.04, the auditor should consider “[d]iscussing
matters that may affect the audit with firm personnel responsible for non-audit services to the entity.”
AICPA Professional Standards, Planning and Supervision, AU § 311.04. To further assure that this
communication occurs, some firms have a policy that requires the audit team, in the planning of the audit,
to inquire of any non-audit client activities during the year. This may include a review of the consulting
reports issued and the supporting work product.
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For example:
•

Having audited a client’s warranty reserves, an audit team might be asked to
contribute to a project to improve the client’s process for obtaining, analyzing
and distributing product quality information. Through such work, the audit team
would arrive at a deeper understanding of the determinants of product quality as
well as of the client’s mechanisms for identification and reporting on product
quality issues. This, in turn, would inform subsequent audit testing regarding the
adequacy of warranty reserves as well as supplement a broader understanding of
the business.

•

An important focus for many high-tech companies is to optimize their “sales
channel,” which involves the various enterprises and other means employed to
transfer merchandise from the producer to the end user. Consulting services on
sales channel optimization may inform an audit firm’s judgments about inventory
valuation, return reserves, and account balances with distributors.

•

Modem information technology systems tend to be complex and have control
aspects different from systems being replaced. Such systems require new audit
approaches and must be fully grasped by the auditors. Moreover, with respect to
the implementation of such systems, interaction between an audit team and a
consulting team is particularly important.
Economists refer to any cost advantages gained by producing different products in a

single firm — such as the kind of synergies that exist in combining the production of audit and
non-audit services, either for a single client or more generally — as “economies of scope.”177 A
professional service firm may enjoy such economies with respect to: (i) physical infrastructure;
(ii) technological infrastructure, including shared hardware, software and telecommunications
standards; (iii) organizational infrastructure, including methodologies, shared standards and other
work processes; (iv) informational infrastructure, including client-specific and industry-specific

177

For example, a firm producing cars and trucks has a cost advantage in producing buses and tanks. This is
because specialized knowledge and machinery is shared across different products. See Economics, supra
note 141, at 522. See also AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, supra note 139,
Appendix B, at 1 (“[t]he economic success of accounting firms in supplying non-audit services is
testimony to the value created by offering multiple lines of service.”)
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knowledge as well as special expertise; (v) training; and (vi) reputational capital.178 Economies
of scope are available to professional service firms of all sizes.179 They lower costs for both
attest and non-attest services, which should make it possible for an ever larger number and range
of clients to obtain such services.
In today’s dynamic business environment, audit teams draw on a broad range of skills
and expertise to provide quality service to clients.

The synergistic interaction among

professionals with different skill sets can be as basic as a brief consultation with a knowledgeable
specialist,180 or deployment as part of an audit team.181 Industry-specific knowledge may be
made available to auditors through industry data bases that contain unique information obtained
as part of the audit and non-audit services rendered by the firm, or through internal meetings
organized along industry lines.182

Use of industry-specific knowledge in planning and

178

Id. at 21-23. (Discussion of economies of scope.)

179

Cf. Rick Telberg, Top 100 Firms Propel Consulting Past Tax, A&A, (hereinafter “TOP 100”) ACCT.
TODAY, (Mar. 17, 1997) (discussion of growth in non-audit services by Accounting Today Top 100 Tax
and Accounting Firms).

180

See Statement of Accounting Standards No. 73, Using the Work o f a Specialist § 336.05 which states:
During the audit * * * an auditor may encounter complex or subjective matters potentially
material to the financial statements. Such matters may require special skill or knowledge
and in the auditor’s judgment require using the work of a specialist to obtain competent
evidential matter.

181

Accounting firms employ various mechanisms to spread the benefits of in-house multidisciplinary
expertise, including: (i) knowledge management and electronic communication systems; (ii) training
programs; (iii) publication of directories of issues experts; (iv) written policies, procedures, and work
processes that leverage such knowledge; and (v) casual interactions among professionals.

182

Some firms have specialists who monitor industry trends and provide valuable information to auditors and
other service lines.
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performing audits results in higher audit quality by providing an increased ability to compare and
analyze client operations and operating results against industry-based expectations.183
As discussed more extensively below, the potential for synergies among professional
service lines has been greatly enhanced by the revolution in information technology. Providers
of both audit and non-audit services learn more from each other than in the past, and draw more
readily upon this knowledge to solve respective service problems.

Databases capturing

knowledge derived from particular engagements, as well as best practices, are now shared
worldwide. Such advances result not only in more informed audits, but also add to the potential
for providing clients with better information concerning emerging business risks.
Many of these valuable synergies would be lost, if, as some have urged, accounting firms
were constrained in the provision to audit clients of non-audit services.184 Specifically, costs
would be expected to rise for non-audit services, and demand reduced, as clients ration their use
of non-audit services in response to higher prices. On the supply-side, this implies that what one
accounting firm loses in business, another would not necessarily gain. This is particularly the

183

Accounting firms employ various mechanisms to collect and disseminate industry knowledge, including
surveying internal industry experts to learn about new trends and market developments, written
communications by industry experts and more informal processes such as internal and external
presentations. Some accounting firms develop industry-segment business models that are periodically
updated and used to inform audit engagements.

184

This is not to suggest that there should be no constraints on the non-audit services provided to audit clients.
For example, the profession has long acknowledged that it should not perform certain services for audit
clients, such as underwriting client securities or acting in the capacity of management. Moreover, new
service lines are sure to arise in the future that the profession should not perform for audit clients. See
Section V for further discussion.
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case with respect to consulting services, where the offerings of the firms are more highly
differentiated.185
On the demand-side, the consequence of this policy would be what economists refer to as
a “deadweight” economic loss — that is, a loss of the benefits of the exchange.186 Clients would
lose the numerous benefits associated with the provision of multiple services by the same
professional service firm — reduced start-up time and learning cost; cumulative knowledge to
identify potential business solutions that address unique client-specific business problems; lower
transaction costs associated with “one-stop shopping;” the enhanced comfort level that comes
from dealing with a known service provider; a readily identifiable contact point responsible for
the account relationship; and, most important, because of information-sharing within the audit
firm, higher quality audits. Denying consumer choice, in short, is likely to result in real and
serious social costs.187

185

See An Economic Analysis of A uditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 22
(“[e]conomic welfare is enhanced when the most efficient supplier of a good or service is allowed to fulfill
the demand for that good or service.”)

186

More technically, a “deadweight loss” is a “loss of consumer surplus or producer surplus due to departures
of prices from marginal costs.” See ECONOMICS, supra note 141, at 902. It constitutes a loss for which
there is no compensating gain by any other party.

187

One of the most important social costs of such a policy is reduced access to information by the auditors.
Professionals who perform mostly non-audit services are more likely to communicate their client-specific
knowledge to the client’s auditors if the non-audit and audit professionals are members of the same firm.
Non-audit experts are motivated to assist in key audit work because of the incentive to sell their non-audit
services to the audit client in follow-on work. Precluding non-audit professionals from performing non
audit work for an audit client would discourage them from providing their best assistance with audits.
Conversely, auditors have a greater incentive to indicate to clients possibilities for business improvement
through non-audit services if those non-audit services are likely to be rendered by the auditor’s firm. See
An Economic Analysis of A uditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, (discussion of supply
of non-audit services) at 18-23. See also, discussion of Year 2000 problem in Section IV at p. 102.
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D.

A Broad Scope of Services Fosters Economies of Scale
Due to “economies of scale,” the capability to serve clients in multiple capacities

lowers the cost of all services. Economies of scale occur when the average cost of production
declines as output is increased, as a result of total production costs being spread over expanding
output. In accounting, once a critical mass is achieved, costs per engagement fall because:
(i) fixed costs are spread over a larger revenue base, and (ii) the learning curve for certain tasks
that must be performed for each engagement is reduced, especially when there is knowledge
sharing across attest and non-attest engagements.188 Examples include: lower per capita training
costs (investments in training programs leveraged across a larger number of professionals); lower
per capita field support costs (spreading the costs for such field support services as market and
professional practice research); and lower per capita information costs (due to the ability to
allocate costs for developing and sharing technical and industry information over a broader base
of professionals.) Because non-attest services often employ the same infrastructure (such as
computer systems, office facilities and client-specific knowledge) as attest services, the cost is
spread further, thereby reducing the firm’s average cost for each.
A globalized economy with a corresponding international structure for service providers
dictates substantial investment by accounting firms in this market. Perhaps the most important
economies of scale are those associated with information sharing and assimilation.

Clients

demand that an accounting firm’s knowledge, skills and methods be uniformly consistent and

188 See, e.g., Paul Danos and John W. Eichenseher, Audit Industry Dynamics: Factors Affecting Changes in
Client-Industry Market Shares, 20 J. OF ACCT. RES. 604 (1982).

-7 4 -

reliable.189 Through the use of information management tools and given sufficient scale, a firm
can effectively shift from real to virtual deployment, whereby each client is benefited by the full
range of the firm’s knowledge resources. While this entails heavy investment and necessitates
taking advantage of scale economies, firms that have deployed well-coordinated information
acquisition and assimilation infrastructures enjoy efficiencies that both reduce costs and result in
more effective audits.

To keep pace with client investments in information technology,

professional service firms are increasingly capital- and technology-intensive.

Accordingly,

capturing economies of scale in the provision of professional services may be essential to a
viable audit practice, particularly with respect to large and highly complex global enterprises, but
also in focused market niches often involving non-Big Six firms.190
If a misguided regulatory approach to auditor independence thwarts these market forces,
today’s multidisciplinary firms will be driven to choose between two models — an audit practice
with limited complementary offerings or a consulting firm that offers a range of professional
services other than audit services. If that were to happen, the likely consequence is greater
concentration in both markets, since each service line would no longer enjoy the scale economies
attributable to the bundling of these services under one roof. This could reduce competition,
stifle innovation and increase costs. And, the economies of scope discussed above191 would also
be lost.

189

The large accounting firms tend to have well-established cultures of shared professional values and
common worldwide policies, procedures and technologies.

190

Cf. TOP 100, supra note 179.

191

See Section III C.
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E.

The Revolution in Information Technology is Increasing the Importance of
Broad Scope of Services
Information technology has profoundly affected every aspect of the creation,

recording, processing, storage, distribution, acquisition, analysis, and interpretation of
information. This revolution has opened the way for the interconnection of economic agents into
complex economic webs, compressing distance and time and making both individuals and
organizations more nimble, as well as interdependent.

Indeed, out of the marriage of

telecommunications and computers, an economy is emerging in which information itself has
begun to overtake other factors of production — such as raw materials and labor — in its relative
contribution to the value of goods and services. As Walter Wriston has observed:
The perception of what constitutes an asset, and what it is that creates wealth
is shifting dramatically. Intellectual capital is becoming relatively more
important than physical capital. Indeed, the new source of wealth is not
material, it is information, knowledge applied to work to create value. The
pursuit of wealth is now largely the pursuit of information, and the
application of information to the means of production.192
This development has profound implications for the accounting profession. In the past,
much of accountancy has occupied itself with compliance work of various sorts — ranging from
the tax code to financial reporting.

Although these services undoubtedly will continue to

constitute a large part of accounting practice, a substantial portion of this work may prove to be
programmable. Over time the traditional periodic audit may become less relevant to users of
financial statements, supplemented by an ever-expanding stream of “on-line,” “real-time”

192

Walter Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution Is Transforming
OUR WORLD xii (1992).
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business information.193 In an instant-access world inundated with information, assurance
services are apt to grow in importance.194
These dramatic shifts present auditors with an array of new challenges, risks, and
opportunities, while spelling the demise of the so-called “commoditized” audit.195 The nature of
audit evidence has already changed significantly. Clients have electronic interfaces with their
customers and suppliers, with transactions “approved” by systems protocols. There is greater
reliance on input and process, and less on authorizations and signatures. While enhanced speed
and accuracy have improved systems reliability, there is less human intervention and paper
documentation. The predicted shift to financial reporting on a continuous basis will require

193

As former SEC Commissioner Wallman explained:
[S]hifting the focus of accounting from an aggregation concept premised on periodic reports
to one premised on realtime access to disaggregated data also permits access to more timely
information. Industry has increasingly been using various forms of electronic data
interchange (EDI) among suppliers and retailers for purposes of inventory control. The
advantages of sharing information on a real-time basis, such as permitting just-in-time
inventory, are obvious and EDI continues to grow at a phenomenal annual rate. It is not too
much of an extension to envision preparers of financial information providing users with
access to select portions of their management information systems for purposes of financial
reporting. Subject to appropriate security measures, access made available through the
Internet would * * * permit all investors and others to obtain that information most relevant
to their decision making. Real-time access to such information becomes even more
important as we continue to facilitate more efficient and faster capital formation.
Steven M. H. Wallman, The Future o f Accounting and Financial Reporting, Part IV: “Access”
Accounting, ACCT. HORIZONS, June 1997, at 103.

194

The Elliott Committee Report predicts the rapid growth of market-driven assurance services. With
instantaneous access to massive amounts of information, users will demand assurance of accuracy, in
various degrees depending on the use. In the not-too-distant future, it is predicted that information users
will communicate directly with “auditors” about their reliability requirements and auditors will identify
appropriate levels of assurance associated with data on a real-time basis. Special Committee on Assurance
Services, Report o f the Special Committee on Assurance Services (visited June 26, 1997)
<http ://www .aicpa. or.. .e/sitemap/index.htm>.

195

See, e.g., Ross D. Spencer, Benefits Consulting Executives Reflect On Their Industry: Changes and Future
Challenges, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REV., June 1996, at 24; Jeanne M. Liedtka, Collaborating Across
Lines o f Business for Competitive Advantage ACAD. OF MGMT. EXECUTIVE, May 1996, at 20.
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auditors to develop a deeper understanding of the reliability of the processes from which that
information is generated, and necessitate substantial “audit” resources devoted to continuous
monitoring.
Looking to the future, the path of audit technology is likely to merge with integrated
reporting systems, and the need for consultants, such as systems implementers, to work closely
with auditors will increase. As the economy shifts further from an industrial to an informational
base, the pace of change in GAAP itself may accelerate with the growing need for measurements
that reflect these changes. Auditing will become more technology-driven, requiring auditors to
develop or have access to considerable expertise in information technology. Reflecting these
technological and competitive forces, as well as their continued commitment to the audit
practice, accounting firms in recent years have invested heavily in preparing their audit practices
for the world of the 21st century.196
The demands on the auditor of tomorrow will also require an increasingly robust
knowledge base. Traditional audit skills must be supplemented by technological and business
knowledge that includes the multi-disciplinary tools necessary for the identification and
assessment of business and audit risk in a fast changing world. In addition, the auditor must
remain current on the global economy’s adaptive behavior in order to make informed judgments
about the recoverability of a client’s assets and the viability of its full business operation over the

196

For example, in the most recent fiscal year, four of the Big Six firms invested an aggregate in excess of
$170 million in audit technology and methodology, and over the last five years, two had an aggregate
investment in excess of $0.5 billion. See AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, supra note
139, Appendix B, at 18. A recent survey showed that in 1996, the Big Six firms invested $49,500 per
partner in audit technology and $5,000 per audit professional per year on continuing education (not
including the time cost of trainees). See information provided to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
by Jeffrey Peck (May 22, 1997).
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foreseeable future. These same forces are intensifying the demand for professional service firms
to provide a range of increasingly sophisticated informational services to their clients.

All

businesses — both large and small — confront a myriad of information technology problems on
a daily basis. The accounting profession may be among the best situated to help businesses
address these problems and assure the highest value application of technology and knowledge.
F.

The Revolution in Information Technology Is Also Increasing the
Importance of Professional Service Firms’ Business Relationships
In today’s rapidly changing world, despite the large investments in information

infrastructure and human capital discussed above, no single firm is likely to have the resources to
acquire, develop or produce all the competencies needed to meet its clients’ demands. Thus, to
stay competitive, firms enter into alliances. The information revolution simultaneously makes
such alliances easier to establish and more necessary than ever before.
Emerging technologies are impacting the basic form and structure of industries. Indeed,
the economic determinants of the organizational structure of productive enterprises are closely
tied to transaction costs.197 These, in turn, are highly dependent upon the cost of information,
which is plummeting with the revolution in information technology.

As a consequence, a

dramatic re-alignment in the development and delivery of information-intensive products and
professional services is taking place.
At the heart of this restructuring is a host of new business relationships. For professional
service firms, remaining efficient and competitive requires that they be flexible enough to enter
into business relationships with audit clients that complement the in-house resources even of the

197

See, e.g., ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra n o te 146.
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largest organizations. From an economic perspective, the forces driving professional service
firms to engage in a variety of new business relationships are essentially identical to the forces
behind the shift to a broader scope of in-house services — namely, the need to deploy the
resources and competencies demanded by the market. They reflect the market’s dynamic search
for the most efficient means of production and delivery of information-intensive services — a
process of fundamental importance to the economy.198 The economies that may be extracted
through employing information technology to combine inter-organizational resources to address
rapidly shifting market demands may be particularly important to small and medium size firms.
Here, too, regulators should not thwart what the market is demanding unless the particular
relationship impairs independence.199
G.

A Broad Scope of Practice is Necessary to Attract the Best Recruits
Professional service firms must attract highly skilled professionals, able to deal

effectively with a complex business and auditing environment.

For example, in today’s

environment, they must have the ability to:
•

understand new financial instruments, including derivatives;

•

evaluate complex computer systems;

•

identify obsolete inventories;

•

evaluate the effects of intricate international agreements;

•

evaluate complicated tax accruals;

•

recognize and judge the significance of important industry trends;

198

See, e.g., Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 82-83 (3d ed., 1950) (“capitalism
[is an] evolutionary [process] * * * [t]he fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new
markets, the new forms o f industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates.”) (italics supplied.)

199

See Section II for further discussion of business relationships in relation to independence.
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•

evaluate the appropriate accounting treatment of employee health and retirement
plans; and

•

assess what skills and knowledge are needed to deal with these issues.

Historically, one reason auditors provided an array of professional services was simply
to balance the highly concentrated audit season with year-round professional activity.200 Today,
diversity of practice remains important to practitioners for a variety of other reasons as well:
•

Multiple service lines provide opportunities to explore alternative career paths
within an organization and expand professional capabilities in new directions.

•

Multi-disciplinary firms offer greater professional security, both in terms of
ability to withstand the unpredictable vicissitudes of long-term inter-disciplinary
growth (or lack thereof) as well as to weather economic cycles.201

•

Multi-disciplinary firms enjoy the economies of scale and scope previously
discussed. This redounds to the benefit of the professionals working within
them.

•

Multi-disciplinary firms offer access to an existing client base for multiple
services.

•

Involving audit professionals in the performance of non-audit services facilitates
the ability of accounting firms to attract and retain the “best and the brightest” in
audit practice.

•

Quality professionals, who set high standards for themselves, perceive that
interaction with professionals in complementary areas of expertise enhances their
“human capital” and ability to perform.

To continue to provide top quality service, accounting firms must attract and retain the
most qualified individuals. Relatively few people know what they would like to do with their
careers when they are at the entry-level stage. Within a multi-line professional service firm, new
recruits enjoy a wide array of career potentials beyond their entry-level positions. Such diversity
of practice has proven to be critical in attracting individuals with the breadth of professional and

200

Concentration occurred because many companies had calendar fiscal years.

201

S e e ECONOMIC INQUIRY, su p r a n o te 152, at 367.
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business skills necessary for today’s complex audits in an increasingly competitive recruiting
environment.
H.

Exposure to Liability and Professional Sanctions Provides a Complementary
Deterrent to Compromising Independence
Complementary to the economic incentive of accounting firms to safeguard

independence is the deterrent posed by exposure to potentially massive liability.

While a

violation of current independence requirements, without more, does not necessarily result in
liability, the litigation experience of accounting firms is such that the prospect of liability acts as
a significant and pervasive constraint.202
The threat of legal proceedings is all too real for accountants. Beginning in the late
1980s, the profession experienced a dramatic increase in litigation expenses. Between 1990 and
1993, the cost of litigation to the accounting and audit practices of the six largest firms increased
65% 203 Net practice protection costs204 rose from 7.7% of gross accounting and audit revenues
in 1990 to 11.9% of gross accounting and audit revenues in 1993 205 By the end of 1992, legal
claims against the six largest firms exceeded $30 billion, an amount more than 20 times the level
of permanent capital available within the six firms and one that threatened the profession’s

202

See An Economic Analysis of A uditor Independence, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 10-15
(discussion of auditors’ liability).

203

See Letter from Mark H. Gitenstein & Andrew J. Pincus, Mayer, Brown & Platt, to Walter Schuetze, Chief
Accountant, Securities & Exchange Commission (June 3, 1994).

204

Net practice protection costs include liability insurance costs plus accounting and audit judgments and
settlements, outside legal fees, and direct costs of internal legal departments, less insurance recoveries. See
Mayer, Brown & Platt, A Disproportionate Burden o f Liability, at 2, n.2 (1993).

205

See AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE, supra note 139, Appendix B, at 12.
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continued existence.206 Partners of the six largest firms have invested more than $3.5 billion of
their own capital in their respective firms.207 This substantial personal investment would be put
at risk by compromising independence.
Exposure to liability attributable to a lack of independence could arise pursuant to federal
securities law, state securities law or common law.208 For example, under certain circumstances,
a lack of independence could open an audit firm or auditor to claims or charges under the
antiffaud provisions of the federal securities laws.209 Further, a statutory “due diligence” defense
to claims arising under Section 11 of the Securities Act, which subjects auditors to liability for
material misrepresentations or omissions in audited financial statements contained in registration
statements filed with the SEC, provides a strong incentive to undertake rigorous, independent
audits before issuing audit reports.210 Moreover, the securities laws of almost every state211

206

See id. at 5. Firms incurred tremendous expense to defend against even weak claims. In 1992, for example,
the six largest firms disposed of 58 cases that included a claim under Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Of those
58 cases, 23 closed with no payment to plaintiffs, and 11 more settled for $150,000 or less. The total
amount paid to plaintiffs in these 34 cases was less than $650,000, yet the firms spent approximately $18.5
million to defend them. See id. at 14-15.

207

See id . at 17.

208

For a summary of enforcement releases, see Ehsan H. Feroz, Kyungjoo Park and Victor S. Pastena The
Financial and Market Effects o f the SEC’s Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, 29 J. ACCT.
RES. 107 (1991). See also, An ANALYSIS OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS, supra note 174, at 303.

209

These provisions, which include Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and
Rule 10b-5 thereunder, Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act (relating to tender offers) and Rule 14a-9 under
the Exchange Act (relating to proxy statements), subject accountants to liability for participation in
schemes to defraud investors, and for material misstatements or omissions in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities.

210

To avoid liability under Section 11, the accountant must prove that “he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the registration statement became
effective, that the statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact
required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.” Securities Act
§ 11(b)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) (1994).

211

The exceptions are N ew Y ork, P ennsylvania, and R hode Island.
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include express civil liability provisions similar to those encountered under federal law.212 A
breach of independence could also result in common law actions for malpractice, alleging breach
of contract or negligence,213 or common law fraud.
Accountants who compromise their independence, moreover, risk more than the
imposition of liability under the common law and the federal and state securities laws; they risk
their very careers. State licensing authorities, in compliance with applicable procedures, may
suspend or revoke the license of an accountant who fails to meet the state’s independence
requirements. Further, the AICPA imposes sanctions for violations of its Code of Professional
Conduct. The Executive Committee of the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section may sanction firms
that are members, if they fail to take corrective action after the Peer Review Committee finds
violations of GAAS (or GAAP), or the Quality Control Inquiry Committee finds violations in
connection with audits that are the subject of litigation.214 Similarly, the Professional Ethics
Division may sanction individual members of the AICPA for a wide variety of violations of
professional standards. State professional associations may also sanction members that fail to
adhere to professional standards.215

212

See Robert J. Haft, LIABILITY OF ATTORNEYS AND ACCOUNTANTS FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS § 5.01
(1996).

213

Clients typically allege damages as a result of actions taken in reliance on inaccurate financial statements,
or as a result of the accountant’s failure to detect an employee’s misuse or embezzlement of funds. See
Russell L. Wald, Annotation, Accountant’s Malpractice Liability to Client, 92 A.L.R. 3d 396, 401 (1997).

214

Sanctions can include: (i) corrective measures by the firm, including measures involving personnel; (ii)
additional continuing professional education; (iii) accelerated or special peer reviews; (iv) admonishments,
censures, or reprimands; (v) suspension from membership in the Section; or (vi) expulsion from Section
membership.

215

Of the 105 AICPA member sanctions for violation of professional performance or independence standards
with suspension or termination of membership in the five years ended December 31, 1996, fourteen related
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Rule 102(e) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice authorizes the Commission to censure a
professional (or firm) or to deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of practicing before it
if the Commission finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that the professional does not
possess-requisite qualifications to represent others, lacks character or integrity, engaged in
unethical or unprofessional behavior, or willfully violated or aided and abetted violation of the
securities laws.216 A suspension or bar from practice before the Commission has severe effects
on the accountants whose primary work involves public companies, whether undertaken as an
internal or independent accountant or auditor, because that work may be construed as “practice
before the Commission.” Moreover, any sanction, whether a suspension, bar, censure, or other
measure,217 often has significant collateral consequences, such as publicity that adversely affects
the accountant’s reputation. The risk of sanction under Rule 102(e) has increased significantly in
the 1990s as the SEC has stepped up enforcement efforts.218 Rule 102(e) proceedings thus
represent a significant disincentive to unprofessional conduct.

to violations of professional independence standards for members in the practice of public accounting. See
The CPA LETTER for that period.
216

The rule also provides that any person whose license to practice as an accountant has been revoked or
suspended in any state shall be suspended from appearing or practicing before the Commission.

217

In addition to suspension, bar, or censure, the SEC has, for example, limited accountants from accepting
new SEC clients and participating in audits of public companies, required improvements to accounting firm
procedures, and mandated peer review by the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA or a similar review body.
See Paul R. Brown & Jeanne A. Calderon, The Increased Use of SEC Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Accountants in the 1990’s, Apr. 1995, at 17.

218

The Commission issued 91 102(e) decisions between 1990 and 1994, as compared to 64 decisions during
the 1970s and 73 decisions during the 1980s. Id. at 18.
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I.

Other Determinants of Auditor Independence
In addition to the economic and legal parameters, social, psychological, ethical

and professional influences are also important considerations in crafting a new conceptual
framework.219 “Internalization” by practitioners of the values of integrity, objectivity and
independence provides the best possible assurance.220 As Dr. W. Warner Burke of Columbia
University notes, these values carry the auditing professional beyond compliance to
commitment.221 They may also provide the most powerful deterrent to the problem of free riders
discussed above.222 As Dr. Burke explains, while self-serving interests have the power to bias
judgment, in the context of auditing “the right culture in the firm” and the “right climate in the
engagement team” will “bias [auditors] in favor of maintaining objectivity and independence.”223
Internalization of fundamental values such as integrity, objectivity and independence may
be fostered through training, peer and group dynamics, “firm culture,” and professionalism.224
Indeed, many of the independence safeguards developed by the profession may be as important
for their contribution in this regard as for the extrinsic motivation they provide.225 Equally

219

See W. Warner Burke, Auditor Independence: An Organizational Psychology Perspective, Oct. 10, 1997
(hereinafter “Burke Report”), Appendix C.

220

See Burke Report, Appendix C, at 10-11.

221

Id. at 2.

222

See discussion of free riders supra Section III B. See id. at 7. Indeed, from a social perspective, collective
action problems often generate ethical values designed to address the problems presented by free riders.

223

Id. at 7-8.

224

Id. at 12.

225

Id. at 4-5.
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important is the involvement of professionals in the self-regulatory process.

As Dr. Burke

exhorts, “involvement leads to commitment.”226
Gary Edwards, a well-known consultant on business and professional ethics, sounds this
same theme in his report on the relationship of professional ethics and self-regulation to auditor
independence.227 He notes that the elements of compliance with ethical standards are typically
more sophisticated in the major professions than in a corporation or industrial group.228 (Indeed,
among the professions, auditors are perhaps unique in the separation they must maintain between
themselves and their clients.) In this context, Edwards explains that maintaining the appearance
of auditor independence (bound as it must be to subjective perception) should be recognized as
essentially aspirational in nature, rather than a regulatory requirement.229 Accordingly, he
counsels that, in the absence of credible objective evidence concerning the appearance of a lack
of auditor independence, enforceable appearance-based rules should be abandoned and
regulatory attention refocused on crafting fundamental independence principles (which would
then be implemented by the firms through self-devised mechanisms based on comparable
existing best ethical compliance practices).230

226

Id. at 12.

227

See Edwards Report, supra note 102, Appendix D.

228

Id at 19-22.

229

Id at 23-25.

230

I d at 8-14.
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J.

Conclusion
As shown above, professional service firms have a strong economic interest in

safeguarding independence,

buttressed by

complementary organizational,

ethical

and

professional motivations and deterrents. As discussed in the next section, to achieve the most
effective regulatory impact, policy-makers should seek to harness these incentives/deterrents by
employing in combination the regulator’s comparative advantage in setting goals in the public
interest and the regulated entities’ comparative advantage in determining how best to implement
those objectives.

IV.

Regulatory Policy Considerations
Formulation of effective regulatory policy to assure auditor independence is not a choice

between the free market and government regulation, or between “weak” and “strong” regulation.
Instead, regulatory policy should be based on implementing the regulatory strategy that optimally
safeguards auditor independence.231 A regulatory model that enlists the profession in the
development and implementation of a system of self-regulation focused on ISB standards
reflecting an informed understanding both of the real threats to auditor independence and
effective safeguards designed to defuse those threats (whenever possible), presents the best
opportunity for achieving this goal.

Such a decentralized regulatory model (increasingly

employed by the SEC and other federal agencies to achieve a variety of regulatory goals) in

231

See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, Editor’s Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement, 11 L. & POL’Y
89, 90 (Apr. 1989) (“The question is not, therefore, simply whether regulations result in ‘compliance’ but
whether the regulations, as administered, produce socially desirable outcomes”).
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which the regulator232 promulgates core principles, prescribes guidelines and then imposes on the
regulated firms the responsibility of developing specific methods of implementation, offers
significant advantages over the detailed, rule-oriented approach that has developed in recent
decades.
A.

Command and Control Regulation
Regulation of the private sector during the last thirty years has increasingly taken

the form of what is generally described as “command and control.” In a command and control
regime, rather than setting performance standards and allowing the regulated persons to
determine how to meet them, the regulator establishes operating standards, issues rules that
define the required practices or behaviors and the specific activities to which they apply, and
imposes penalties on those who fail to comply. In recent years, the command and control
approach has been the subject of extensive bipartisan criticism and re-evaluation.233 Drawing on
examples from the existing areas of command and control regulation, its principal shortcomings

232

The ISB is a private standards-setter, akin to the Financial Accounting Standards Board (hereinafter
“FASB”), not a classic regulator. For example, the ISB lacks enforcement authority. (Enforcement of
independence standards is the responsibility of the SEC, the AICPA, and state boards of accountancy.)
However, the ISB is a primary element of the new regulatory system governing auditor independence (as
illustrated in Figure 1.1, supra) and, as such, should develop and implement the standards-setting process
in accordance with sound regulatory policy.

233

In The Death of Common Sense, attorney and economist Philip Howard writes:
Our regulatory system has become an instruction manual. It tells us and
bureaucrats exactly what to do and how to do it. Detailed rule after rule
addresses every eventuality, or at least every situation lawmakers and
bureaucrats can think of.
Philip K. Howard, The Death
Sense”).

of

Common Sense 6 (1994) (hereinafter “Commmon

Vice President Albert Gore, in his book Common Sense Government, states: “in the pursuit of certainty
we have created a system that attempts to cover every eventuality, spelling everything out in excruciating
detail.” Albert Gore, Common Sense Government 47 (1995) (hereinafter “Government”).

-8 9 -

are highlighted below.
1.

Technical Compliance Instead of Achievement of Goals
One of the key shortcomings of command and control regulation is that it

emphasizes technical compliance with particularized rules rather than the achievement of policy
objectives or goals. A regulatory regime stressing compliance with detailed, specific rules, over
time, will require additional rules, in order to address new developments, or close off loopholes
in existing rules.234 In this way, regulations beget more regulations, leading to a regime of
detailed rules, developed through accretion, that becomes increasingly tangential to the original
purpose of the regulations.
This accretion of regulations often yields unintended results. For example, a compliant
entity that meets (or exceeds) the goal of the regulatory regime may still find itself subject to
sanction for technical violations, regardless of its overall performance.235 Likewise, an entity
that falls short of the goal of the regulatory regime may nonetheless be considered compliant,
because it meets the regime’s technical specifications. In the worst case, compliance with the

234

Common Sense states:
Precise rules, most people believe, ‘close off loopholes.’ It happens to be the
other way around. Loopholes only exist because of precise rules. The
Constitution, a short document of general principles, has no loopholes. The tax
law, all 36,000 pages of it, is practically nothing but loopholes.
Common Sense, supra note 233 at 43.

235

See, e.g., Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System o f Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry
Sector Approach, 26 Envtl. L. 457, 465-66 (Summer 1996) (stating that EPA has observed of its
regulation of hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) that “‘[i]n
RCRA, as in other programs, a regulated hazardous waste handler literally must do hundreds of things
correctly to fully comply with the regulations, yet doing only one thing wrong makes the handler a
violator’”) (quoting U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste & Emergency
Response, The Nation’s Hazardous Waste Program at a Crossroads 36 (1990)).
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regulations receives a higher priority than achieving the underlying policy objective.236
Examples abound of the shortcomings of command and control regulation. Over the last
twenty years, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) has developed over
4,000 detailed regulations, dictating particulars such as the length of ladders and the required
height of railings (42 inches).237 Similarly, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has
not only identified pollutants and required regulated entities to address the sources of these
pollutants on their property, but also has issued detailed regulations specifying the exact
combination of technologies to be applied by regulated entities to address the identified
problems 238 For instance:
•

In spite of its excellent safety record, a brick manufacturer caught up in
this regulatory maze was repeatedly cited by OSHA for having railings
that were only 40 inches high.239

•

In the same vein, Vice President Gore described a case in which OSHA
imposed a fine on a company “for failing to require its workers to don hard
hats as they rushed to save a co-worker from a collapsed trench.”240

•

The EPA adopted a rule in 1990 requiring that specific equipment be
installed in wastewater pipes to filter out benzene. Amoco Oil spent $31
million to bring its Yorktown, Virginia refinery into compliance with the
regulation. As it turned out, however, the plant was emitting significant
amounts of benzene — but not from its wastewater pipes. Instead, the
pollution was emanating from leakage at the refinery’s loading docks, an

236

As Howard has written: “[W]e seem to have achieved the worst of both worlds: a system of regulation that
goes too far while it also does too little” (quoted approvingly in GOVERNMENT, supra note 233, at 35).

237

See Common Sense, supra note 233, at 12.

238

See David Osborne and Ted Gabeler, Reinventing Government 299 (1992).

239

See Common Sense, supra note 233, at 13.

240

See GOVERNMENT, supra note 233, at 46 (citing Dan Margolies and Bonar Menninger, “OSHA’s
Obsessions Trivialize Hazards,” Kan . City Bus. J. 2 (Dec. 1994)
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area not then subject to regulation for benzene emissions.
Command and control regulation thus often produces rules that yield absurd outcomes,
such as the hard hat case, or miss the mark and fail to address the real dangers, such as the EPA’s
regulation of benzene emissions. As discussed in Section II of this White Paper and illustrated
below, the command and control approach to the regulation of auditor independence,
characterized by the dozens of rulings, interpretations, enforcement proceedings and other SEC
guidance concerning independence to which auditors are expected to conform their conduct, has
produced the same shortcomings seen in other areas of command and control regulation. As
Philip Howard, who was retained by the SEC to advise the SEC’s Task Force on Disclosure
Simplification, reported to SEC Chairman Levitt last year:
Like all agencies * * * the SEC has suffered from the bureaucratic
tendency to create ever thicker rulebooks. Each complication
breeds another level of complexity and, over time, the original
regulatory goal becomes obscured amid thousands of words of
detailed dictates. Some SEC rules, intended to guide market
participants in daily decisions, have become a kind of Latin liturgy,
comprehensible only to those of us who have devoted our
professional lives to abstract regulatory nuances.241
Likewise, The Wall Street Journal reported that, during an interview on September 28, 1997, (on
the eve of his return to his private life), SEC Commissioner Wallman:
called for the [SEC] to redouble efforts to move away from a
detail-driven “command and control” regulatory structure that he
said is becoming increasingly anachronistic in an age when
technological advances occur faster than the agency can regulate
them. Instead, he urged the Commission to adopt broad central
tenets of what it wants to achieve and leave it to those in the

241

Report of the Task Force on Disclosure
<http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/smpl.htmp>.
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Simplification

2

(Mar.

5,

1996)

market to decide how it should be accomplished.242
There are numerous examples of such detailed dictates in the SEC’s regulation of auditor
independence.

For instance, the Codification o f Financial Reporting Policies states that

restrictions against holding official positions and associations with the client apply not only to an
accountant, but also to relatives of the accountant “in varying degrees depending on the closeness
of the relationship.”243 In one example, the SEC Staff advised a firm that it would not question
the firm’s independence if the son-in-law of a firm partner was a branch manager of a bank that
was a subsidiary of a firm audit client, but that its independence might be impaired in the future
if the son-in-law were promoted, even if the promotion did not entail the assumption of
responsibility for the client’s financial statements.244
In a recent situation, the SEC Staff opined that a firm’s independence would be impaired
if it admitted to partnership a manager whose father was a director of an audit client, even if the
firm transferred the manager to an office that was not responsible for the audit engagement.245
The requirements thus presume a lack of independence even in instances where the family

242

Paul Beckett, SEC Commissioner Wallman, on the Eve o f His Departure, Seeks More Reforms, WALL St .
J., Sept. 29, 1997, at B9.

243

Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, § 602.02.h., 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,273, at
62,908 (1997). The SEC’s policies state that the financial interests and business relationships of an
“accountant’s immediate family or other dependent relatives” generally would be ascribed to the
accountant for independence purposes. They also provide that, in determining whether an impairment of
independence exists, the Staff will consider “the positions occupied by the parties in their respective
employment, as may make the related parties appear to have the opportunity to mold the shape of the
financial statements.” Id.

244

Yount, Hyde & Barbour, P.C., Securiites & Exchange Commission No-Action Letter, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶77,557, at 78,799 (Mar. 2 , 1985).

245

McGladrey & Pullen, Securities & Exchange Commission No-Action Letter, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 76,918, at 78,653 (July 1, 1993).
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member may not have anything to do with the financial statements, and regardless of whether the
mere employment of relatives by a client poses any actual threat to the integrity of the client’s
financial statements. The benefit to investors is hard to fathom, although the damage done to
families of partners and employees of accounting firms is very real.
The SEC’s detailed guidance further provides that auditors of public companies should
not enter into “direct and material indirect business relationships” with their clients or their
affiliates.246 The SEC has interpreted this guidance as precluding a professional services firm
from entering into a prime/subcontractor arrangement with an audit client (or vice versa) to
provide services to unrelated third parties, regardless of the materiality of the arrangement to the
firm or its client.247 No appearance-based concerns regarding the independence of the firm from
the client would be raised, however, if the third party instead entered into separate contracts with
the firm and the client. Moreover, as a factual matter, it is unclear how such a relationship,
however structured, actually impairs the firm’s independence or otherwise presents a threat to the
integrity of the client’s financial statements. Nevertheless, the proscription remains in effect.
In a recent instance, an audit firm was informed by the SEC that its independence would
be impaired if it purchased or held an immaterial equity investment of less than five percent of
the shares of a closely held entity, where a director of one of its publicly traded audit clients was
also an equity shareholder of that same closely held entity, no matter how immaterial to the
director or how passive or small the director’s investment might be to the closely held entity. In

246

Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, § 602.02.g, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,272, at
62,905 (1997).

247

See, e.g., Letter to A. Clayton Ostlund, Touche Ross & Co., from Clarence A. Staubs, Ass’t Chief
Accountant, Securities & Exchange Commission (May 8, 1981).
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the view of the SEC Staff, this situation represents a “joint business venture” between the
professional services firm and the audit client, prohibited under §602.02.g.
Elsewhere, the SEC’s policies state that “an accounting firm cannot be deemed
independent with regard to auditing financial statements of a client if it has participated closely,
either manually or through its computer systems, in maintenance of the basic accounting records
and preparation of the financial statements.”248 Based on this policy, the SEC Staff has
concluded that an accounting firm would lack independence with respect to a client that was a
registered investment company merely because the firm retained custody of the key to the
client’s safe deposit box.249 Such an audit firm could meticulously ensure its objectivity and
integrity in the conduct of its audits, but still run afoul of the SEC’s policies because it arguably
had access to whatever the client chose to keep in its safe deposit box.
In sum, as these examples demonstrate, command and control regulation carries with it a
substantial danger that compliance with detailed rules will become a substitute for achievement
of the intended policy objective. Moreover, there is a significant likelihood that such rules not
only will fail to foster the intended policy goal, but will divert resources away from the real
threats and toward those items which regulators, far removed from the situation, believe are the
problems, and, in the process, deflect attention from the underlying purpose of the regulation. As
a result, detailed regulations may not only be ineffective but actually counterproductive.250

248

Codification
62,890.

249

Accounting Series Release No. 81, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,103, at
62,230 (Dec. 11, 1958).

250

This is the rationale which supports the mandate of the Clinton Administration’s 1995 National
Performance Review initiatives to “reward results, not red tape, by changing performance measurement

of

Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02.C, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 73,263, at
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2.

Cost-Ineffective Regulation
As noted, the issue is not whether regulation itself is unnecessary or too

costly. If safety is impaired because employees fall over railings, the height of a railing is an
appropriate subject for regulation; similarly, if the employment of relatives of auditors by a client
impairs independence and lowers audit quality, regulation is indicated.

These examples,

however, lead one to question whether regulation at such a level of detail is the most effective
way to expend scarce regulatory and private sector resources and ensure achievement of the
policy goal. Under a regulation that merely required regulated firms to reduce the rate of worker
accidents, and noted, for instance, that railings must be high enough to prevent falls, individual
firms could address whatever causes of accidents might be of concern at their particular
facility.251 The same point applies in respect of family relationships. Under a regulation that
required auditing firms to maintain their independence, and noted that firms should ensure that
family relationships do not impair the firm’s independence, firms could develop particularized
solutions.252

Thus, while regulators are well-suited to state general principles of broad

applicability, they are often poorly equipped to determine what will be the most effective means
for each entity to achieve the regulatory goal.253

systems to focus on ultimate goals {e.g., cleaner air and safer workplaces) rather than the number of
citations written and fines assessed.” GOVERNMENT, supra note 233, at 270.
251

See infra pp. 111-112 for a discussion of the Maine 200 Program, under which OSHA implemented such a
system on a trial basis. Vice President Gore described the success of this program, stating that regulated
firms’ own workers are identifying - and fixing - 14 times more hazards” as the OSHA inspectors could
have found, and that “injury rates dropped 35 percent.” Government, supra note 233, at 41.

252

This is more fully discussed in Section V, see infra Section V.

253

As Philip Howard noted:
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a)

Informational Efficiency
Related to this point is the efficiency with which a government

regulator can collect and analyze the data necessary to formulate and implement regulations.
Creating detailed, particularized regulations requires detailed, particularized information.*
254 The
advantage of the regulator, however, lies in obtaining a broad base of knowledge about a
particular industry that no single firm may have, compared with the detailed knowledge of each
specific firm that only its partners or officers possess.255

Decision making must be transferred, from words on a page back to people on
the spot. This requires legal frameworks that are open, not open-and-shut.
* * *
Law should articulate goals, award subsidies, allocate presumptions, and
provide mechanisms for resolving disagreements, but law should almost never
provide the final answer. Life is too complex. Our public goals are too
complex. Hard rules only make sense when protocol. . . is more important than
getting something done. . . . Law can’t think, and so law must be entrusted to
humans and they must take responsibility for their interpretation of it.
Common Sense, supra note 233, at 186.
254

As Justice Stephen Breyer observed when he was a professor of law at Harvard University, “much of the
needed information is so detailed that only by replicating the industry’s expertise could the agency obtain
it.” Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and
Reform. 92 HARV. L. Rev . 549, 571 (June 1979) (hereinafter “ANALYZING REGULATORY FAILURE”).

255

Because an adequate information base is frequently unavailable from other sources, such as the agency’s
own staff, outside experts or public interest groups, unless the regulator is prepared to grant the industry
significant input in the formulation of a standard, the regulator runs a substantial risk that the standard will
be wide of the mark in terms of preventing the harm. Such a result serves the interests of no one - not
industry, not the regulator, and least of all the public which the regulator is supposed to protect. As Vice
President Gore puts it:
Ask industry how it should be regulated? Who else knows the problems, and
the potential solutions, better? So long as the government establishes standards
that protect the public, why not let industries and other affected stakeholders
help figure out how best to get there?
Government, supra note 233, at 74. As a general principle, then, a regulated industry should have input
into the formulation of policies and standards. It should be noted that the ISB’s composition — with
representatives of the profession playing key roles — takes this principle into account.
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b)

Rigid Rules, Dynamic Reality
Legal obligations are designed to be stable and predictable, while

regulated entities ideally are rapidly adaptable to changing commercial and technological
environments.256 Universal rules cannot be altered quickly to reflect changing circumstances.257
The Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,258 whose nearly 40-year “reign
of error” has now in large part come to an end,259 is a prime example. Under that clause, it was
required that even a scintilla of a substance thought to be a probable human or animal carcinogen
be banned from U.S. food. Over the years following enactment of the Delaney Clause, science
provided methodologies capable of identifying quantities of such substances in the food supply
more minuscule than could have been imagined at the time of enactment of the Delaney Clause.
With no evidence of their cancer-causing potential at such vanishingly low thresholds, a variety
of pesticides and food additives thus were prohibited in the U.S., notwithstanding the fact that
these products might also have provided significant health benefits (e.g, more abundant food
supplies at lower cost, lower fat and cholesterol content, better control in diabetic diets).

256

Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 110 (1992) (hereinafter “RESPONSIVE
Regulation”).

257

As Philip Howard observes:
Compulsive devotion to uniformity in law can generally be achieved only by
infidelity to fairness in life. Justice Cardozo understood our inclination toward
universal rules, but cautioned that “uniformity of method will carry us upon the
rocks” and that “the curse of this fluidity, of an ever-shifting approximation, is
one that the law must bear,” or “curses yet more dreadful will be invited in
exchange.” One of the dreadful curses is that we are making diversity illegal.
Common Sense, supra note 233, at 38.

258

21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).

259

Amendments in 1994 and 1996 effectively removed dietary supplements and pesticide residues from the
prohibition of the Delaney Clause.
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Benefits could not even be considered or balanced against the degree of cancer risk — by statute,
any such risk was too much.260
3.

Motivations of Regulated Entities
Regulated entities have varied motivations and objectives, as do the sub

units and decision makers within them.

An additional weakness of command and control

regulation is that it frequently is premised on the notion that “the typical corporation supposedly
carefully calculates to disobey the law when the anticipated fine and the probability of being
caught are seen as small in comparison to the profits to be gained through disobedience.”261 The
reality is that private firms are no more monolithic than the regulators themselves. As Vice
President Gore observed,
People — in government or out — are, for the most part, neither
crooked nor stupid. Most people want to do the right thing, so
long as the right thing makes sense. Perhaps the most important
thing about the reinvention initiative, and its regulatory reform
work in particular, is that it is based on a new assumption: that
people are honest and that if you tell people what needs to be done,
and let them get on with doing it, the chances are it will be done
better — and more cheaply — than if you tell them how.
Moreover, it values them as human beings.262
Consistent with this philosophy, an effective regulatory strategy not only must address the actions
of purely economic actors, but also take advantage of individuals’ trust, honesty, professionalism

260

In its March 7, 1997 report, the Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk
Management stated that “[t]he Delaney Clause illustrates what can happen when Congress legislates
scientific judgment, however well-intentioned, in a manner that cannot evolve with advances in scientific
knowledge.” 2 The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management in
Regulatory Decision Making, at 136 (1997).

261

Jay A. Sigler and Joseph E. Murphy, Interactive Corporate Compliance: An Alternative
Regulatory Compulsion 119 (1988) (hereinafter “Interactive Corporate Compliance”).

262

Government, supra note 233, at 54.
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and sense of civic responsibility.
Even if individuals can be relied upon to comply with rules or principles, a command and
control regime may become so burdensome and complex that no one, including those who seek
to comply, can do so. For example, no facility or risk manager can be aware of, much less assure
compliance with, four thousand OSHA regulations.263 Likewise, auditors are expected to know,
understand, and comply with scores of SEC and AICPA interpretations and guidelines regarding
auditor independence that have accumulated over the years (and which have limited coherence as
a whole).
Persons who cannot understand the rules, however, may take the position that they are not
personally responsible for ensuring that the rules are followed. Instead, that responsibility may
come to be viewed as the sole province of the firm’s “compliance” personnel. Thus, rather than
fostering a culture of compliance among all individuals subject to regulation, an overly complex
regime encourages such individuals to consider compliance to be someone else’s job.264 Worse
still, if the detailed regulations bear only a tangential relationship to the policy objectives to be
achieved (i.e., if compliance becomes an end in itself), they will breed only cynicism and
contempt.
4.

The Myth of Eliminating All Risk
When regulation attempts to address every eventuality, it also seeks to

263

In all likelihood, neither can an OSHA inspector, so each inspector enforces the regulations he or she
happens to know. See COMMON Sense, supra note 233, at 30-34.

264

For example, while there may be no empirical research on how many pages of regulations the typical
manager can assimilate, it is certain that a manager can remember more of them if he has played a role in
their development and understands their relationship to the policy objective to be achieved. See BURKE
Report, supra note 219, Appendix C, at 11-12.
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eliminate all risk. Thus, as described by Howard, situations have arisen in which OSHA cited a
firm for failing to provide its employees with warning forms relating to the bottles of Windex
found on the premises, or required firms to label bricks as hazardous substances, because of the
remote possibility that a worker might saw a brick and release dust containing a material that may
cause cancer.265 Although bricks and Windex are not among the most important threats to
worker safety, the drive to eliminate whatever danger these products might pose causes the
regulator (and the regulated firms) to divert resources to such relatively minor concerns, to the
exclusion of any underlying systemic problem that may exist at a regulated business. As Justice
Breyer pointed out (while he was a law professor at Harvard), “[e]fforts to cure every minor
defect, to close every conceivable loophole, are ultimately counterproductive.”266
In the context of the regulation of auditor independence, the quest to eliminate even
attenuated risk has manifested itself in prohibitions on relationships that might give rise to an
“appearance” of a lack of independence.267 At worst, these requirements prevent auditors from
having any dealings with audit clients outside the scope of the audit that might conceivably cause
any person to question the existence of independence, regardless of the materiality of the
relationship to the auditing firm, the countervailing societal benefits of the relationship,268 or the

265

See COMMON Sense, supra note 233, at 37-8. The justification given for a special warning on Windex use
was the OSHA inspector’s concern that the Windex may be used “in higher concentrations” in the
workplace than in the household. Id. at 38. See also, the discussion of the Delaney Clause, supra p. 98.

266

Analyzing Regulatory Failure, supra note 254, at 586. Instead, Breyer recommended that “regulation
should aim at worst cases, and in attacking such cases regulation should seek simple rules.” Id.

267

To a large extent, the examples of particularized restrictions on auditor conduct discussed supra, are also
examples of appearance-based regulation of independence.

268

For a discussion of the benefits of relationships that may present only an “appearance” of an impairment on
independence, See Section III.
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absence of any empirical evidence that the auditor’s independence was compromised, either in
fact or appearance.269
A cogent, recent example of this propensity to seek the elimination of all risk regardless
of the costs involves the role of accounting firms in addressing the so-called “Year 2000
Problem.” A consequence of software programs that record the year using only the last two
digits,270 it has been estimated that the total, world-wide cost to correct the Year 2000 Problem
will be in the hundreds of billions of dollars.271 Companies concerned about the Year 2000
Problem may often call upon the services of consultants skilled in identifying the company’s
exposure to the problem, and assisting companies in their remediation efforts. Because of the
potential scope of the problem, many companies, particularly large companies, require the
services of large consulting firms.
Accounting firms have taken a leading role in bringing Year 2000 Problems to the
attention of their clients, including audit clients, and assisting them with the identification and
correction of such problems. Nevertheless, the SEC Staff has indicated that it might question an
accounting firm’s independence if the firm “designs or modifies [a client’s computer] programs

269

This is not to say that all appearance-based regulation should necessarily be precluded. See Section II at 44
for a thorough consideration of appearance-based regulation. Any such regulation, however, must have an
empirical basis.

270

The Year 2000 Problem stems from decisions by programmers of the 1960s to save memory space by
using only the last two digits of a year instead of all four when referring to the date, a technique that
programmers continued to use until very recently. But when “00” comes up for the year 2000, many
computers will view it as 1900 instead, causing widespread problems.

271

For example, it has been estimated that it will take 500 employees and $100 million to fix American
Airlines’ system. See, e.g., Richard J. Koretko, New Millennium Is Cause for Concern, J. OF ACCT. 15
(Oct. 1996).
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to correct the Year 2000 problem.”272 In expressing its potential concern, the SEC Staff did not
explain how the provision of Year 2000 services might pose any threat to the integrity of the
client’s financial statements or impair a firm’s independence.273 Nor did the Staff acknowledge
the enormous societal benefits to be gained (and costs avoided) by the provision of such services
by accounting firms that are both qualified and well-situated to assist their clients with their
remediation efforts.
B.

An Alternative Approach - Enforced Self-Regulation
Whether

called

“Enforced

Self-Regulation,”

“Audited

Self-Regulation,”

“Interactive Compliance,” or “Cooperative Implementation,” the alternative to the command and
control approach calls for the regulator to promulgate rules of broad applicability, and then rely
on the regulated entities to develop specific, individualized and enforceable implementation
plans.274 Under this approach, the regulator’s role is to articulate the policy objective, provide

272

SEC Staff Report to the Congress on the Readiness of the United States Security Industry
Public Companies to M eet the Information Processing Challenges of the Year 2000 (June
1997), at 14 <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/yr2000.htm>.

and

273

Indeed, prior SEC pronouncements support the conclusion that services provided by accounting firms to
clients to identify and correct Year 2000 Problems should not be considered to impair the firms’
independence. For example, the SEC stated years ago that systems-related services identical to those
provided by accounting firms to assist clients with the correction of Year 2000 problems are “proper
function[s] for the qualified public accountant” and that “[c]omputer programming is an aspect of systems
design.” Accounting Series Release No. 126, supra note 36, at 62,307.

274

See, e.g., RESPONSIVE REGULATION, supra note 256, at 101-32; Douglas C. Michael, Federal Agency Use
o f Audited Self-Regulation as a Regulatory Technique, 47 ADMIN. L. Rev . 171 (Spring 1995) (hereinafter
“Audited Self-Regulation”); Interactive Corporate Compliance supra note 261; Cooperative
Implementation, supra note 73, at 535. Professor Michael described some of the benefits of this
approach as follows:
Because cooperative implementation relies on rules developed by the regulated entities,
the agency’s rules can be “transparent,” stating only the outcome or result desired. These
rules, known as performance or output standards, have long been recognized by
researchers in administrative reform to have unique potential to be more flexible,
coordinated and rational. In addition to benefiting the regulated entities and the intended
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incentives for its achievement, assist in developing self-regulatory plans, and administer a
credible program of detection and enforcement. Rather than prescribing a detailed set of rules,
enforced self-regulation seeks to achieve the policy objective by enlisting the regulated entities in
developing an array of solutions tailored to the requirements of each participant.275
A system of enforced self-regulation of auditor independence offers a variety of benefits.
By establishing goals and requiring the firms to accomplish the goals, rules could be both
simpler and more specific, and address circumstances at each firm that a centralized rule-maker
may be unaware of, or unable to address.276 By placing the responsibility on individual firms to
establish and enforce regulations, the system would provide the flexibility necessary for changes
in services offered and other developments, and keep the regulatory regime in close touch with
each firm’s circumstances. Commitment to self-generated rules would likely be strengthened

beneficiaries of the regulatory program, these standards should benefit the agency as
well. Not only can programs be improved, but the consequently simpler and more
routine enforcement strategy can make the regulatory program less expensive and more
efficient, either lowering altogether the government’s costs or allowing the agency to
concentrate those resources on other problems.
Cooperative Implementation at 554 (footnotes omitted). See also, Remarks of Commissioner,
Securities & Exchange Commission, Steven M.H. Wallman, Institute of International Bankers,
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 4, 1996) (“We must consider adopting a new regulatory philosophy, one that is
more goal oriented and less command-and-control oriented”).
275

See, e.g., COOPERATIVE IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 73, at 598 (“The regulatory program that would be a
good candidate for cooperative implementation is one in which complex regulations are applied to complex
organizations in order to prevent harm from occurring, rather than merely to identify and punish
violators”); John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology o f Regulatory Enforcement,” 18 L.
& Soc’Y REV. 179, 183 (1984) (“It is generally agreed that cooperative strategies are most important when
the complexity of compliance situations makes it impossible to specify in unambiguous legal rules the
behavior required to achieve intended policy purposes.”).

276

Cooperative Implementation supra note 73, at 554 (observing that “[c]ooperative implementation has
great potential to produce better regulation, and to produce it more efficiently, because the regulated
entities themselves would be developing the regulations....[t]heoretically, this should result in better
standards and greater compliance.”).

- 104-

and made more effective.277
For global professional services firms subject to the standards of more than one country,
performance standards will greatly facilitate compliance with independence rules both within and
outside the United States 278 A system of self-generated rules would also permit the ISB to
recognize the validity of different approaches developed internationally and in other countries to
the safeguarding of independence. This may foster the further interest in the development of
international principles-based standards, without sacrificing the goals of U.S. regulation.
C.

Implementation of Enforced Self-Regulation
Many federal agencies, including the SEC itself, have adopted enforced self-

regulatory models to achieve better adherence to statutory policies.

Several examples are

discussed below.
1.

Federal Securities Laws
In recent years, Congress has acknowledged the advantages of enforced

self-regulation under the federal securities laws. Pursuant to Section 204A of the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) 279 and Section 15(f) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)280 Congress obligated regulated entities to implement their own,

277

Id. (noting that “[r]ules developed by the regulated entity itself should have the inherent advantage of
being perceived as reasonable by those who must comply.”).

278

Several international organizations have already proposed auditor ethics codes that include discussion of
auditor independence. Perhaps the most widely recognized of these codes is the International Federation of
Accountants’ Code of Ethics for Public Accountants. See International Federation of Accountants, CODE
of Professional Ethics for Professional Accountants 18 (1996). Other codes include the European
Contact Group’s Code of Conduct.
See European Contact Group, RESPONDING TO Market
Expectations: An Action Plan to Reduce the Expectation Gap 8 (July 1996).

279

15 U.S.C. § 80b-4a (1994).

280

15 U.S.C. §78o(f)(1994).

-105-

individually-tailored rules to detect and prevent conduct Congress determined to be detrimental
to the public interest. Similarly, pursuant to Rule 17j-l281 under the Investment Company Act of
1940,282 the SEC has adopted strategies of enforced self-regulation. Each of these examples
demonstrates the viability of enforced self-regulation as applied to the objectives of the securities
laws.
a)

Sections 204A and 15(f)
Multiservice securities firms may face internal conflicts of interest

where, for example, the investment banking group of a firm comes into possession of material,
nonpublic information that could be of value to the retail and institutional brokerage group. In
spite of the possibility of conflicts of interest (and the risk of insider trading), neither the SEC
nor Congress has prohibited multiservice securities firms from providing particular services.
Instead, in 1988, Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988, which added Section 15(f) to the Exchange Act and Section 204A to the Advisers Act. In
identical language, those provisions state that:
Every registered broker or dealer [or investment adviser] shall
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures
reasonably designed, taking into consideration the nature of such
broker’s or dealer’s [investment adviser’s] business, to prevent the
misuse in violation of this title, or the rules and regulations
thereunder, of material, nonpublic information by such broker or
dealer [investment adviser] or any person associated with such
broker or dealer [investment adviser].283

281

17 C.F.R. § 270.17j-l (1997).

282

15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to 80a-64 (1994).

283

In other words, rather than try to “eliminate the risk” of insider trading, Congress opted to require firms to
adopt prophylactic measures to prevent the occurrence of the evil being addressed. Congress thereby
avoided regulatory overbreadth.
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In March, 1990, the SEC Staff undertook a study of broker-dealer efforts to develop such
codes, which, in practice, have involved erecting so-called “Chinese Walls” to prevent the flow
of information between employees in different parts of a broker-dealer’s business
organization.284

The Staff “determined that the necessary improvements to the efficient

operation of broker-dealer Chinese Walls would be best effectuated, not by Commission
rulemaking, but by vigorous self-regulatory examination programs, supplemented by
Commission oversight.”285
b)

Rule 17j-l
Rule 17j-l requires each investment company to adopt an

individualized, firm-tailored, “code of ethics” to regulate the personal securities trading of its
employees, with a view to detecting and sanctioning employees who engage in personal
securities transactions in a manner detrimental to firm clients 286 The SEC rejected a prohibition
on personal securities trading by such firms’ employees, recognizing that the benefits to the

284

See 8 Louis Loss and Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation 3621-23 (3d ed. 1991). While, in the
broker-dealer context this flow of information can be detrimental to the public interest, in the very different
context of a multiservice auditing and consulting firm, the flow of information between auditors and
consultants enhances the audit function and furthers the public interest. See discussion in Section III,
supra.

285

Broker Dealer Policies and Procedures Designed to Segment the Flow and Prevent the Misuse of Material
Non-Public Information, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,520, at 80,629 (Mar.
1990).

286

Specifically, the codes are to be designed to “prevent . . . associated persons [of investment companies]
from engaging in fraudulent practices or manipulative activities in connection with the purchase or sale by
such persons of securities held or to be acquired by investment companies.” See Personal Investment
Activities of Investment Company Personnel and Codes of Ethics of Investment Companies and their
Investment Advisers and Principal Underwriters, Investment Company Act Release No. 21341, [1995
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,653, at 87,011 (Sept. 8, 1995).
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marketplace of permitting such trading outweighed the potential harm that it might cause.287
Instead, the SEC decentralized the regulation of employee personal trading, relying on each
regulated entity to determine the best means to address the problem (and providing strong
incentives for the firms to do so). As the SEC observed:
The variety of employment and institutional arrangements utilized
by different investment companies renders impractical a rule
designed to cover all conceivable possibilities. Moreover, as a
matter of policy the Commission believes the introduction and
tailoring of ethical restraints on the behavior of persons associated
with an investment company can best be left in the first instance to
the directors of the investment company.288
Responding to this mandate, regulated entities have developed a wide variety of codes
tailored to their individual circumstances.289
2.

Community
Standards

Reinvestment

Act

(“CRA”)

Performance-Based

The CRA directs the bank regulatory agencies to publish regulations to
carry out the purposes of the CRA, which was enacted to eliminate the practice of “redlining,” or
the denial of credit on properties in the local community in which the bank is chartered wholly
because of their geographic location in areas perceived to have a high risk of default.290 The

287

See Report of SEC Division of Investment Management
Investment Company Personnel 27-28 (Sept. 1994).

288

Investment Company Act Release No. 11421, [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,679, at
83,735 (Oct. 3 1 , 1980).

289

See Investment Company institute Report of the Advisory Group on Personal Investing,
Appendix II (May 9, 1994). Codes generally include pre-clearance requirements for personal securities
transactions and restrictions on personal transactions during periods in which trades are executed with
company funds.

290

12 U.S.C. § 2905 (1994). The recitation of congressional findings and statement of purpose states that
“regulated financial institutions have [a] continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs
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on

Personal Investment Activities

of

CRA does not contain any substantive requirements regarding an institution’s investment in its
local community. Instead, using a variety of assessment factors, the institution’s regulatory
agency evaluates the extent to which the institution is meeting the credit needs of its community,
and provides each institution with a CRA “rating,” based on the results of the assessment. Under
the CRA regulations previously in effect (the “Procedure-Based Regulations”), the bank
regulatory agencies considered twelve separate factors in determining a depository institution’s
CRA rating.291
In July 1993, President Clinton asked the bank regulatory agencies to implement reforms
to streamline and clarify the Procedure-Based Regulations, which were regularly criticized for
emphasizing paperwork over results.292 After considering a number of alternatives, in May 1995,
the bank regulatory agencies adopted revised CRA regulations (the “Performance-Based

of the local communities in which they are chartered.” 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3)(1994). The respective
federal bank regulatory agencies’ regulations are substantively parallel to one another. For a discussion of
the CRA, generally, see Thomas P. Vartanian, Robert H. Ledig, Alisa Babitz, et al., The Fair Lending
Guide § 8.01 (1995) (“The Fair Lending Guide”).
291

These factors focused on a depository institution’s efforts to ascertain the credit needs of its entire
community, its efforts to market its products to its entire community and its compliance with procedural
requirements, including the obligation to delineate the local communities that comprise the institution’s
entire community, prepare a CRA statement, post a CRA notice and maintain a CRA file. Id. at § 8.03.

292

Remarks Announcing the Community Development Banking and Finance Initiative, 29 WEEKLY COMP.
An historical treatment of the criticism of the Procedure-Based
Regulations, as well as the response of Congress, regulators, and consumer and community groups to the
President’s directive, may be found in THE Fair LENDING GUIDE, supra note 290, at §8.04[A]. Shortly
after the President’s remarks, the bank regulatory agencies proposed a revised approach to the CRA.
Although the 1993 proposal was not adopted, the agencies’ remarks regarding the CRA as it was then
implemented, encapsulate the sentiments of both regulated entities and those intended to benefit from the
regulation:
PRES. doc . 1339 (July 15, 1993).

Despite the CRA’s notable successes, bank and thrift industry, community,
consumer and other groups maintain that its full potential has not been realized,
in large part, because compliance efforts have been focused on process at the
expense of performance.
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Regulations”).293 Pursuant to the Performance-Based Regulations, the bank regulatory agencies
now assess the performance of institutions subject to the CRA by evaluating their performance
measured by standards relating to lending, investment and service.294 The Performance-Based
Regulations permit the regulators to tailor the assessment mechanism to the institution (e.g,
small institutions are assessed pursuant to streamlined performance standards for small banks).
In addition, an institution may request that a regulator evaluate its CRA performance under a
strategic plan designed by the institution and approved by the regulator.
3.

EPA’s Project XL
On March 16, 1995, President Clinton announced a number of

‘reinvention initiatives’ to be implemented by the EPA, as part of a strategy to improve public
health and environmental protection at a more reasonable cost.295 One of these initiatives, called
“Project XL,” is a national pilot program to test new approaches for meeting environmental
protection goals.296 The EPA views Project XL as part of a “quest for a more efficient and

Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466 (Dec. 21, 1993).
293

Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (May 4, 1995).

294

The Fair Lending Guide, supra note 290, at § 8.04[8][C].

295

Remarks on Regulatory Reform 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. D o c. 426 (Mar. 16, 1995). See also, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 27,282 (May 2 3 , 1995).

296

This is to be achieved by a partnership arrangement in which the EPA,
working with the states, enables individual companies to develop their own
ways to improve the environment. Partners will be allowed to replace current
requirements with alternative, company-developed controls so long as they
perform better than current rules and regulations, permit citizens to examine
assumptions and track progress, ensure worker safety and environmental justice,
are supported by the community and are enforceable.
Government, supra note 233, at 70.
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results-oriented regulatory system.”297 According to the EPA, Project XL “offers good actors —
environmental leaders and today’s average performers alike — a tremendous opportunity to think
‘outside the box’ of our current system and to find solutions to obstacles that limit environmental
performance.”298
4.

OSHA’s Maine 200 Program
The Maine 200 Program started in 1993 after OSHA examined Maine’s

workers’ compensation data and determined that enforcement efforts were not having an
adequate impact on the firms registering the highest number of worker compensation claims.
The mismatch was particularly troubling to OSHA because of Maine’s relatively high incidence
of hazards, injuries, and illness.

Notwithstanding OSHA’s vigorous enforcement efforts in

Maine, including “award-winning” numbers of citations and numerous fines, Maine continued to
have a disproportionate number of worker injuries. In the most demonstrable way, command and
control was not working.
Determined to reduce escalating injury and illness claims, OSHA selected the 200 Maine
companies with the highest volume of worker injury claims.299 OSHA then offered each
employer on the list two options. The employers could either (i) choose to work with OSHA by
themselves identifying and correcting hazards and implementing comprehensive companydrafted safety and health programs to sustain the effort, or (ii) opt for an increase in OSHA

297

Environmental Protection Agency, Notice of Modifications to Project XL, 62 Fed. Reg. 19872 (Apr. 23,
1997).

298

Id.

299

Report of the U.S. D epartment of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health A dministration,
Maine Top 200 Program: 1995 Winner: Innovations in American Government Award (1995).
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inspections. All but two of the firms decided to enter into a compliance partnership with OSHA.
The program has been a success for the regulator, the companies and the workers. Over
the eight years before the program, OSHA identified some 37,000 hazards at 1,316 work sites.
In the first three years of the program, employers identified 180,000 workplace hazards and
corrected 128,000 of them. More importantly, after two years of the program, the participants’
injury rate had fallen by 35%.300
OSHA is now introducing variations of the Maine 200 Program nationwide, under the
name “Cooperation Compliance Programs.”

After operating these programs in nine states,

OSHA expects to implement them nationwide during October 1997.301

5.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation of Operator Testing
and Plant Maintenance
The

Nuclear

Regulatory

Commission

(“NRC”)

has

regulatory

responsibility302 for assuring the protection of the public health and safety from radiological
hazards at the more than 100 nuclear power reactors located at some 50 power plant sites
throughout the U.S. These plants and reactors are remarkable in their diversity — in terms of
power rating, design, number of reactors per plant, service area, the mix of nuclear and
conventional facilities operated by the utility owner, and number of owners.

The NRC is

responsible for assuring that each licensee operates its plants safely. By means of adopting a

300

Id. The firms represented only about one percent of the state’s employers, but accounted for 45 percent of
the workplace injuries, illnesses and fatalities.

301

New OSHA Program, Nat’l . L. J ., Sept. 22, 1997, at A 13.

302

As the NRC has repeatedly made clear, operational responsibility for the plants is with the facility
licensees (typically, electric power utilities). The NRC views its job not as telling the licensee how to run
its plant, but only assuring that the licensee does so safely in compliance with the law and regulations.
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decentralized approach in certain aspects of its regulation, the NRC does what it is best capable
of doing — overseeing the performance of its facility licensees — and requires the licensees to
fulfill their operational responsibilities through programs and plant-specific goals which each
licensee has designed.
For example, the NRC’s newly adopted nuclear plant maintenance rule303 sets broad
standards304 (with licensee-established specific goals) and leaves it to the facility licensee, who is
most familiar with the plant and its equipment, to devise the monitoring plan by which those
goals and standards will be met.305 The NRC then reviews that monitoring plan for its
adequacy.306
Likewise, rather than itself drafting, proctoring or grading the written tests for individuals
who are nuclear reactor operators, the NRC (following a voluntary pilot testing program by some

303

10 C.F.R. § 50.65 (1997).

304

10 C.F.R. § 50.65(a)(1) begins as follows: “Each holder of a license to operate a nuclear power plant. . .
shall monitor the performance or condition of structures, systems, or components, against licenseeestablished goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that such structures, systems, and
components . . . are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. Such goals shall be established
commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account industry-wide operating experience.”

305

Similarly, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Export Administration (“BXA”) has
implemented a program called the Special Comprehensive License (“SCL”) to streamline the licensing
process for certain exports and export-related activities to certain countries. 15 C.F.R. Part 752 (1997).
Because BXA controls may be imposed for national security, human rights, anti-terrorism, and a variety of
other reasons, exporters are frequently required to obtain multiple licenses for essentially repetitive
transactions, often over an extended period. To avoid such multiple licensing, the SCL authorizes these
exports and activities without resort to case-by-case review. A key element of SCL application process is
the development and implementation by the applicant of an Internal Control Program designed to provide
assurance that exports and re-exports will not be made in a manner contrary to what BXA would have
permitted on a case-by-case basis. Id. at § 752.11 BXA thus leaves the task of creating a solution to the
applicant, and considers only the adequacy of the result in assessing the SCL application.

306

When a structure, system or component “does not meet established goals,” the rule states that “appropriate
corrective action shall be taken.” 10 C.F.R. § 50.65(a)(1)(1997).
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utilities) recently proposed to turn that responsibility over to the facility licensees.307 The NRC
would not mandate the questions to be asked on the tests. Instead, it has described the required
content of the written examinations and operating tests in terms of the regulatory goals to be
achieved, identified the general subject areas and safety-related systems to be covered,308 and
will review and approve future examinations and operating tests. The NRC would provide a
guidance document on preparing the examinations, and has enunciated broad norms for
preserving the integrity of the testing process.309 The agency requires its facility licensees to
adopt their own means of assuring integrity, in accordance with NRC guidance310 and imposes
sanctions should they fail to implement effective mechanisms.311

307

62 Fed. Reg. 42,426-30 (Aug. 7, 1997), proposing to amend 10 C.F.R. Part 55, Subpart E (1997).

308

See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 55.41(a), which states, in part:
Content. The written examination for an operator will contain a representative
selection of questions on the knowledge, skills, and abilities needed to perform
licensed operator duties. The knowledge, skills, and abilities will be identified,
in part, from learning objectives derived from a systematic analysis of licensed
operator duties performed by each facility licensee and contained in its training
program and from information [in various facility-specific reports filed by the
facility licensee with the NRC.]

309

The regulations at § 55.49 provide that “[Applicants, licensees and facility licensees shall not engage in
any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part.”
10 C.F.R. §55.49(1997).

310

See, NUREG 1021: Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors Interim Rev.
8 (Jan. 1997).

311

There are other examples of such firm-centered compliance programs. For instance, in 1986, in response
to concerns regarding the business ethics of defense industry participants, executives from major defense
contracting corporations formulated Defense Industry Initiatives on Business Ethics and Conduct (“DII”), a
voluntary program for industry self-regulation. See CONDUCT AND RESPONSIBILITY: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT (1986). Companies participating in DII must agree to adopt and implement “a set of principles
of business ethics and conduct that acknowledge and address their corporate responsibilities under federal
procurement laws and to the public.” Id. at 42. Among other things, a DII participant agrees to adopt a
written code of conduct, tailored to the company’s own circumstances, and agrees to implement related
training and communications programs. In this regard, the DII performs a role similar to the ISB
guidelines, except that, as befits a profession, the ISB’s approach will be mandatory and builds on an
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D.

Conclusion
In his 1979 article on regulatory reform, then-professor Stephen Breyer set forth

three general principles for effective governmental regulation:
•

aim at the worst cases, and in attacking these cases
regulators should seek simple rules.

•

rely upon incentives and bargaining whenever possible to
induce more acceptable behavior.

•

look at economic regulation through a procompetitive lens
and adopt a “least restrictive alternative” approach.

Sixteen years later, President Clinton made the same point in setting forth what he
expected of those in his Administration responsible for adopting and implementing regulations:
I am instructing all regulators to go over every single regulation and cut
those regulations which are obsolete, to work toward results, not red tape,
to get out of Washington and to go out into the country to create grass
roots partnerships with the people who are subject to these regulations and
to negotiate rather than dictate wherever possible.
*
*
*
We should ask ourselves, Do we really need this regulation? Could
private businesses do this just as well with some accountability to us?
*
*
*
I want to convene immediately groups consisting of the frontline
regulators and the people affected by their regulations . . . Most people in
business in this country know that there is a reason for these . . . areas of
regulations. And most people would be more than happy to work to find a
way that would reduce hassle and still achieve the public interest we seek
to achieve.
*
*
*
. . . I want to move from a process where lawyers write volumes to one

existing system of self-regulation that is deeply rooted in the accounting profession. Similarly,
organizations have adopted codes in response to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The codes are
designed assure that the adopting organization has effectively ensured that it is in compliance with
applicable federal laws.
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where people create partnerships based on common objectives and
common sense. I want each regulatory agency head to submit to the White
House a list of pending procedures that can be converted into consensual
negotiations.312
Section V of this White Paper describes a new conceptual framework for auditor
independence that builds upon the enforced self-regulation model.

V.

Proposal for a New Conceptual Framework
This White Paper sets forth the following new conceptual framework for auditor

independence. As discussed in Section IV, regulation of independence in the public interest can
best achieve its goals not through “command and control” directives, but rather by building on
the concept that auditing professionals and their firms have a fundamental obligation to establish
and enforce policies that provide reasonable assurance to investors that those responsible for the
performance of an audit are objective, act with integrity and therefore maintain their
independence. These regulatory policy considerations are aligned with the economic, behavioral
and ethical determinants of audit firm and auditor behavior described in Section III. The new
framework would call for the ISB to provide clear guidance regarding the core principles of
independence, and then require firms to implement those principles through their own
compliance codes, subject to ISB oversight.

312

Remarks on Regulatory Reform, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 278, 280 (Feb. 21, 1995).
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A.

A Principles-Based System
A primary objective of the ISB is “the development of principles-based

independence standards.”313 The accounting profession has strongly supported movement away
from a regime of detailed independence rules to a set of principles-based codes. Accordingly,
this White Paper suggests that the ISB should consider and adopt certain core principles as the
basis for a new set of independence guidance replacing the detailed rules it has adopted
provisionally. The independence principles articulated by the ISB should be broadly worded
distillations of what common sense, professional history, and rigorous analysis of the complete
range of incentives shaping the auditor-client relationship tell us are the threats which must be
counteracted or mitigated in order to protect and enhance the objectivity of the auditor.
Based on a general consensus in the profession regarding the primary considerations
affecting auditor independence,314 and as explained in more detail below, this White Paper
proposes that the ISB adopt the following core principles:
•

Auditors and firms should not be financially dependent upon an audit client;

•

Auditors and firms should not have conflicting interests that would impair
their objectivity with regard to matters affecting the financial statements; and,

313

Discussion Paper re: Independence Standards Board (May 7, 1997), referenced in Letter from Richard H.
Walker, General Counsel, Securities & Exchange Commission to Barry C. Melancon, President and CEO,
AICPA (May 1 6 , 1997).

314

Various prior analyses of auditor independence have described principles of auditor independence. In each
instance, the professional body responsible for the analysis has identified a common set of issues - the
independence issues posed by financial dependence upon an audit client, by conflicts of interest involving
an audit client, and by assumption of an inappropriate role vis-a-vis an audit client. See, e.g., Arthur
Anderson & Co., et al., The Public Accounting Profession: Meeting the Needs o f a Changing World (Jan.
1991) (describing four principles); AICPA SECPS Task Force, A New Approach to Auditor Independence
(1992) (proposing three principles). In a similar vein, recent professional guidance issued in the United
Kingdom attempts to categorize challenges to independence and identifies five types of potential threats.
See Statement on Integrity, Objectivity and Independence (Apr. 1996).
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•

Auditors and firms should not have relationships with, or engage in activities
for, clients that would entail making managerial decisions or otherwise serve
to impair an auditor’s objectivity.

The ISB should also recognize that risks or threats to achievement of the core principles
of independence set forth above can be averted or mitigated in many instances by appropriate
compensating controls (i.e., safeguards), and that firms should be encouraged to put in place and
enforce specific safeguards to protect independence.315 Further, although it is neither a principle
of independence per se nor a safeguard, the ISB’s new conceptual framework should recognize
the importance of materiality. Materiality, a pervasive concept in accounting and auditing, is a
factor which, although not always stated, is almost always relevant to the question of whether a
potential threat to an auditor’s independence creates an unacceptable risk of impairing his or her
objectivity.
Thus, and as discussed in detail below, the ISB’s approach to independence should reflect
the following considerations:
•

Immaterial interactions between an auditor or firm and an audit client should
be presumed not to impair auditor independence, absent evidence to the
contrary; and,

•

Many potential risks or threats to independence can be mitigated by
appropriate safeguards.

Once the ISB has adopted core principles of independence, these principles should be
cooperatively implemented through a process involving the ISB, the profession, and individual

315

As discussed in Section II supra, professional services firms already have instituted many safeguards in
connection with their own risk management programs, as well as in response to particular requirements the
profession has adopted for those firms which audit public entities.
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firms which audit public entities. As discussed below, the initial process would consist of
several distinct stages:316
•

The ISB would issue detailed explanatory “guidelines” expanding upon the
independence principles and setting forth the types of risks and threats that
firms will need to address in implementing those principles, as well as the
considerations (e.g., materiality, safeguards) that affect independence
judgments.

•

The IIC would create a “drafting guide” to aid firms requiring assistance in the
formulation of their codes. This drafting guide would provide illustrative
examples of safeguards that negate or reduce particular threats to
independence.

•

Each auditing firm would create and adopt an independence code (applying
the guidelines) in order to implement and internally enforce the ISB’s
independence principles. Codes must be put in place within a reasonable
transition period (e.g., three years) to be established by the ISB.317

The ISB guidelines, by identifying the specific risks or threats that firms should address
in implementing the core principles of independence, would act, in effect, as the equivalent of the
proposing releases that federal agencies have used to commence their own analogous regulatory
reform initiatives.318 The guidelines would allow the ISB to indicate the relative weight that it
assigns to the various potential threats to auditor independence, suggest appropriate
considerations which could serve to counteract or mitigate those threats, such as the imposition

316

This process is illustrated in Figure 1.2 supra.

317

This transition mechanism is suggested in order to accommodate small and mid-sized firms, which
otherwise might be unable to develop codes in a timely manner. During a firm’s transition period, if any, it
would continue to be governed by the existing system of rules and interpretations.

318

See, e.g, Environmental Protection Agency, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg.
27282 (May 23, 1995) (describing the XL program to improve environmental protection through reduced
but targeted regulation, project criteria, and the selection process for individual facilities and/or industry
sectors). See also, text accompanying notes 296-299 infra.
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of specific safeguards, and identify those unusual instances where considerations of public policy
might override the results of a normal independence analysis.319
As a practical matter, small and mid-sized firms may require additional assistance, as
well as time, in formulating appropriate codes. Therefore, it is suggested that the IIC review
existing independence rules and the profession’s practices, and then produce a “drafting guide”
to facilitate such firms’ participation in the new system.320 (There might even be multiple
drafting guides intended for different size firms.) Such a drafting guide would provide, through
examples, direction as to the appropriate resolution of issues raised in the ISB guidelines tailored
to the requirements of those firms.
Those firms participating in the new system of firm-specific independence codes would
elaborate upon and apply the ISB’s core independence principles. Some firms would choose to
participate in this new system right away; others might opt to remain under the prior
independence requirements applicable to auditors of public entities for a reasonable transition
period (not to exceed three years). Firms that require some time to adopt codes, or that wish to
wait and avail themselves of codes developed by similarly situated firms, could use this
transition rule to remain under the existing independence regulations while the new system
evolves. After three years, the ISB also would review how well the new process is achieving the

319

In other words, the ISB should retain the option to allow firms to undertake a relationship or activity that
might pose an abstract threat to independence but that, in actuality, serves the public interest, whether by
producing a more effective audit or otherwise. See Wallman, supra note 10, at 91. For example, the
current independence rules have, in effect, taken such public policy considerations into account in finding
that provision of tax advisory services is acceptable in terms of audit independence, notwithstanding the
potential for self-review.

320

Similarly, when it became necessary for investment companies to draft codes of ethics to regulate the
personal securities trading of those companies’ portfolio managers, the Investment Company Institute (the
“ICI”) prepared a “drafting guide” to facilitate that process.
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Board’s stated goals for independence before definitively retiring that portion of the old SEC
rules not consistent with the ISB guidelines.
Each participating firm would address the specific independence issues identified in the
guidelines and drafting guide(s). The firm would then craft specific self-regulatory solutions
consistent with the guidelines and include them in its independence code. The code would be
expected to detail the safeguards designed to insulate audit partners and other members of the
audit team from influences and pressures which could undermine their objectivity. In many
instances, the guidelines would identify a range of pre-approved safeguards as appropriate ways
to address each particular threat to independence; in others, the guidelines would set forth criteria
for firms to meet in designing appropriate safeguards. A firm’s code should be appropriate to its
size, its organizational structure (and affiliations) and the nature of its practice. Under this new
system, then, firms would aggressively address the threats applicable to their own auditor
independence — by designing and putting in place safeguards to assure the independence of the
firm and of the audit team.321 These safeguards, for example, would serve to prevent a “free
riding” audit partner (as previously discussed in Section III) from pursuing his or her personal
interests at the expense of the firm’s collective need to maintain its reputation. Compliance with
the safeguards would be subject to periodic testing as part of the regular peer review process (as
described below).
Each firm’s code would be filed with the ISB and thus would become public. Public
filing would provide an opportunity for investors and firm clients to understand firms’

321

Firm codes would not represent professional standards as such, but rather would set forth safeguards
through which professional standards (e.g., the ISB’s principles and guidelines) would be applied. The
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independence codes, and would facilitate firms’ comparison of their own independence codes
with those of their peers. This transparency could foster competition among firms to develop
measures most valued by investors, in effect creating a market in superior independence
safeguards and establishing the conditions for a potential “race to the top.” *322 Public filing
would also provide firms an additional incentive to comply with the provisions they set forth in
their codes. Further, in contrast to the present system, in which some of the guidance of the SEC
Staff remains unavailable to the public,323 public filing would engender more open discussion of
independence issues, giving the codes the educational aspect and moral force that an effective
independence regime should possess.
Moreover, additional mechanisms would likely be adopted to ensure that firms put in
place and continue to apply proper safeguards for auditor independence, as well as to encourage
the continued evolution of codes in the direction of more effective safeguards to assure
independence, as follows:
•

The ISB should be empowered to review firm codes, assess whether a code
contains a comprehensive and effective set of safeguards, and retain the option
to disapprove inadequate codes.

independence standards themselves would continue to be enforceable, just as they are today, by the SEC,
the AICPA and State Boards of Accountancy.
322

See Interactive Corporate Compliance, supra note 261, at 144. The authors note, for example, that:
The nurturance of interactive compliance would require construction of model programs
of compliance. High-complying corporations could provide some kind of model for
others in the same regulated group. This flagship approach to compliance would create
competition among firms to provide the prototype for industry compliance. Competition
is supposed to be one of the chief characteristics of a capitalist economy.

323

See Checkosky v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 23 F.3d 452, 482-483 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (concurring
opinion, J. Randolph) (describing the SEC’s use of an unpublished opinion in connection with a Rule 2(e)
proceeding, and explaining the problems inherent in a regulator’s reliance upon unpublished opinions and
interpretations).
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•

The IIC should analyze the codes adopted by firms and distill from them a set
of “best practices” to inform the creation of new codes and the evolution of
existing ones.

•

Firm-wide independence codes will facilitate the process of testing auditor
independence through peer review. (Peer review refers to periodic
examination by other accountants of a SECPS member firm’s audit quality
control systems.)

Firm codes would be subject to ISB review for content and quality.324 The review
process would assess whether the codes address threats to independence in a clear and
comprehensive manner and contain sufficient detail to give meaningful guidance.325 The ISB
would have the option to disapprove codes (or portions thereof) that are not consistent with the
core independence principles, as amplified by the guidelines. Firms would submit to the ISB
subsequent amendments to firm codes, subject also to ISB review. Firm codes and subsequent
amendments would be deemed to be approved unless explicitly disapproved (in whole or in part).
Selective ISB review would serve three principal functions. First, it would enable the
ISB to develop unique competence in assessing independence codes. Second, it could identify
potential deficiencies in individual codes and help resolve them. This resolution process would
enable any firm whose code was the subject of ISB review to explain the factors relevant to its

324

The ISB could be assisted in its review of selected firm independence codes by its professional staff and/or
by the IIC. The IIC is charged, among other things, to “address broader interpretive issues, including those
that emerge from inquiries fielded by the ISB staff,” as well as “other duties * * * assigned to it by the
Board.” Discussion Paper re: Independence Standards Board, supra note 313, at 4.

325

Given the number of public accounting firms, ISB review, even of selected codes, might be perceived by
some as imposing too great an administrative cost. However, two factors would reduce administrative
costs and logistical problems. First, groups of affiliated firms would likely develop codes on a joint basis,
thereby reducing the number of codes submitted to the ISB. Also, as previously noted, the IIC would
publish one or more “drafting guides” to assist small and mid-sized firms in the preparation of their codes.
The existence of these guides would assist firms in drafting codes, thereby reducing the review burden of
the ISB and/or its staff.
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particular practice, as well as to draw upon the expertise of the ISB and its staff. The goal would
be for the firm to craft a code that responded to the realities of the firm’s practice and fully
safeguarded the independence of the firm and its auditors. Finally, ISB review would foster
greater transparency, and thus enable investors to assure themselves that firms have adopted
codes that protect auditor independence.
As the ISB itself develops unique experience with and competence in assessing firm
safeguards, it could use the codes, taken as a body, as a compendium of practice that might prove
helpful as new interpretive issues arise. The IIC, to facilitate this process, should conduct a
detailed review of codes submitted to the ISB and distill from them “best practices.” The best
practices (i.e., exemplary safeguards) identified by these independence experts could serve as
benchmarks and, if adopted by the ISB, could become standards for the profession. Like the
public filing requirement, the IIC’s efforts to formulate best practices would assist the ongoing
development of better independence codes. Professional services firms with effective policies
valued by investors would be rewarded in the market. Moreover, the IIC’s ongoing efforts to
formulate best practices, based upon review of compliance codes by these independence experts,
would complement and extend its initial effort to provide guidance by means of the drafting
guide(s).
Finally, review of firms’ compliance with their independence codes would continue to be
a major element of the regular peer review process, in order to provide assurance to investors that
each firm applies its code in a manner that protects auditor independence in conformity with the
ISB’s principles and guidance. Each peer reviewer would test the subject firm’s compliance with
its independence code provisions. According to the SEC, peer review provides “added assurance
to investors, creditors and clients that an accountant is consistently complying with professional
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standards.”326 While peer review already tests a firm’s independence,327 a requirement for all
firms to adopt and comply with detailed independence codes would render peer review even
more effective with respect to the efficacy of safeguards. Strengthening the consideration given
independence in the peer review process, through the widespread use of detailed independence
codes for individual firms, would likewise reinforce auditors’ commitment to maintaining
independence from audit clients.
B.

ISB Guidelines on Independence Issues
The ISB, in its guidelines, would describe a methodology for analyzing

independence issues and creating appropriate independence codes at the firm level. For each
firm, the first step would be to apply the ISB’s independence principles and address potential
threats to the independence of an auditor or professional services firm. The independence
principles that the profession is recommending to the ISB are described below, with illustrations
of how these core principles can serve as a basis to address the independence issues faced daily
by members of the accounting profession. Each firm would then consider a series of questions in
determining how to address different, potential threats to independence, as follows:
•

Is the risk or threat of impairment material? (If not, it would normally require no
further response);

326

Independent Accountants - Mandatory Peer Review, Securities Act Release No. 6695, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,122, at 88,641 (Apr. 1, 1987). Similarly, the Commission has
indicated its belief that peer review “reinforces an accountant’s commitment to the maintenance of
adequate audit quality controls.” Id. at 88,644.

327

See, e.g, AICPA, SEC Practice Section Peer Review Program Manual 13242-49, 13342-45 (1997) (both
the quality control questionnaire filled out by the subject firm prior to commencement of the review and
the program guidelines used by the reviewer address “Independence, Integrity and Objectivity”).
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•

Next, are there safeguards that could effectively counteract the potential impairment?
(If so, such safeguards should be adopted as part of the firm code);

•

Finally, is this one of the rare cases when a public policy consideration indicates that
the normal result of the independence analysis should be varied? (If so, the situation
should be brought to the attention of the ISB.)

The ISB guidelines would explicitly discuss how firms should apply each of these
considerations - materiality, safeguards and (if present) additional public policy considerations when designing independence codes.
1.

Materiality
Materiality, a familiar and fundamental concept in accounting and

auditing, should almost always be a relevant consideration in assessing whether an auditor can
successfully resist a potential threat to his or her independence. Moreover, materiality is a factor
consistently deemed important by auditors, preparers and users of financial statements in
reaching judgments as to an auditor’s independence.328 Thus, immaterial interactions between an
auditor or firm and an audit client should be presumed not to impair auditor independence, absent
evidence to the contrary.
The SEC’s independence requirements now explicitly address materiality only in certain
contexts.329 For example, under those requirements materiality is considered relevant to many
business relationships between auditors and clients (except for those which arise as a consumer
in the normal course of business) — indirect business relationships are considered not to impair

328

See, e.g., ORREN REPORT, supra note 97, at 6-7 (with respect to business relationships).

329

See John M. Lacey, Auditor/Client Joint Investments and Independence, 4 RES. IN ACCT. REG. 129 (Gary
John Previts, ed. 1990).
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independence so long as they are immaterial, while even immaterial direct relationships are
prohibited.330 While the SEC Staff reviews individual independence matters “in the light of all
the pertinent circumstances in the particular case,”331 its judgments as to the relative importance
of facts often appear inconsistent with the common understanding of quantitative and qualitative
materiality.332
Any past reluctance by the SEC explicitly to identify materiality as a relevant factor in
making many independence judgments may relate simply to the size of major accounting firms
and of their revenues. However, while firm-level measures often will constitute an appropriate
yardstick for assessing materiality, they certainly are not the only measures that can be applied
(for example, in assessing the relevance of particular threats to the independence of an individual
audit partner or audit team). Not only would materiality be expressly identified as a factor
relevant to making independence judgments, it should also be possible for the ISB guidelines to
identify appropriate standards against which to assess the quantitative and qualitative aspects of
materiality with respect to most independence-related issues.333 Only in certain instances will a

330

Codification of Financial Reporting Policies § 602.02.g, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) | 73,272, at
62,905 (1997). Despite this formal conception, the business relationship analysis as to whether a third
entity dealing with the audit client is related to a professional services firm may subsume issues of
materiality (i e., in assessing whether the third party is in fact affiliated with the firm).

331

Id. at § 602.02.a, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
§210.2-01(c) (1997).

332

Section IV supra describes a number of instances where the SEC has explicitly or implicitly disregarded
considerations of materiality in reaching conclusions as to auditor independence.

333

Materiality has both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. For example, in the accounting context, while
the FASB has stated that “[materiality judgments are primarily quantitative in nature,” it has also specified
that “magnitude by itself, without regard to the nature of the item and the circumstances in which the
judgment has to be made, will not generally be [the] basis for a materiality judgment.” FASB Statement of
Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2,
123, 125.

73,257, at 62,885 (1997). See also, Rule 2-01(c), 17 C.F.R.
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potential threat to independence be so great, or a practice so universally regarded as
inappropriate, that materiality considerations should not apply. These areas would be identified
by the ISB and set forth in the guidelines.
2.

Safeguards
As discussed in Section II, the profession has long recognized the

importance of appropriate safeguards as a means to mitigate potential threats to independence,
for example, in the form of various quality control measures imposed by the SECPS (e.g., annual
confirmation of independence, partner rotation, concurring partner review, peer review).334 The
ISB guidelines would identify types of potential threats to the independence of a firm or an
auditor, consistent with the principles enumerated above, and then describe the degree to which
such threats can and should be addressed through safeguards. This safeguards-oriented approach
would promote a measured and pragmatic response to threats to independence, matching threats
and safeguards, and would impose a blanket proscription only where such a step was absolutely
necessary (i.e., with respect to a limited number of activities and relationships).
In certain instances, the ISB might find that a potential threat to independence was so
serious that it could not be mitigated through any combination of safeguards or that safeguards
simply were not practicable (i.e., instances where there would be an absolute bar or “red

334

The importance of safeguards is also recognized in other countries; for example, in recent professional
guidance issued in the United Kingdom. See Statement on Integrity, Objectivity and Independence (Apr.
1996). In particular, this Statement notes that “[a]uditors should always consider the use of safeguards and
procedures which may negate or reduce threats [and] should be prepared to demonstrate that in relation to
each identified threat, they have considered the availability and effectiveness of the safeguards and
procedures and are satisfied that their objectivity in carrying out the assignment will be properly
preserved.” Id. at § 3.1.
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light”).335 In most cases, however, one would expect that an appropriate additional safeguard or
set of safeguards could mitigate a particular threat to independence (a “yellow light” situation).
In such instances, the ISB would indicate in the guidelines what type of safeguards would be
most effective in addressing each specific threat.

Thus, for example, when the threat to

independence is one that involves factors that could affect the objectivity of the engagement
partner, it might be mitigated by (among other things) additional review by an industry expert or
more extensive concurring partner review of the audit than would otherwise occur. Finally, in
some other instances, threats to independence may be so attenuated that the normal level of
safeguards already associated with the profession’s existing quality control efforts are sufficient
to assure that independence will not be impaired.
Safeguards come in many forms, and the guidelines, where appropriate, could simply
offer examples, indicate important characteristics of the safeguards, and then invite firms that
seek to perform certain services to design an adequate set of case-specific independence
protections. This would allow firms to develop new mechanisms to address potential
independence concerns. The ISB, of course, could assess whether those safeguards in fact are
adequate through its review of firm codes, as described earlier.

335

For example, even though de minimis investments by a partner in a firm’s audit client may be immaterial to
the partner, the costs of monitoring and policing such investments might indicate the need for a blanket
prohibition. Moreover, such a prohibition would be consistent with the profession’s aspiration to avoid
even an appearance that auditor independence might be impaired. C f. Edwards, supra note 102, at 22-25,
Appendix D.
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Areas in which a firm could propose internal safeguards,336 as appropriate, in addition to
the protections that exist in the environment of the practice (e.g., professional obligations,
litigation exposure, oversight by client audit committees), include:
•

Inculcating independence as a cornerstone of firm culture and values (e.g.,
training programs; consultative mechanisms for auditors facing independence
issues; partner performance review and compensation policies);

•

Risk management procedures (e.g., client acceptance and continuance
policies);

•

Organizational and structural solutions (e.g., Chinese Walls); and

•

Internal accountability (e.g, monitoring of personal investments and related
periodic individual confirmations; ability to communicate independencerelated concerns to top levels of the firm; concurring partner review; audit
practice review; self-inspections and special procedures in circumstances of
potential self-review).
3.

Public Policy in Special Cases

As noted in former Commissioner Wallman’s recent commentary

on

independence issues, there may be special cases where a relationship or activity that could pose a
threat to independence should nonetheless be allowed, because it would “add to the ability of the
auditor to conduct a more efficient or effective audit or otherwise serve the public interest, in this
particular case or in general, so that the public interest warrants permitting the activity or
relationship.”337 The ISB guidelines could identify such issues and specify a procedure through
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Section II supra lists representative quality control measures currently used by some or all of the Big Six to
address independence-related issues. For a discussion of the types of safeguards employed by the
profession, and how those safeguards relate to auditors and their professional obligations, see Burke
Report, supra note 219, Appendix C and EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 102, at 22-25, Appendix D.

337

See Wallman, supra note 10, at 91.
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which additional considerations of public policy could be brought to the ISB’s attention when
appropriate.
C.

ISB Principles and Illustrative Guidelines
The principles of independence should be broad in scope and thus not constitute

mutually exclusive categories. Nevertheless, the ISB would be able, through its guidelines, to
highlight major independence issues and articulate how they relate to one or more of the core
principles it has adopted, as do the illustrative examples presented below. Thereby, the ISB can
inform the profession as to the considerations, and the types of possible safeguards, that are most
pertinent to various potential threats to auditor independence.
In recognition of the inherent difficulties of regulating on the basis of appearance, as
described in Section II, the ISB would direct firms to address threats to the appearance of
independence only where there is an adequate empirical foundation, and a clear need, for such
measures. Even in the absence of an empirical foundation to support mandatory requirements,
however, firms are constrained by certain appearance-based AICPA rules, and may well decide
to forego particular opportunities that raise similar appearance concerns in order to maintain their
professional self-image, or for purposes of risk management.338

338

As discussed in EDWARDS REPORT, supra note 102, Appendix D and in Section II supra, the profession
views the appearance of independence as an important aspiration for auditors and auditing firms, and, in
that connection, has adopted certain appearance-based rules (which will remain in effect as professional
requirements for all auditors).
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1.

Auditors and Firms Should not be Financially Dependent Upon an
Audit Client.
An auditor must always retain the capacity to perform an audit in an

objective manner, since the very essence of auditing is providing assurance as to reliability.
Accordingly, auditors must avoid situations in which their judgment might be affected by the
financial consequences of audit decisions they make regarding the reliability of a client’s
financial statements. Further, the reputational value of an audit firm’s opinion to the investing
public is heightened to the degree that the firm and its auditors have interests that are distinct
from those of the audit client. Thus, the ISB should adopt the principle that, to be independent,
an auditor must demonstrably lack financial dependence upon a particular audit client. The
threat of financial dependence may arise in a number of areas, including, but not limited to:
•

Auditor investment in an audit client;

•

Revenues derived from a particular audit client;339

•

Auditor compensation and incentives; and,

•

Loans to or from an audit client to the auditor(s), including unpaid
professional fees.

For example, compensation for audit partners could give rise to a potential threat to
independence if designed to reward partners for success in obtaining and retaining specific audit
clients. Similarly, a firm with an established practice could be considered to be financially

339

As m entioned above, it m ay be appropriate to test relative dependence ( i.e., m ateriality) n o t ju st w ith
respect to the firm , b u t also in relation to particular regions o r offices o f the firm .
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dependent if that firm or an autonomous unit of that firm consistently obtains a material portion
of its revenues from, or in cooperation with, an audit client.340
The guidelines should identify the threat to independence posed by such financial reliance
and which threats are subject to mitigation through safeguards. Student loans from banking
clients to individual auditors who have since graduated, for example, probably should be viewed
as a “yellow light” situation, whereas investments by individual auditors in their audit clients
presumably would be barred. In the former instance, and in other “yellow light” cases, the
guidelines would direct firms to put in place adequate safeguards and compensating controls at
the level of the firm, the audit team and the engagement partner.

Thus, in the case of an

engagement partner or an audit team, overcoming a particular threat might require that specified
quality control procedures be performed by individuals from another office or unit of the firm, or
might necessitate additional review by an industry expert.
2.

Auditors and Firms Should not have Conflicting Interests that would
Affect Their Objectivity with Regard to Matters Affecting the
Financial Statements.
Under the profession’s standards, an auditor’s only interest in the financial

statements of a client should be in whether they present fairly, in all material respects, the client’s
financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in conformity with GAAP. Actual and
potential conflicts of interest are unacceptable from an independence standpoint to the degree
that they could interfere with an auditor’s objective evaluation of the client’s financial

340

An appropriate quantitative “rule of thumb” for such dependence might be a figure of 15% of revenues, or
10% for a firm exceeding a certain size. This 15% figure is, in fact, the SEC’s current “rule of thumb.” A
similar standard has been proposed in the United Kingdom.
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statements. These conflicts may take two forms — an interest directly adverse to the client or a
self-interest otherwise inconsistent with objective performance of an audit.
Interests adverse to clients not only tend to affect the auditor’s objectivity, but can also
impede client management’s ability to communicate frankly with the auditor, and thus limit the
ability of the auditor and his or her firm to obtain all of the information necessary to provide a
reasonable basis for the firm’s report. Thus, for these reasons, litigation where an audit client
and an auditor have adverse interests will often serve to impair the auditor’s objectivity.
However, litigation unrelated to the audit involving claims that are immaterial with respect to
both the firm and to the client’s financial statements (e.g, billing disputes regarding non-audit
services) would not usually be considered to imperil objectivity. As one example of how the
ISB’s guidelines could shape firm independence codes, the guidelines could identify the relevant
considerations, and invite firms to explain how they would both insulate the auditing team from
pressures arising from litigation and ensure that any litigation did not affect the flow of
information between the auditor and client management.
Auditors should also avoid self-interest relative to material matters affecting the financial
statements that would conflict with their role and duties as auditors, such as would exist when an
auditor or the firm has a stake in the financial statements, the results of the audit or the success of
the audit client (i.e., an inappropriate mutuality of interests). Such a stake can interfere with the
objectivity with which an auditor examines information and reaches conclusions regarding the
fairness of those financial statements. A classic example of a potential threat to independence
which may be said to arise from a mutuality of interest would be a business relationship with an
audit client where the firm and its client are jointly providing services to a third-party, including
prime-subcontractor arrangements, strategic alliances, joint ventures, value added re-seller
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arrangements and co-investments.341 So long as the business relationship was immaterial, the
relationship normally would be allowed. On the other hand, if the relationship proved to be
material, it normally would be approached as a “yellow light” situation (requiring the application
of appropriate safeguards to protect auditor independence), as discussed more fully below.342
Other examples of self-interest that may pose a threat to auditor independence include,
but are not limited to, the following:
•

Auditor investment in an audit client;

•

A former firm partner who becomes affiliated with an audit client; and,

•

Preferential treatment provided to the auditor by the client (e.g., gifts).

One would use the same methodology applied to other potential threats to independence
to analyze the various business relationships between auditors and their clients. For example, in
the case of relationships where a professional services firm works with another entity to perform
activities in furtherance of the economic success of the endeavor (e.g., a prime-subcontractor
relationship to install an audit client’s software at a third-party site), one first would assess the
materiality of that alliance or business relationship to the revenues of professional services firm
and the audit client.

Where pertinent, the materiality of compensation derived from that

relationship might also be assessed (using appropriate measures) with respect to the individual

341

On occasion, business relationships involving an audit client may pose a potential threat not just in terms of
mutuality of interest but also with regard to the third core principle, the requirement not to assume
managerial responsibility. As previously discussed, the core principles are not mutually exclusive. The
breadth of these core principles provides assurance that, taken together, they are sufficient to encompass
the entire range of independence issues that a regulator should seek to address.

342

Existing SEC rules and interpretations allow immaterial business relationships only when the relationship
is indirect, and bar all direct relationships, even if immaterial to both the auditor and the client. See
Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, supra note 330, at § 602.02.g.
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audit partner. Second, if the relationship is material, one would analyze whether any safeguards
could be applied to maintain the independence of the professional services firm, such as
structural or organizational solutions designed to insulate the engagement partner and the audit
team from potential threats to independence. Another possible organizational safeguard, for
example, would be for a firm to create a compliance team to monitor and review the audit work
of clients participating in specific business relationships (e.g. teaming) that could give rise to a
potential threat to independence.343
3.

Auditors and Firms Should not have Relationships with, Or Engage
in Activities for, Clients that would Entail Making Managerial
Decisions Or Otherwise Serve to Impair An Auditor’s Objectivity.
Management bears ultimate responsibility for corporate decision-making

and the presentation of a company’s financial statements. An auditor’s role is to express an
independent opinion, for the benefit of investors and others, regarding the fair presentation of the
financial statements prepared by management. By contrast, if an auditor were to undertake
managerial responsibility for a client’s financial reporting decisions, that auditor might set aside
the skeptical and objective view that is necessary to perform an independent audit. An auditor
thus cannot be expected to be objective with regard to matters for which the auditor, or his or her
firm, has assumed managerial responsibility.

343

To be effective in safeguarding the fact and the appearance of independence, an internal compliance team
would need (among other things) adequate resources, a direct reporting relationship with high levels in the
firm, and an established protocol for testing independence.
Similarly, a compliance team, or some other additional level of internal review or inspection, might be an
appropriate safeguard for outsourcing engagements. As discussed below, the potential threats posed by a
typical outsourcing engagement will differ from those raised by most business relationships with third
parties because there is the potential for self-review (in addition to any potential threat relating to
inappropriate forms of mutuality of interest).
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On the other hand, when a professional services firm assists client management with
professional services, there is no logical or empirical reason that would suggest the existence of a
threat to independence, so long as management reviews, understands and bears responsibility for
adopting or rejecting the results of those services. This conclusion is strengthened when the
professional services are of an essentially ministerial nature (e.g, routine maintenance of a
computer network) and does not involve the exercise of managerial discretion.
Examples of relationships344 that may pose a threat to an auditor’s independence include,
but are not limited to, the following:
•

The auditor is an officer, director or employee of an audit
client;

•

The auditor or audit firm acts as a promoter or underwriter of the client’s
business or its securities; and,

•

A close relative of a member of the audit team is an officer, director or
employee of an audit client.

The profession has long recognized that independent auditors cannot become part of
management, in the sense of making managerial decisions, and therefore may not hold an official
position with a client (e.g., an officer or a director) that entails the assumption of such
responsibilities. Thus, a blanket ban on auditors assuming these roles would be appropriate
regardless of materiality considerations, safeguards or other factors, such as the relative size of a
director’s annual fee.

344

As with other lists in this Section V, the following list of relationships that may pose a threat to
independence is not intended to give rise to an inference that listed relationships actually do create a
potential threat. Family relationship issues, in particular, can be quite complex.
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In contrast, when auditors or professional services firms perform functions that do not
involve the assumption of managerial responsibility, the independence analysis under the ISB’s
guidelines should involve the considerations previously outlined, including materiality and
possible use of safeguards in circumstances where a potential threat to independence may arise.
For example, an outsourcing relationship that gives rise to the potential for self-review would be
analyzed to see whether the firm’s relationship was truly inconsistent with performance of an
objective audit. Thus, in the case of internal audit outsourcing, a firm would be expected to have
adequate safeguards in place to provide reasonable assurance that there would be no improper
assumption of management responsibility. Making managerial decisions would be a prohibited
“red light,” but performing such an internal audit outsourcing (or “extended audit”) engagement
would not, provided that no managerial decisions are made. Such an engagement would be a
“yellow light” situation where firms could proceed so long as appropriate safeguards were in
place to mitigate the threat to independence by assuring that inappropriate activities do not occur.
Appropriate safeguards for an extended audit engagement would involve, for example,
documenting an understanding in the engagement agreement that the auditor and client
management each possess distinct responsibilities, and that they share an understanding of what
those responsibilities will entail over the course of the engagement. Further, the firm would need
to assure itself that the client’s board of directors (e.g., the audit committee) was fully apprised of
the terms of the engagement, and, in addition, might wish to supplement the client’s monitoring
of the engagement with its own internal procedures for monitoring the respective activities.
Interpretation 101-13, recently adopted by the AICPA under its Rules of Conduct, contains a
detailed discussion of the various measures that the profession has identified as necessary
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protections for auditor independence in connection with internal audit outsourcing
engagements.345
Another example of a “yellow-light” situation would be an instance where a client has
coded all client financial data, but such source data is subsequently processed on an auditing
firm’s computer system. The current SEC approach, would bar even such ministerial assistance
to an audit client.346 By contrast, under the profession’s own rules, the auditor’s ministerial act
of processing such information would not impair the auditing firm’s independence so long as the
client itself had coded all of the financial data and the auditor or auditing firm had not assumed
managerial responsibility in relation to the client’s financial reporting.347 It is precisely this type
of situation, where the potential threat to independence is so attenuated that the profession has
considered and rejected a blanket prohibition, that would most clearly benefit from development
of a new conceptual approach involving considerations of materiality and the application of
appropriate safeguards for independence.

VI.

Conclusion
The creation of the ISB constitutes a significant opportunity to conduct a fundamental re

examination of the regulation of auditor independence. This White Paper is intended to aid the
ISB in conducting such a re-examination. The profession looks forward to participating in a

345

See AICPA Professional Standards, ET § 101.15.

346

See Codification of Financial Reporting Policies, supra note 330, at §602.02.g. Indeed, this situation
is treated as if it actually involves self-review.

347

See AICPA Interpretation 101-3 Under Rule of Conduct 101: Accounting Services, ET § 101.05.
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searching discussion of the issues bearing on this most important subject and anticipates that the
ISB will adopt a new conceptual framework for auditor independence that will guide the
profession as it prepares for the challenges of the 21st Century.

Respectfully submitted,

Harvey L. Pitt

David E. Birenbaum
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson
A Partnership Including Professional Corporations
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Suite 800
Washington, DC 20004-2505

- 140-

Appendix A

THE APPEARANCE STANDARD FOR AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE: WHAT WE KNOW AND SHOULD KNOW

by

Professor Gary Orren
Harvard University

A Report Prepared on behalf of the AICPA in Connection with the
Presentation to the Independence Standards Board of
“Serving the Public Interest: A New Conceptual Framework for Auditor
Independence”

October 2 0 , 1997

Abstract
This paper analyzes the appearance standard of auditor independence from an empirical
perspective.

It begins by critically reviewing what past empirical studies tell us about the

public's perception of auditor independence and the impact of non-auditing services on those
perceptions. While some early studies concluded that public confidence in auditor independence
was adversely affected by the provision of non-auditing advisory services by auditing firms,
those studies were few in number and methodologically weak. Most studies have found that
non-auditing services have minimal effects on the appearance of auditor independence. These
studies also show that people with greater knowledge about the auditing profession are less
concerned about the potential threat of non-auditing services on auditor independence, and that
public perceptions are closely tied to materiality when considering auditor-client business
relationships or the provision of services to audit clients. The paper concludes by proposing a
research methodology for collecting empirical data which will provide a principled basis for
making regulatory judgments on the appearance issue.

The proposed research design is a

multifaceted one, incorporating multiple methodologies (using survey and non-survey techniques
to gather both quantitative and qualitative data) which pose a wide range of questions to many
different stakeholders at regular intervals over time.

THE APPEARANCE STANDARD FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE:
WHAT WE KNOW AND SHOULD KNOW
Gary Orren
One of the hallmarks of contemporary life is the erosion of trust in nearly every
institution—from government to the media to business and labor.1 However, if our financial
markets are to work properly, the public must have confidence in the integrity and objectivity of
auditors. Faith in the independence of auditors is a professional imperative.
Over the years, two standards for assessing auditor independence have emerged: fact and
appearance. The former refers to the actual, objective state of the relationship between auditing
firms and their clients; the latter to the subjective state of that relationship as perceived by clients
and third parties. The focus of this paper is on the appearance standard.2
The purpose of this paper is to explore the appearance standard empirically, both
retrospectively and prospectively. What do past studies tell us about the public's perception of
auditors' independence and the impact of those perceptions? How might we design future studies
to improve our understanding? Do the users of auditors' financial statements think that auditors
lack independence? How are those perceptions colored by the substantial growth of non-auditing
services provided by auditing firms? Does this increasing supply of management advisory
services adversely affect the auditing profession by eroding the public's confidence in auditors'
independence?
1
Gary Orren, “Fall From Grace: The Public’s Loss of Faith in Government,” in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip
D. Zelikow, and David C. King, Why People Don’t Trust Government (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
October, 1997), pp. 77-107. Also, Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business,
Labor, and Government in the Public Mind (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
2
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) acknowledged the importance of
perceptions of auditor independence in 1972: “ Independent auditors should not only be independent in fact; they
should avoid situations that may lead outsiders to doubt their independence.” The current AICPA Code of
Professional Conduct explicitly requires not only actual independence from audit clients but also the appearance of
independence to third parties. Also in 1972 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began issuing a series
of interpretive guidelines which emphasized the need for auditors to maintain independence from their clients in
both fact and appearance. In 1979 the SEC quoted with approval the report of the Public Oversight Board (POB)
which stated that “it is also important that the auditor appear independent to all users of the financial information he
provides. This latter concept is a key ingredient to the value of the audit function since users of audit reports must
be able to rely on the independent auditor. If they perceive that there is a lack of independence whether or not such
a deficiency exists, much of that value is lost.”

The Illusiveness and Elusiveness of Perception

The appearance standard is about perception.
regulators and standards-setters is two-fold.

The perception problem which faces

First, they must ascertain whether the public's

perception of auditing firms is accurate or inaccurate. Empirically speaking, regulators and
standards-setters are not especially challenged by either the ideal situation, where auditors are in
fact independent and also are perceived to be independent by the public, or by the worst
situation, where auditors lack independence in fact and also are perceived to lack independence.
The more challenging situations involve misperceptions, instances where auditors are
actually independent but the public perceives them not to be, or where auditors lack
independence but the public thinks they are independent. Some observers have addressed this
last possibility, concluding that the fact of independence should have primacy over the question
of appearance. “ There is a place for appearance of independence in the conceptual structure on
audit independence, but not as the separate coequal of the fact of independence, i.e., not as the
notion that the auditor ‘should be independent in fact and in appearance.’ The role of appearance
of independence should be limited to determining the fact of independence.”3
Perceptions are notoriously inaccurate. We perceive things that are not true, and we fail
to perceive things that are. Often our vantage points are inadequate. For example, by perception
standards alone, it was hardly unreasonable for the ancients to suppose that the sun revolved
around the earth. Every morning and evening they could observe it rising and setting. It was
only when mankind was armed with sophisticated scientific instruments that this reasonable
perception could be refuted.4
3
Robert K. Elliott and Peter D. Jacobson, “Audit Independence: Concept and Application,” The CPA
Journal, March, 1992, pp. 35-36. Former SEC Commissioner Steven Wallman quotes Elliott and Jacobson
favorably, and echoes their conclusion: “If we keep saying that we must guard against appearances being tainted
even though there is no tainting in fact, then we confuse the public and ourselves and, worse, we promote bad public
policy.” Wallman, p. 79.
4
The fields o f social and cognitive psychology ab ound w ith exam ples o f hu m an m isperception. These
m isperceptions stem from a variety o f hum an tendencies: to see regularity and o rd er w here only chance is
operating, to fail to detect and correct for incom plete and unrepresentative data, and to interpret am biguous and
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Regulators face an even greater challenge with perception. They must perceive what the
public perceives.

Their task is to discern whether users and potential users of financial audits

think auditors are sufficiently independent. As Wallman put it, the appearance standard turns on
“someone's view [the regulators’ and standards-setters’ view] of public opinion.”5
Seat of the pants perceptions of others’ perceptions are no more reliable than our general
perceptions of the world. For the past three decades I have been a practitioner, analyst, and
teacher of survey research. Yet I am still struck by how often the conventional wisdom of what
people think is proved wrong by well-crafted opinion surveys. For example, it was widely
believed for many years that Independent voters were the best-informed and most issue-oriented
citizens, compared to knee-jerk partisan loyalists.

Survey data conclusively showed just the

opposite.6 Watching nightly news coverage of anti-war protests on college campuses at the
height of the Vietnam War, most people assumed that young Americans were dovish on the war.
Surveys showed that the young were mostly hawkish.7 Time and again we are fooled by our
prejudices, biases, and preconceptions. We are deceived by the riveting anecdote and dramatic
personal experience. Personal hunches are poor substitutes for systematic, reliable evidence.

inconsistent data in light of our pet theories and prior expectations. See Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What
Isn’t So (New York: The Free Press, 1991); Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and
Shortcomings o f Social Judgment (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980); Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, “Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” Science, Vol. 185, 1974, pp. 1124-1131; Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “ Subjective Probablilty: A Judgment of Representativeness,” Cognitive
Psychology, Vol. 3, 1971, pp. 430-454; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “On the Psychology of Prediction,”
Psychological Review, Vol. 80, 1973, pp. 237-251; Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Belief in the Law of
Small Numbers,” Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 76, 1971, pp. 105-110; Hillel J. Einhorn and Robin M. Hogarth,
“Confidence in Judgment: Persistence of the Illusion of Validity,” Psychological Review, Vol. 85, 1977, pp. 395416; Robert K. Merton, “The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” Antioch Review, Vol. 8, 1948, pp. 193-210; Daniel
Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths: The Psychology o f Deception (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985); Robert
Abelson, “Beliefs Are Like Possessions,” Journal for the Theory o f Social Behaviour, Vol. 16, 1986, pp. 222-250;
and Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies o f Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston: Hougton
Mifflin, 1982).
5

W allm an, p. 94. Italics and bracketed com m ent added.

6
Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960).
7
M ilton J. R osenberg, Sidney V erba, and Philip E. C onverse, Vietnam and the Silent Majority (N ew York:
H arper and Row e, 1970), pp. 53-79.
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What We Know About Appearance: the Empirical Evidence

A series of blue-ribbon committees have concluded there is virtually no evidence that the
provision of non-audit services for audit clients has in fact impaired the independence of
accounting firms.8
The empirical evidence on appearance suggests a similar conclusion. A few empirical
studies have concluded that the provision of non-audit services to audit clients has enhanced the
risk of perceived auditor dependence.9 But most empirical studies find that non-auditing services

8
The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities: Report, Conclusions and Recommendations (Cohen
Commission), AICPA, 1978; Scope o f Services by CPA Firms, Report of the Public Oversight Board of the SEC
Practice Section, Division for CPA Firms, AICPA, 1979, 1986, and 1994; Report o f the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Treadway Commission), October 1987; The Future Relevance, Reliability, and
Credibility o f Financial Information, Recommendations to the AICPA Board of Directors by Seven Major
Accounting Firms, April 1986, 1991; and the Securities and Exchange Commission OCA Report, 1994. In the
words of POB Chairman A.A. Sommer, Jr.: there is no known “ instance in which it can be demonstrated that the
provision of MAS to an audit client interfered with independence in performing the audit function.” Public
Perceptions o f Management Advisory Services Performed by CPA Firms for Audit Clients, Report prepared for
Public Oversight Board, SEC Practice Section, Division for CPA Firms, AICPA, by Audits & Surveys, Inc., 1986.
Similarly, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded in 1996 that “ [n]one of these studies reported any
conclusive evidence of diminished audit quality or harm to the public interest, or any actual impairment of auditor
independence, as a consequence of public accounting firms providing advisory or consulting services to their audit
clients.”
9
Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., “Compatibility of Management Consulting and Auditing,” The Accounting Review,
July 1965, pp. 587-593; Abraham J. Briloff, “ Old Myths and New Realities in Accountancy,” The Accounting
Review, July 1966, pp. 484-495; Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., “Management Services: A Challenge to Audit
Independence?,” The Accounting Review, October 1966, pp. 721-728; Ronald V. Hartley and Timothy L. Ross,
“MAS and Audit Independence: An Image Problem,” The Journal o f Accountancy, November 1972, pp. 42-51;
Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, “The Effect of Gifts, Discounts, And Client Size on Perceived Auditor
Independence,” The Accounting Review, Vol. 55, No. 1, January 1980, pp. 50-60; Michael Firth, “Perceptions of
Auditor Independence and Official Ethical Guidelines, The Accounting Review, Vol. 55, No. 3, July 1980, pp. 451465; Randolph A. Shockley, “Perceptions of Auditors’ Independence: An Empirical Analysis,” The Accounting
Review, Vol. 55, No. 4, October 1981, pp. 785-800; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, “Auditor Independence and
Non-Audit Services: Director Views and Their Policy Implications,” Journal o f Accounting and Public Policy,
Vol. 2, Spring 1983, pp. 43-62; and Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, “Non-Audit Services and Auditor
Independence—A Continuing Problem,” Auditing: A Journal o f Practice and Theory, Vol. 3, No. 2, Spring 1984,
pp. 89-97. The results reported by Schulte actually support a more mixed conclusion. A full 67 percent of the
respondents in his sample reported that they perceived no adverse effect from non-audit services.
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have minimal adverse effects on the perception of auditor independence.10
What generalizations can we draw from this body of research?
• Despite the critical importance of the appearance issue in the debate over auditor
independence, the quantity of empirical studies on the impact of non-auditing services on the
appearance of independence is surprisingly slim. An inventory of only two dozen or so studies,
some quite minor or even flawed, over the span of three decades is a thin empirical base.
• The bulk of available research indicates that the confidence of the investing public and
other market participants in the independence of accounting firms has not been significantly
impaired by the growth of non-audit services.

While users do not perceive perfect or pure

independence—hardly surprising since auditors are paid by their clients—they do perceive
substantial independence that has been minimally affected by the provision of non-audit services.
The following conclusions are typical of those reported in these studies:

“There was no

indication that the buyers perceived these reports to be less credible because the same auditors
provided MAS to the sellers.” ; “Overall, professional financial analysts who responded to this
study expressed a very high degree of confidence in the CPA’s ability to remain independent

10
Pierre L. Titard, “Independence and MAS—Opinions of Financial Statement Users,” The Journal o f
Accountancy, July 1971, pp. 47-52; David Lavin, “Perceptions of the Independence of the Auditor,” The
Accounting Review, January 1976, pp. 41-50; Philip M.J. Reckers and A.J. Stagliano, “Non-Audit Services and
Perceived Independence: Some New Evidence,” Auditing: A Journal o f Practice and Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1,
Summer 1981, pp. 23-37; James H. Scheiner, “An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of SEC Non-Audit Service
Disclosure Requirements on Independent Auditors and Their Clients,” Journal o f Accounting Research, Vol. 22,
Autumn 1984, pp. 789-; G. William Glezen and James A. Millar, “An Empirical Investigation of Stockholder
Reaction to Disclosures Required by ASR No. 250,” Journal o f Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 2, Autumn
1985, pp. 859-870; Sue McKinley, Kurt Pany, and Philip M.J. Reckers, “An Examination of the Influence of CPA
Firm Type, Size, MAS Provision on Loan Officer Decisions and Perceptions,” Journal o f Accounting Research,
Vol. 23, No. 2, Autumn 1985, pp. 887-896; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, “ Within- Vs. Between-Subjects
Experimental Designs: A Study of Demand Effects,” Auditing: A Journal o f Practice and Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1,
Fall 1987, pp. 39-53; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, “MAS, Auditing, and Your Orientation,” The CPA
Journal, February 1988, pp. 70-72; Kurt Pany and Philip M.J. Reckers, “Auditor Performance of MAS: A Study of
Its Effects on Decisions and Perceptions,” Accounting Horizons, June 1988, pp. 31-38; Nicholas Dopuch and
Ronald R. King, “The Impact of MAS on Auditors’ Independence: An Experimental Markets Study,” Journal o f
Accounting Research, Vol. 29, Supplement 1991, pp. 60-106; D. Jordan Lowe and Kurt Pany, “CPA Performance
of Consulting Engagements with Audit Clients,” Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall
1995, pp. 35-53; and D. Jordan Lowe and Kurt Pany, “An Examination of the Effects of Type of Engagement,
Materiality, and Structure on CPA Consulting Engagements with Audit Clients,” Accounting Horizons, Vol. 10, No.
4, December 1996, pp. 32-51. Some analysts have placed the Titard and Lavin studies in the “adverse effects”
column. However, they actually belong on the opposite side of the ledger. According to Titard, “the appearance of
independence does not appear to be a problem of great concern at the present time...The overall conclusion is that
MAS and the appearance of independence is not a serious problem for the profession...” Lavin’s respondents were
more likely to view his scenarios as not impairing auditor independence, and more likely to express views closer to
the AICPA’s position than the SEC’s.
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while doing non-audit work along with the audit.” ; “ Our results are inconsistent with the
conventional wisdom that providing MAS for clients negatively effects financial statement users’
perceptions of auditor independence, whether performed by Big Eight or local firms.” ; “ ...this
study indicated that auditor provided MAS exerts little, if any, effect on typical investment or
credit granting decisions, on perceptions of financial statement reliability, or on perceptions of
auditor independence.” 11
• Most surveys show that people with greater knowledge about the auditing profession
are less concerned about the threat that expanded services might pose for auditor independence.
People who are uninformed and lack familiarity with auditing are more likely to be skeptical and
suspicious of the widening scope of non-audit services.12
• Studies have explored how a variety of factors might diminish or enhance the public’s
perception of auditor independence (and the impact of non-auditing services on that perception),
such as firm size, the separation of auditing and non-auditing functions, and how many years
auditors have served their clients. By far, the most important of these factors is the materiality of
the auditor-client relationship. As one study reported: “These results provide consistent support
for the conclusion that the materiality of a prime/ subcontractor business relationship between a
CPA firm and its audit client significantly affected financial statement users’ perceptions and
decisions. Respondents perceived greater CPA independence and higher financial reliability to
exist with an immaterial as compared to a material CPA relationship. These perceptions were
also revealed in the loan decision.” 13
• The handful of empirical studies which found that non-audit services seriously damaged
the appearance of auditor independence were, for the most part, the earliest studies conducted on
this subject. More recent research has found little adverse effect. This may be due to the fact
11
Dopuch and King, p. 88; Reckers and Stagliano, p. 34; McKinley, Pany, and Reckers, p. 894; and Pany and
Reckers, 1988, p. 38.
12
For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship between knowledge of the auditing profession and
perception of auditor independence see Burton, pp. 3-5. Pany and Reckers (1984) do not find evidence of this
relationship in their results.
13

Low e and Pany, 1995.
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that market participants have become more accustomed to non-audit services, and the use of
these services has been refined over the past 30 years. It also may stem from the fact that the
methodological rigor of the research has improved over time.
In some of the earlier studies question wording was inadequate and research designs
unsophisticated.

These methodological flaws probably exaggerated the signs of an auditor

appearance problem. For example, some studies included questions about whether non-audit
services may possibly compromise an auditor’s independence. Respondents in one study were
asked: “Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to clients whose financial
statements they also audit. Do you think that providing any of the following services to audit
clients may possibly result in a CPA’s losing some of his audit independence?” 14 One cannot
place much confidence in questions which inquire about possible effects or which present vague
hypotheticals. Other studies introduced bias by asking subjects to compare different levels of
non-auditing services in a way that transparently revealed the researchers’ expectations and
focus, probably causing them to overstate the severity of the appearance problem.15 Finally,
some early studies focused too heavily on whether there was an effect of non-audit services on
perceived auditor independence which could be shown to be “statistically significant.” 16 In
some cases the size of the sample virtually guaranteed statistical significance. Furthermore, it is
the magnitude of such effects and not simply whether they exist or not that is most relevant.17 To
regulators, meaningful results must be more than statistically significant.

They must be

practically significant, and that depends largely on the size of effects.

Future Empirical Research on Appearance
14

Titard, p. 49.

15
See, for example: Briloff, Hartley and Ross, Lavin, Pany and Reckers 1983 and 1984, Shulte, and Titard.
Pany and Reckers, 1987 and Pany and Reckers, June 1988, discuss how such poor experimental design may have
biased earlier studies.
16

For example: Lavin, 1976; Firth, 1980; and Shockley, 1981.

17
On the critical importance of estimating the magnitude of effects, see Robert P. Abelson, Statistics as
Principled Argument (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1995), especially pp. 39-53.
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In the remaining pages of this paper I shall propose a methodology for collecting and
analyzing empirical data which will provide a principled basis for standards-setters and making
regulatory judgments on the appearance of independence. This methodology will be described in
macro, not micro form. This is not the place to detail the myriad nuts and bolts of a research
methodology. It is the place, however, to specify the underlying core principles that should
guide the proposed methodology.
We begin with a simple truth: the valid interpretation of public opinion on any issue
cannot be captured in a single question. It requires a variety of questions with different formats,
alternative wordings, asked at various times. This is certainly the norm in other disciplines.
Economists, for example, have long relied on an assortment of indicators and composite indexes
for appraising economic performance. We would not be content to rely on a single economic
measure—say, the CPI index or the rate of unemployment—to summarize the overall state of the
economy.

Public perceptions are even harder to measure than economic performance. A

phenomenon as elusive and illusive as the public's perception of auditor independence requires a
multifaceted approach.
Multifaceted is, indeed, the watchword of our proposed research design.

It can be

summarized in terms of four questions: How should the data be collected? What questions
should be asked?

Who should be asked these questions? And, When should the data be

collected?
How should the data be collected? Four different methodologies should be used to
collect the data.18 Traditional surveys (using mail questionnaires and telephone surveys) are
well-suited to the task of posing the basic contextual and policy questions.19 However, these
18
The advantages of employing multiple research methodologies are described in Gary King, Robert
Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994) and Delbert C. Miller, Handbook o f Research Design and Social Measurement
(Newbury Park: Sage, 1991).
19
Peter H. Rossi, James D. Wright, and Andy B. Anderson, Handbook o f Survey Research (New York:
Academic Press, 1983).
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traditional surveys must be supplemented with surveys using experimental and quasiexperimental designs.20 These are studies which divide subjects into groups who receive
different materials and scenarios in order to “control for,” or isolate, the effects of various
factors.

As critical as these first two methods are, neither can supply the essential qualitative

data which focus groups yield. These in-depth discussions lasting about two hours with carefully
selected groups of 10-20 participants can uncover some of the nuances and subtleties that elude
mass surveys, help reveal the processes that lie behind the opinions found in surveys, give people
a more comfortable setting for expressing sensitive opinions, and suggest issues and questions
which should be explored with larger samples in future surveys.21 Finally, although traditional
surveys, experimental designs, and focus groups can shed considerable light on people's
attitudes, none of them reveals much about people's actual behavior. Data on people's behavior
can be collected more directly with what data analysts call aggregate data.22
Two examples illustrate how aggregate data might enrich our understanding of the
public's perception of auditor independence. One important indicator of the public's faith or lack
of faith in a company and its decisions is how that company's stock performs in the stock market.
It might be revealing, therefore, to compare the stock market value of companies whose
accountants provide non-audit services with the stock market value of companies whose
accountants do not provide such services, or to compare the stock values before and after audit
firms began providing non-audit services. The information necessary to perform this type of
analysis was available between 1978 and 1982 when public companies were required by the SEC
to disclose the percentage of fees they paid for non-audit services in relation to audit fees. It may
or may not be available after 1982 when such disclosure was voluntary.
20
Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963); and Thomas D. Cook and Donald T. Campbell, QuasiExperimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979).
21
The pioneering work of Peter Hart and Associates with focus groups has demonstrated the value of this
technique in social research. On the critical importance of qualitative data in general, see King, Keohane, and
Verba, Designing Social Inquiry and Louise G. White, Political Analysis: Technique and Practice (Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994), pp. 211-229.
22

Louise G. White, Political Analysis, pp. 239-260.

-9 -

Incidentally, related aggregate data analyses already have been conducted examining
whether shareholders or audit committees were less likely to approve decisions to retain audit
firms following disclosure that those firms were supplying significant non-audit services to their
companies. The studies found that disclosure had no discernible effect on the behavior of these
users of financial audits. Neither auditor retention rates nor the decision to procure non-audit
services from audit firms changed significantly following disclosure.23
Another illustration of how aggregate data might augment our understanding of the
appearance issue is an analysis of the behavior of the insurance industry. Aside from auditors
themselves, no one has a greater economic stake in potential auditor liability than insurers.
Insurers are extremely sensitive to the risk of audit failure. Nonetheless, according to one
leading insurance broker, insurance brokers and underwriters do not assign higher risk factors
and premiums to audit firms who provide non-audit services than to firms who do not provide
such services, casting doubt on whether the provision of non-traditional services undermines
auditor independence in the eyes of insurers.24 It would be useful to examine industry-wide data
to confirm this statement.
Each of these four methods has its own peculiar strengths and limitations.

They

complement each other, and together would provide a full picture of the public’s view of auditor
independence.
What questions should be asked? Future research should not be limited to just one or
two key questions (what social scientists call dependent variables) or one or two background
factors, or independent variables.25
At least three categories of dependent variables seem essential: questions which probe
the perception of auditor independence (both confidence in the independence of auditors,
23

See studies by Glezen and Millar and by Scheiner referenced in footnote 10 above.

24

Letter from Peter S. Christie of Minet (a subsidiary of Aon Group Inc.).

25
For discussions of the need for multiple questions in social research, see Gary Orren, “Presidential
Popularity Ratings: Another View,” Public Opinion, May/June 1978, p. 35 and Henry E. Brady and Gary R. Orren,
“Polling Pitfalls: Sources of Error in Public Opinion Surveys,” in Thomas E. Mann and Gary R. Orren, eds., Media
Polls in American Politics (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 55-94.
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generally, and confidence in auditors who provide non-audit services, more specifically) under
different circumstances or scenarios; questions which probe the perception of financial statement
accuracy and reliability, again under varying circumstances; and questions which ask
respondents about specific decisions which they have the discretion to make (i.e., questions to
loan officers about making a loan decision, to creditors about granting credit, to investors about
the decision to invest, to stockholders about the vote to engage an audit firm, etc.).

The

questions would probe what decisions these people would make and have made under varying
circumstances.
As mentioned earlier, it is not sufficient simply to learn whether non-audit services have
diminished the public's perception of auditor independence or not. We must learn the magnitude
of the effect. How else can we intelligently determine whether the threat of non-audit services to
perceived auditor independence is large enough to warrant regulation? Beyond that, future
research must help us learn more about how investors and other market participants arrive at their
perceptions. This involves exploring several “ independent” variables: the impact of different
types of non-auditing services, different kinds of third parties, different degrees of materiality,
separation of function, length of association between auditors and clients, and size of firms. This
also requires more in-depth conversations with stakeholders trying to understand why they
perceive audit firms as they do.
Who should be asked these questions? The answer to the appearance issue will not be
found in particular situations involving this or that auditor and client. The answer will be found
among users and observers of audits generally. Future research must involve a system-wide
analysis.
All types of consumers of audit services should be studied: financial analysts, lenders,
insurers, fund managers, shareholders, and clients. There should be one restriction, however:
research subjects should be limited to typical users of financial statements. For several reasons,
the public-at-large is not an appropriate target for future research.
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The traditional answer to the question of who should judge auditor independence is “a
reasonable person having knowledge of all the relevant facts.” The average citizen does not
have the requisite knowledge of the facts to assess whether auditor-client relationships pose an
unacceptable risk to independence. Previous public opinion research suggests that surveys of
uninformed users will elicit evanescent “doorstep opinions,” created on-the-spot by the survey
itself, instead of measuring thoughtful perceptions that existed prior to the questioning.26 For the
most part, the public-at-large is unaware of the relevant tradeoffs involved, and therefore has
little reason to demand anything less than absolute, pure independence of auditors. Citizen views
also are likely to reflect the deep cynicism, disenchantment, and suspicion which the public feels
toward most institutions and authorities these days.
In 1992 the Office of Government Ethics, in establishing uniform standards of conduct
for executive branch officials, decided to revisit the issue of appearance, and adopted a
“reasonable person test.” The Office of Government Ethics argued, as we have here, that this
provided an “appropriate assurance to an employee that his or her conduct will not be judged
from the perspective of the unreasonable, uninformed, or overly zealous [observer].”27
When should the data be collected? The final core principle is that future research
should be conducted periodically at regular intervals 28 Ideally, each of the proposed four
methodologies (traditional surveys, experimental designs, focus groups, and aggregate data
studies) would be conducted every year, but that may not be financially feasible. Alternatively, a
staggered schedule of two methods per year would still be enlightening.
The auditing profession is undergoing dynamic change. Investigations of it can be no
less dynamic. Up to now, regulators have relied on empirical information which is static, and
26
Brady and Orren, “Polling Pitfalls: Sources of Error in Public Opinion Surveys,” pp. 71-76 and Donald
R. Kinder and David O. Sears, “Public Opinion and Political Action,” in Gardner Lindzey and Elliott Aronson,
eds., The Handbook o f Social Psychology, Vol. 2, Third Edition (New York: Random House, 1984).
27
Office of Government Ethics, “ Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch,”
August 7, 1992.
28
On the value of longitudinal data see David C. Hoaglin, Richard J. Light, Bucknam McPeek, Frederick
Mosteller, and Michael A. Stoto, Data For Decisions: Information Strategies for Policy Makers (Cambridge, MA:
Abt Books, 1982), pp. 107-116.
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even stale.

Future research ought to provide up-to-date information, reflecting current

experience among auditors, clients, and third parties. Also up to now, empirical information has
been generated in an ad hoc, sporadic, and kaleidoscopic fashion governed only by the particular
interests of individual scholars. Regular empirical monitoring overseen by a central authority
would ensure that questions, sampling, and other methodologies would be systematic and
comparable. This would permit, for the first time, the analysis of changes over time.
This multifaceted research design will yield a rich body of information. The truth about
the perception of auditor independence and how non-audit services affect perception will emerge
from the intersection of multiple methodologies asking multiple questions of multiple sources at
multiple times.

In Conclusion

The impact of standards-setters and regulatory decisions on the auditing profession is too
great for us simply to conclude with a call for more humility and caution in conducting studies
and interpreting results.

Instead, we will conclude by stressing that decisions about the

appearance of auditor independence should not rest on personal hunches and subjective
impressions.
It is true that measuring public perceptions is a slippery task. The distinguished public
opinion scholar V.O. Key, Jr. once cautioned that “to speak with precision of public opinion is a
task not unlike coming to grips with the Holy Ghost.”29 Critics of empirical research are fond of
quoting Mark Twain's quip, “There are three kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics.” But
statistician Frederick Mosteller probably offered an even wiser reply: “It is easy to lie with
statistics. But it is easier to lie without them.”30

V . O. K ey, Jr., P ublic O pinion a n d A m erica n D em ocracy (K nopf, 1961), p. 8.
30Interview w ith F rederick M osteller, E m eritus P rofessor o f M athem atic Statistics at H arvard U niversity.
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The principles that will guide future regulations on the appearance issue should be
neither capricious nor arbitrary, but should be based on sound evidence with solid empirical
foundation. As former Commissioner Wallman has written, “There appears to be little choice at
this moment but to take into account appearance issues. Nevertheless, we could all do a better
job in helping the public arrive at more informed perceptions about auditor independence
matters.”31

We also could do a better job in helping regulators arrive at more informed

perceptions of those perceptions. If regulators and standards-setters are to establish appropriate
professional standards for auditors, they themselves should surely base their decisions on
empirical studies which also meet strict professional standards.

31

W allm an, p. 94.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper provides an economic analysis of multi-client, multi-service accounting firms.
The objective is to aid in the development of a new framework for auditor independence. We
adopt the modem theory of the economics of organization, which views organizational structures
and relationships as the results of efforts to create and deliver value. We see auditor
independence as a property of auditors' interests, both at a personal level and at the level of the
accounting firm.
A proper assessment of auditors' interests requires a holistic approach. That is, in
assessing auditor independence, we must examine the totality of auditors' interests. We identify
and analyze a complex web of institutional and personal incentives that affect auditors' interests.
Our major findings are:
♦ Auditors’ liability is significant and provides incentives to maintain auditor
independence.
Auditors' actual and potential losses from litigation play a large role in
determining auditors' incentives. Losses from litigation contributed to the 1990
bankruptcy of Laventhol & Horwath, at one time the seventh largest accounting
firm. In 1993, the six largest accounting firms (hereafter, the Big Six) incurred
more than $1 billion in costs of judgments, settlements and legal defense.
Although rarely alleged to be a cause of loss, auditor independence is an issue in
litigation. Impairing independence at the level of the accounting firm would invite
an avalanche of litigation.
♦ Auditors' investments are substantial and provide incentives to maintain auditor
independence.
Auditors have many investments that they must protect by safeguarding
their independence.
•

Accounting firms invest in their reputations, part of which is a reputation for
independence. Honest clients want independent auditors. A crucial feature of the modem,
multi-client accounting firm is that any threat to the firm's independence threatens its
entire stream of audit revenues. These revenue streams are substantial. For example, the
aggregate audit revenues of the Big Six in 1996 exceeded $6 billion.

•

Auditors have financial capital invested in their firms. The total partners' capital in the
Big Six is in excess of $3.5 billion.
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•

Auditors have investments in technology and audit methodology. In the last year alone,
four of the Big Six spent more than $170 million on audit technology and methodology.

♦ Accounting firms earn substantial and growing revenues from supplying non-audit
services.
The Big Six's revenues from non-audit services in 1996 exceeded $9.0
billion, $5.6 billion of which came from supplying consulting services. $1 billion
of their consulting revenues came from their SEC audit clients. Consulting
revenues account for all of the real growth in the revenues of the Big Six since
1990.
♦ There is a strong intuitive case for economies of scope between auditing and non-audit
services.
Economies of scope are cost efficiencies obtained by delivering multiple
services through one firm.
•

Because auditing, tax work and consulting generate knowledge of clients' organizations,
processes, and problems, it is intuitive that there exist economies of scope in auditing and
these non-audit services. Auditors and tax professionals typically help each other in
performing their services. Many accounting firms stress the sharing of information
between their auditors and consultants.

•

Auditors often rely directly on the work of tax professionals. Also, experience in specific
cases is suggestive of economies of scope in auditing and consulting.

•

While quantitative estimates of economies of scope are not available, the success of
accounting firms in competing in consulting markets is testimony to their existence.

♦ There is no evidence that the supply of non-audit services threatens auditor
independence.
The supply of non-audit services is not a significant factor in auditors'
losses in litigation or in pricing their liability insurance. There is no evidence that
investors are concerned that the supply of non-audit services impairs
independence.
•

Of 610 claims against the Big Six tracked by an insurance broker, at most three involved
even an allegation that the supply of non-audit services impaired auditor independence.
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•

Auditors' insurers do not include clauses in insurance contracts restricting the supply of
non-audit services, and they do not consider the supply of non-audit services as a risk
factor in determining prices for the Big Six's liability insurance.

•

There is no evidence that shareholders, managers, auditors or investors had any reaction
to the SEC's required disclosures about non-audit fees that were in force from 1978 to
1982, at which time the requirements were rescinded.

♦ Trends toward increasing globalization and the rapid rate of change in information
technologies will place new demands on accounting firms and the practice of auditing.
Improvements in information technology and low transportation costs are
changing business practices. These trends have fundamental implications for
auditing, as clients change the way they capture, process and distribute
information. They are also likely to create new opportunities for accounting firms
to benefit from economies of scale and scope. In assessing the efforts of
accounting firms to compete in this environment, it is vital that we fully recognize
their attempts to craft their organizations and their relationships in ways that
protect their independence, deliver value to their clients, and benefit the public.
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1. Objective and Introduction
1.1. Objective
The objective of this paper is to provide an economic analysis of multi-client, multi
service accounting firms to aid in the development of a new conceptual framework for auditor
independence. The analysis adopts the modem theory of the economics of organization.1 The
basic tenet of this theory is that organizational structures in a capitalist society are the result of
efforts to craft economies and deliver value. Regulation that best serves the public interest is that
which reinforces value creation and checks abuses.
The demands of the economic environment, economies of scope and scale, and the
expectations of society as imposed through legal liability are important determinants of the
organization of the auditing industry. A new conceptual framework for auditor independence
should be grounded in a thorough understanding of these economic realities. The current
approach to auditor independence is not based on a consistent view of the incentives of
accounting firms flowing from their economic environment. It does not pay consistent attention
to efficiencies of scope and scale. It too often is based on the appearance of independence
assessed in a piecemeal fashion, as opposed to being based on the totality of incentives for
independence. It is not surprising, then, that current independence rules have been characterized
as inconsistent, outmoded, and, most importantly, costly.2
One of the greatest sources of dissatisfaction with current independence rules relates to
the provision of non-audit services to audit clients. The economic success of accounting firms in
supplying non-audit services is testimony to the value created by offering multiple lines of
service. Despite repeated contentions that the supply of non-audit services threatens auditor
independence, we find no evidence of it in litigation against auditors, the pricing of auditors'
liability insurance, or in investor reaction to disclosures about non-audit services.3 We conclude
that these contentions are based on the appearance of threats to auditor independence, and do not
take into account the totality of an accounting firm's incentives to create economic value and to
maintain its independence.
1See Williamson, Oliver, The Economic Institutions o f Capitalism, The Free Press: New York, 1985.
2See, for example, Elliott, Robert, K. and Peter D. Jacobson, 1992, "Audit Independence: Concept and Application,"
The CPA Journal, 34-39, and Wallman, Steven M.H., 1996, "The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and
Auditor Independence," Accounting Horizons, 10(4) 76-97.
3We examine the relevant evidence in detail in Section 6.
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1.2. Organization of the Paper
To introduce our analysis, we provide some background in the remainder of this section.
We turn in Section 2 to a brief description of the audit process and the environment within which
auditing takes place. Sections 3, 4 and 5 take up crucial areas of auditors' incentives: legal
liability, investments in reputations and expertise, and the supply of non-audit services,
respectively. Two important trends affecting the auditing industry, globalization and rapidly
changing information technology, are discussed in Section 6. Brief concluding remarks are
offered in Section 7.
1.3. Background
1.3.1. General Economic Background
By almost any measure, the world's financial markets today are more active, more
influential in human affairs, and more efficient in allocating resources than at any other time in
history. Worldwide financial markets allow investors across the globe to shift financial resources
and spread risks quickly and efficiently.4 Information is the life-blood of these markets.
Forward-looking information allows market participants to assess the risks and returns of
potential investments. Backward-looking information allows them to monitor the uses of
resources and to construct appropriate incentives for proper stewardship. Financial information is
a vital element in maintaining the level of public confidence that is required for active and
vibrant capital markets.5
Much of the valuable information of use to capital markets begins in the hands of
managers and must be reported by them.6 Yet managers' financial interests and their
4For example, according to International Monetary Fund statistics, cross-border U.S. equity and bond transactions
have increased approximately fifty-fold since 1980, and the daily turnover on world currency markets now exceeds
the global stock of foreign exchange reserves (The Economist, September 20, 1997, p.24).
5The value of informing investors through financial disclosure forms a cornerstone for the regulation of financial
markets. Perhaps the most famous words in this respect are those of Louis D. Brandeis who recommended adequate
publicity “... as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.” (L. D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It, 1914, p.
93).
6For an analyses of companies' incentives to disclose financial information, see Dye, Ronald, "Disclosure of
Nonproprietary Information," Journal o f Accounting Research, Spring 1985, and Dye, Ronald, "Mandatory Versus
Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real Externalities," The Accounting Review, Jan. 1990, pp. 124.
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undiversifiable human capital can lead to erroneous, manipulated, and consciously or
unconsciously misstated financial reports. Intended or not, these actions divert resources to
management's personal use. Financial markets impose a premium for this risk, which managers
have incentives to reduce. One way to do this is to provide financial disclosures about the use of
resources. In turn, it is then often helpful to employ auditors to provide assurance that
managements' financial reports are reliable. Even before independent audits became mandatory, a
great many companies obtained them.7 Today, many private debt agreements call for periodic,
audited financial statements.8
Even at this simple level, it is apparent that auditors' interests cannot be co-extensive
with managements' interests. If they were, an external auditor’s report would be ineffective in
monitoring management.
1.3.2. Auditors' and Managers' Interests
While it is clear that auditors' and managers' interests cannot be co-extensive, should we
expect them to in no ways coincide? From an economic perspective, the answer is clearly no.
Both auditors and managers have strong incentives to issue accurate financial reports. Managers
have fiduciary duties to shareholders, reputations to protect, internal controls to limit their
actions, legal and regulatory reporting requirements to follow, and peers to monitor their
behavior. Also, as we stated above, financial markets set the cost of capital as a function of the
quality of the information disclosed.9 Managers have many incentives to ensure the integrity of
financial reports.
Similarly, auditors have duties of care to follow in performing audits, reputations to
protect, internal policies and control mechanisms to limit their actions, liability to consider,*
7Before federal securities laws mandated independent audits, 94% of the companies traded on the New York Stock
Exchange issued audited financial statements. See Arthur Andersen & Co., et al., The Public Accounting Profession:
Meeting the Needs o f a Changing World, Jan. 1991.
8 ociety's interests sometime go beyond those of individual managers and auditors, and government regulations,
S
state laws, and exchange listing requirements call for audits of financial reports. But beyond this, individuals may
find that the potential gains from subverting their professional responsibilities outweigh the costs, and they may
sacrifice their personal integrity and issue fraudulent financial reports. Fraudulent financial reporting can shake the
public's faith in the fairness of markets. This can disrupt the functioning of financial markets and impose costs on all
honest market participants. Therefore, the public has a legitimate and important interest in monitoring and
regulating the behavior of managers and auditors.
9See Botosan, Christine A., 1997, "Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital," The Accounting Review, 72(3),
323-347.
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professional and governmental regulations to obey, and peers to monitor their behavior. Auditors
are held accountable for their reports in many ways.
Auditors and managers have many other common interests. For example, both have
interests in ensuring the client's internal control systems are functioning well. By far the most
cost effective way to conduct an audit is to examine a sample of records kept by reliable
accounting systems that are under management's supervision. In addition, an effective audit
requires an understanding of the client that is most efficiently acquired from management.
Auditors and managers have common interests in the viability of the client. Managers
have a strong interest in maintaining the financial health of the firms for which they work.
Auditors are interested in having financially healthy clients.10 Both have likely invested in a
specialized relationship that benefits both parties from its continuation.11
Auditors and managers have common interests in assuring that the terms of the audit
engagement provide appropriate economic incentives to perform all necessary, and no
unnecessary, audit work. These incentives will be strengthened by giving the auditors a tangible
stake in assuring the reliability of the financial statements.12
While each of these factors gives auditors and managers common interests, there are
important places where their interests diverge. Auditors' interests center on accuracy and
reliability. Their interest in reported financial results is secondary. For example, it might not
matter to the auditors whether a client's reported income is $1 billion or $2 billion. The auditor
wants the most appropriate figure under generally accepted accounting principles. On the other
hand, managers' interest in reported results is often very high, and may overwhelm their interest
in accuracy. Managers will almost always prefer, other things being equal, a reported income of

10Prospering clients usually mean a safe, growing base of audit fees. Also, business failure often brings a flurry of
litigation in which auditors and managers are accused of common misdeeds.
11Levinthal, Daniel A. and Mark Fichman, "Dynamics of Interorganizational Attachments: Auditor-Client
Relationships," Administrative Science Quarterly, 33, 1988, pp. 345-369, estimate the hazard rates, which are the
probability laws that govern the dissolution of auditor-client relationships. Their estimated rates increase for the first
four years of the auditor-client relationship, and decrease after that. The decrease of the hazard rates is consistent
with the build-up of relationship-specific capital.
12See Antle, Rick, "The Auditor as an Economic Agent," Journal o f Accounting Research, Autumn 1982, Part II,
Antle, Rick, "Auditor Independence," Journal o f Accounting Research, Spring 1984, and Antle, Rick and Richard
Lambert, "Accountants' Loss Functions and Induced Preferences for Conservatism," in Economic Analysis o f
Information and Contracts: Essays in Honour o f John E. Butterworth , G. A. Feltham, A. H. Amershi and W. T.
Ziemba, eds., (Kluwer, 1988).
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$2 billion to a reported income of $1 billion. The divergence of interests allows auditors to
enhance the market's perceptions of the integrity of financial reports.13
1.3.3. Auditor Independence
There is a history of trying to characterize the extent of the necessary divergence of
interests in qualitative terms. In particular, the concept of auditor independence has been used to
describe the boundaries of sufficient and insufficient divergence of interests. The complexity and
partially overlapping composition of auditors' and managers' interests make this description a
challenging and, very likely, an on-going activity. One recent effort in this regard produced the
definition of independence which we adopt. For our purposes, the Special Committee on
Assurance Services' definition of independence is an absence of interests that create an
unacceptable risk of bias with respect to the quality or context of information that is the subject
of an audit engagement.14
With this background, we begin our in-depth analysis of auditor independence with an
examination of the audit process and the environment within which auditors work.

2. The Audit Process and Its Economic Environment
2.1. Auditors' Products
In the abstract, an auditor's product is simply information - an assurance about the
financial statements - and the perceived statistical properties of that assurance determine its
economic value. To elaborate, public financial reports convey information to many audiences
faced with several potential decisions. Investors might be deciding how much and at what prices
to purchase a company's common stock. Shareholders might be deciding whether to vote for a
candidate for a directorship. Bank loan officers might be assessing the riskiness of a loan to the
company in order to settle on an appropriate interest rate.
We adopt an economist's view of decision-making. The decision-maker begins with a set
of prior beliefs and basic preferences over the potential outcomes of the decision. He or she

13See Antle, Rick and Barry Nalebuff, "Conservatism and Auditor-Client Negotiations," Journal o f Accounting
Research, Supplement 1991, pp. 31-54.
14The definition we have characterized was obtained from the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) web site at <http://www.aicpa.org/assurance/scas/comstud/assind/index.htm> visited on August 8, 1997.
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acquires and processes information helpful in improving the decision. In particular, the decision
maker combines relevant information with prior beliefs to form a better assessment of the
likelihood of possible consequences. The audit report's statistical properties15 come into play in
the process of combining relevant information with prior beliefs. For example, if the decision
maker processes information in a Bayesian fashion,16 the joint probability distribution of the
relevant information is involved in revising beliefs to make the best decision. In an economic
view of decision making, the statistical characteristics of the audit report determine its value.
The importance of this observation is that it focuses attention on the informational
properties of auditors' outputs. Auditors' incentives, personal characteristics and circumstances
are relevant only insofar as they impact the information in auditors' reports. To address the
effects of these factors on auditors' reports, we view auditors' decision processes in the same way
we view other decision-makers' processes.17 Auditors gather information, update their beliefs,
and then make decisions as a function of their incentives. We describe this process in more detail
below.
2.2. The Audit Process
2.2.1. Audit Teams
Auditing involves gathering and processing information in order to express an opinion
about financial statements. For all but the smallest clients, this is done by a team of individuals
with varying experience and rank within the accounting firm. The lowest ranking members of the
15Precisely what aspects of the perceived statistical properties of the audit report are important varies with the
particular decision-maker and the particular decision problem at hand. For example, an investor interested in
assessing the value of a stock will be primarily interested in the perceived statistical properties of forward-looking
information about future cash flows, given how the firm will be managed. A shareholder interested in assessing
management's stewardship will be primarily interested in the perceived statistical characteristics of backward
looking information. (See Gjesdal, Frøystein, "Accounting for Stewardship," Journal o f Accounting Research,
Spring 1981, pp. 208-231.) Further, in assessing stewardship, it is important to compare what actually happened
with what should have happened under good stewardship. (See Holmström, Bengt, "Moral Hazard and
Observability," The Bell Journal o f Economics, 1979.) Comparing what actually happened with what should have
happened is where the statistical characteristics of the audit report come in.
16Bayes' Theorem shows how the laws of probability dictate updating beliefs with new information. It states that a
decision maker updates his or her probability about event x, P(x), given new information y, which occurs with
probability P(y), according to the formula P(x|y) = P(x,y) /P(y), where P(x,y) is the joint probability of receiving
both x and y. The important point for our purposes is the crucial role played by the joint probability in this formula.
17See Antle, Rick, "The Auditor as an Economic Agent," Journal o f Accounting Research, Autumn 1982.
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team (hereafter, staff) are recent college graduates, some of whom may not have completed the
CPA examination or experience requirements. The highest ranking member of the team is a
partner of the accounting firm (lead or engagement partner), who has many years of audit
experience and is always a CPA.18 Between the engagement partner and the staff are individuals
with varying experience (hereafter, seniors and managers), almost all of whom are CPAs.
At lower levels, the tasks on an audit are highly structured. Everyone on the audit follows
an audit program, which is typically derived from tailoring a template supplied by the accounting
firm. Auditors are required by generally accepted auditing standards to plan their work
adequately,19 and structured audit programs have been in use in the major accounting firms for
many years.20 Of course, changes in technologies, clients' innovations in business practices, new
transactions, and a host of other factors make the development and application of audit programs
an ongoing task.
Higher ranking members of the audit team supervise the lower ranks, review the audit
work, and make important accounting and auditing judgments.21 Managers and partners also
negotiate with the client on accounting and auditing matters and on audit fees, and market the
accounting firm's other services to the client. The work at higher levels, particularly at the level
of the engagement partner, involves significant judgment.
Figure 2.1 sketches our characterization of the basic elements of the audit team's task.
The team applies a set of information processing rules to the evidence and assertions of
importance to the audit at hand to generate an audit report. The team possesses a unique set of
personal characteristics and relationships among its members, and has some level of resources
and technology at its disposal. The audit team is usually composed of individuals who bring it
specialized expertise, some by technique, some by experience, and some by knowledge of the
client. The team’s behavior is also affected by its incentives, and this is the point at which
independence arises. Therefore, we will discuss the teams' incentives in some detail.

18For SEC registrants, there must also be a concurring partner.
19AU Section 150.02.
20The standardization of audit work has led to claims that auditing is becoming an industry rather than a profession.
One consequence is that price competition for audits has at times been fierce. For example, Maher, Michael W.,
Peter Tiessen, Robert Colson, and Amy J. Broman, "Competition and Audit Fees," The Accounting Review, Jan.
1992, pp. 199-211, reports that real audit fees declined significantly between 1977 and 1981.
21In addition to those directly assigned to the audit team, the larger accounting firms typically make available
partner-level specialist groups to assist the engagement partner with complex accounting and auditing matters.
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2.2.2. Auditors' Incentives
The audit team's incentives may be thought of as some combination of the incentives of
the team's members. In the modem economy, the totality of an auditor's incentives are
determined by a constellation of factors arising from three basic sources:
1. Institutional incentives from the environment
2. Institutional incentives from the accounting firm's governance structure22
3. Individual factors.
To elaborate, we give some examples of the factors arising from each of these three sources.
Institutional incentives from the environment:
1. A complex, dynamic web of professional relationships with clients.
2. Competition in the markets for audit services.
3. Competition in the markets for non-audit services, especially consulting and taxation
advice.
4. Professional regulations, including codes of professional conduct, professional
standards, and administrative disciplinary processes administered by peer
professionals.
5. Government regulations and private sector standards subject to regulatory oversight.
6. Legal liability, including federal and state securities laws and liability insurance
polices.
Institutional incentives from the accounting firm's governance structure:
1. The firm's choice of particular auditing and non-auditing services to offer.
2. The firm's internal control practices.
3. The firm's compensation policies and practices.
22Throughout the paper, we use the term "governance structure" to encompass all the devices used to organize and
mediate economic relationships. Our use of this term is in the tradition of the economics of organization.
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4. A complex, dynamic web of professional relationships with other members of the
team and the firm.
Individual factors:
1. Each auditor's sense of professionalism.
2. Each auditor's web of personal relationships.
3. Each auditor's personal investment and economic situation.
4. Each auditor's family situation.
These factors operate differently across the different members of the team. For example,
the work of any auditor on the team might be compromised by a close familial relationship with
key client personnel. An audit junior is more likely to have incentives determined heavily by the
accounting firm's internal control and compensation policies, and is not likely to have many
incentives tied to the accounting firm's web of relationships with the client. An audit partner has
more flexibility in dealing with internal control policies and is less likely to simply take them as
a fixed incentive, but a partner has much more responsibility at the level of the web of
relationships with clients.
We see the incentives as operating on two levels: personal and institutional. Personallevel incentives involve the incentives of individual auditors. These include their personal
relationships, investments and individual legal liability. Personal-level incentives include the
compensation of individual auditors and their professional relationships with other members of
the accounting firm. Institutional-level incentives involve forces that affect the accounting firm.
These include pressures from competition, professional and governmental regulations applied at
the firm level, and firm-level liability.
The firm's governance structure is the vehicle through which institutional-level incentives
are translated to personal-level incentives. In assessing auditors' independence, we seek to
differentiate the firm's incentives to maintain good governance from the individuals' incentives to
comply with the firm's interests. This allows us to obtain some separation between the problem
of individuals' incentives to impair independence23 and the problem of the accounting firm in
maintaining a governance structure which adequately protects its independence.

23In economic terms, we are concerned here with the problem of free-riders who take advantage of the difficulties in
organizing collective actions.
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We will not comment extensively on independence concerns arising from personal-level
incentives, such as members of the audit team owning the common stock of audit clients or
having a close familial relationship with important client personnel.24 Independence at this level
is, we believe, best handled through a combination of accounting firms' internal quality controls,
compensation policies and practices, safeguards, requisite training and proficiency, and
professional regulations. Since the first four of these-quality control, compensation, safeguards
and training-are largely internal governance matters, we would expect each firm to devise
economically efficient means of implementing them through its governance structure. Therefore,
most of our effort and analysis is directed at institutional-level independence issues.
In analyzing auditor independence in terms of the totality of auditors' institutional-level
incentives, there are three main areas that should be considered. One is auditors' professional and
legal liability. Another is auditors' incentives to protect their investments in reputational and
intellectual capital. The third is the supply of non-audit services to clients. We discuss auditor’s
liability in the next section, then turn to the role of investments in reputation and intellectual
capital, and finally to the supply of non-audit services.

3. Auditors’ Liability
Auditors' liability is important to consider when assessing independence because it is
significant in amount and can impose costs on firms that impair their independence. This section
examines the significance of litigation first, then discusses the incentives to maintain
independence resulting from liability.
3.1. Amount and Cost of Litigation
Auditors face significant monetary costs through their liability. While we do not have
data for all accounting firms, Mayer, Brown & Platt have compiled the costs to the Big Six25
firms of protecting their practices from 1990 to 1993, and their results are in Table 3.1.26

24We do not intend to imply that the current rules on familial relationships and ownership of common stock should
not be re-examined. Particularly in the context of a large accounting firm, ownership of common stock by one
partner of the firm who is not involved in the audit and with appropriate safeguards in place should not impair the
independence of the entire firm with respect to that client.
25The Big Six are the six largest U. S. accounting firms: Arthur Andersen LLP, Coopers & Lybrand LLP, Deloitte
& Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP and Price Waterhouse LLP.
26Source: Mayer, Brown & Platt, letter of June 3, 1994, to Mr. Walter Schuetze, Chief Accountant, Securities and
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Table 3.1
Big Six Accounting Firms
Accounting and Audit Practice Protection Costs2728
(in millions)
1990

1991

1992

1993

$5,275

$5,319

$5,470

$5,588

$367

$485

$783

$1,082

37

(8)

(185)

(416)

Net audit practice protection costs

$404

$477

$598

$666

Net costs as a percent of revenues

7.7%

9.0%

10.9%

11.9%

Gross accounting and auditing
28
revenues
Costs of judgments, settlements and
legal defense
Insurance premiums, net of recoveries

The Big Six firms' gross losses from litigation in 1993, $1,082 billion, were an
astonishing 19.4% of their revenues. Legal liability costs helped drive Laventhol & Horwath, at
one time the seventh largest accounting firm, into bankruptcy. When it filed for Chapter 11 on

Exchange Commission.
27All our data, both in the tables and the text, are for the United States only.
28These figures for revenues were taken directly from the Mayer, Brown & Platt letter and differ slightly from the
gross revenue figures from the SECPS that we use later in the paper. The Mayer, Brown and Platt revenue figures
were compiled to be consistent with the cost figures reported later in the table. These data, unlike the SECPS data,
are not derived from the firms’ own fiscal accounting periods. The Mayer, Brown & Platt data are the best revenue
estimates against which to compare litigation costs. In any event, the differences among these numbers and the ones
we rely on more heavily later are slight. Using the revenue data from Table 4.1, net costs as a percent of revenues
are 7.7%, 9.1%, 11.1%, and 11.9% in 1990-93, respectively.
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November 21, 1990, Laventhol & Horwath (with revenues in 1990 of more than $345 million)
was the largest professional services firm ever to go bankrupt.29
To get an idea of the importance of legal liability to individual partners, we examine perpartner losses in settlements and litigation relative to per-partner average earnings for the Big Six
firms. Data30 are contained in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2
Awards, Settlements and Average Earnings per Big Six Partner
1990-1992
(in thousands)
Year

Amount of Awards and
Settlements Paid per
Audit Partner

Average Earnings per
Partner

Awards &, Settlements as
a % of Average Earnings

1992

$186

$212

88%

1991

$38

$190

20%

1990

$20

$206

10%

Even at the lowest of the three per-partner figures of 10%, litigation provides a
substantial influence on partners' behavior. At 88% of the average partner earnings, the influence
of litigation is overwhelming. Having experienced a year in which the Big Six incurred such
heavy litigation losses as 1992, nearly all audit partners will be cognizant of the possibility of
litigation for a long time.
We attempted to compile dollar amounts similar to those in Table 3.2 for more recent
years, but time pressures prevented it. Instead, we obtained data from Minet, Inc., (hereafter,
Minet) an insurance advisor and broker for the Big Six firms, on the numbers of claims filed
against the Big Six accounting firms in the United States from 1990 to the present. Minet data

29See Weber, Joseph, M. Galen, C. Yang, and D. Greising, "Behind the Fall of Laventhol," Business Week, 54, 1990,
p. 54.
30Source: "A Disproportionate Burden of Liability," Tables VII and VIII.
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(collected on a policy year basis) show that legal liability remains a strong force on auditors. The
Minet data are presented in Table 3.3.31

Table 3.3
Number of Claims/Suits against Big Six Firms
1990-1996
Policy Year

Claims/Suits

1995-96

109

1994-95

124

1993-94

126

1992-93

145

1991-92

140

1990-91

203

3.2. Liability Provides Incentives to Maintain Independence
While a comprehensive and scientifically rigorous analysis of auditors’ losses in litigation
is beyond the scope of this paper, it is clear that the possibility of litigation plays a large role in
determining auditors' incentives. Further, although many public accountants contend the primary
reason behind their losses is the failure of the clients' businesses, as opposed to audit failures,
data from Minet indicate that a significant amount of litigation does not involve insolvent clients.
From 1987 to 1993, the percentages of claims against Big Six firms involving insolvent clients
are shown in Table 3.4.32

3'These data were taken from Minet's Statistical Database. Minet believes that since 1993, the Big Six firms might
not have reported small settlement payments to their insurers. If true, this would at least partially explain the
decrease in claims reported since 1993.
32These data were compiled from Minet's Risk Management database, which contains 610 matters against the Big
Six firms in the United States. The Risk Management database includes all reported matters on which there is
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Table 3.4
Percentages of Claims against Big Six Firms Involving Insolvent Clients
1987-1993
Year

Percentage of Claims Involving Insolvent
Clients

1993

48

1992

34

1991

47

1990

58

1989

41

1988

46

1987

60

Aside from whether the losses from litigation are deserved or excessive, the point here is
that the possibility of litigation exerts powerful effects on auditors' behavior. Auditors losses in
litigation are not due only to the business failures of their clients. Although it is somewhat rare,
plaintiffs do specifically allege lack of auditor independence as a cause of loss. According to data
from Minet's Risk Management database, plaintiffs alleged that lack of independence/objectivity
was a cause of loss in 9% of claims against Big Six accounting firms in the United States since
June 1, 1972.
Combining the very large potential losses in litigation with the observation that
independence issues are sometimes alleged to be a cause of loss, it seems clear that an accounting
firm that engages in an institutional level of lack of independence would face an avalanche of
litigation. We conclude that the possibility of litigation provides accounting firms with powerful
incentives to avoid systemic independence violations.

sufficient information in addition to every reported matter with an incurred loss of at least $1,000,000.
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4. Auditors’ Investments
Auditors have incentives to preserve their independence beyond those forced on them by
the liability system. Auditors have investments in their firms' reputations for independence and in
their stock of expertise which would be put at risk should they impair independence. We observe
auditors taking steps to protect these investments. This section discusses these investments,
beginning with reputations.
4.1. Auditors' Reputations
Competition in the markets for their services induces auditors to invest in their
reputations, of which a reputation for independence is a part. It is hard to imagine anything but a
corrupt Board of Directors allowing the company to hire a non-independent auditor. Engaging in
an institutional-level abrogation of independence would put the firm's entire stream of audit
revenues at risk.33 This is a crucial feature of the multi-client nature of the practices of almost all
modem accounting firms. With one client, the threat of a loss of revenue might be used to gain
power over the auditor and impair auditor independence. With multiple clients, an abrogation of
independence with one client threatens the revenue stream derived from the entire client pool.34
As a conservative estimate of the total amount of audit revenue obtained by the auditors
of public companies in the United States, we examined the Big Six firms' reports to the AICPA
SEC Practice Section (SECPS). Even considering only these six accounting firms, the revenue
streams are substantial. As indicated in Table 4.1, audit revenues in the U.S. for the Big Six firms
topped $6 billion in 1996. In terms of constant 1996 dollars, the Big Six firms' revenues have
been hovering just over $6 billion for several years.35

33The non-audit revenues might be at risk as well, if the audit reputation provides a positive spillover onto non-audit
services.
34Economic analyses of independence often focus not on revenues but on quasi-rents, which are the excess of
revenues over costs in a given period that allow relationship-specific capital to generate a return. See DeAngelo,
Linda, "Auditor Independence, "Low Balling," and Disclosure Regulation," Journal o f Accounting and Economics,
1981. There are no data on quasi-rents, so we state our analysis in terms of revenues.
35Nominal revenue figures were taken from the firms' reports to the SECPS. These are restated using the Consumer
Price Index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). In particular, we extracted Series ID CUUR0000SA0, U.S.
City Average, All items, on Sept. 26, 1997, from the BLS Web Site, accessible at
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Table 4.1
Big Six Firms' Audit Revenues
1990-1996
Year
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

Big Six Total Audit Revenues Big Six Total Audit Revenues
(millions of 1996 $)
(millions of nominal $)
6,136
6,136
6,011
5,839
6,200
5,856
6,083
5,603
6,044
5,405
6,067
5,266
6,272
5,225

It is clear that the present value of this revenue stream is a very large number, and that it
represents a substantial "bond" to insure that accounting firms protect their independence. For
example, estimating the stream of audit revenues to be flat at $6 billion per year in perpetuity and
using an interest rate of 10%, the total present value of the Big Six revenue stream is $60 billion.
Of course, costs must be deducted from this revenue stream to get the net value of future profits
at risk. We offer this examination of their revenues as a reflection of the size of the market.
4.2. Partners’ Capital
Another, much more conservative measure of the amount that would be put at risk by
compromising independence is the total partners' capital in accounting firms. As a conservative
estimate of this capital, we obtained estimates for the Big Six firms in the U.S. In each of the
firms, the total partners' capital as of the latest fiscal year end was in the hundreds of millions of
dollars. The total partners' capital in the Big Six firms as of the latest fiscal year end for each firm
was in excess of $3.5 billion.36
This is a very conservative measure, since it represents only the partners' total current
financial investment. It does not consider the devastating effects on the value of their human
<http://stats.bls.gov/datahome.htm>.
36Compiled from data supplied to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shiver & Jacobson.
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capital, should they lose their rights to conduct audits. The bankruptcy of Laventhol & Horwath
establishes that, at a minimum, the partners stand to lose their total capital in the firm, should the
firm sacrifice its independence.
4.3. Investments in Audit Methodology and Technology
Accounting firms also have an incentive to protect their substantial investments in audit
methodology and technology. We asked the Big Six firms how much they spent on improving
audit methodology and technology in the most recent fiscal year. Four of the six had that amount
available, and the total of the four was in excess of $170 million.37 Two of the six were able to
provide figures for the total investment in audit methodology and technology over the last five
years. These two firms alone spent in excess of $500 million over this period.
In more qualitative terms, we asked each of the Big Six firms to describe their recent
investments in audit technology and methodology. Based on their responses, it is apparent to us
that the industry is making substantial investments in software and data/knowledge bases. We
will comment more on this trend in Section 6. Our purpose here is to note the firms' interest in
protecting these investments. Investments in audit technology and methodology are specific to
the auditing industry. That is, it is unlikely that they would be of much use to anyone other than
an accounting firm, and perhaps not even to another accounting firm. The firms have powerful
incentives to protect these investments by policing themselves.
4.4. Protection of Investments through Internal Controls and Safeguards
Accounting firms protect their investments in many ways, the most important of which
are the accepted control procedures they apply within their organizations. Accounting firms have
in place elaborate safeguards to insure the independence of their individual auditors with respect
to their clients. These safeguards include careful selection and training of audit personnel,
tracking of personal investments, consultation requirements, national-level consultation
functions, partner rotation, second partner reviews, and client acceptance and retention policies.

5. The Supply of Non-Audit Services
The independence implications of auditors supplying non-audit services to audit clients
have long been a source of dispute and controversy. Independence concerns led the SEC to issue
37Compiled from data supplied to Fried, Frank, Harris, Shiver & Jacobson.
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ASR 250 in June 1978, requiring proxy-statement disclosures about audit fees and fees for non
audit services paid to the accounting firm. Serious doubts about the usefulness of these
disclosures led to the withdrawal of ASR 250 after only three years, but the issue of auditor
supply of non-audit services to audit clients has not gone away. In fact, the growth of such
services has led to renewed interest in their implications for auditing.
This section examines the economics of accounting firms' supply of non-audit services to
audit clients. We begin with an examination of the significance of these services, then turn to the
crucial issue of economies of scope with audit services. Finally, we seek to understand whether
there appears to be any harm in the supply of such services by examining the relation between
the supply of non-audit services and the practice protection costs paid by Big Six firms.
5.1. Significance of Non-audit Services

Revenues from non-audit services are a significant and growing portion of the revenues
of accounting firms. For the Big Six, Table 5.138 shows that total revenues from consulting had
virtually equaled those from auditing in 1996. Given the trends of the two revenue streams,
consulting revenues very likely now exceed those from auditing. Revenues from tax services
have grown somewhat, but seem to behave much more like audit fees in terms of growth than do
the consulting fees.

38Compiled from data submitted by the Big Six firms to the SECPS.
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Table 5.1
Breakdown of Big Six Fees by Source39
Year

Audit

1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

millions of
1996$
6,136
6,011
6,200
6,083
6,044
6,067
6,272

Tax

%
40
44
50
51
52
52
53

millions of
1996$
3,439
3,104
2,868
3,022
3,044
3,027
3,113

Total Consulting

%
23
23
23
26
26
26
26

millions of
1996$
5,582
4,431
3,346
2,732
2,622
2,583
2,482

Total Revenues
(millions of
1996$)

%
37
33
27
23
22
22
21

15,156
13,546
12,413
11,838
11,710
11,676
11,867

Table 5.1 also shows that consulting revenues have grown substantially as measured by
their fraction of total Big Six fees. Combining tax and consulting fees, we see that 60% of the
revenues of the Big Six firms in 1996 were from the supply of non-audit services.
Because there appears to be little controversy in accounting firms’ supply of tax services,
we focus on consulting services. One important fact not revealed by our analysis to this point is
the extent of consulting services supplied to audit clients. While we do not have the data to
answer this question for general audit clients, the Big Six firms' reports to the SECPS separate
consulting fees for SEC audit clients from those of all other consumers of consulting services.
Table 5.240 shows that auditors supply a substantial amount of consulting services to their SEC
audit clients.

39The percentages are stated in terms of percentages of total revenues.
40Compiled from data submitted by the Big Six firms to the SECPS.
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Table 5.2
Composition of Big Six Consulting Fees:
SEC Clients & All Other41
Year

1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

millions of 1996$
1,024
708
583
497
438
350
431

Total Consulting
(millions of 1996$)

All other clients

SEC audit clients
%
18
16
17
18
17
14
17

millions of 1996$
4,558
3,723
2,763
2,236
2,184
2,233
2,050

%
82
84
83
82
83
86
83

5,582
4,431
3,346
2,732
2,622
2,583
2,482

Table 5.2 also shows the percentage of total consulting revenues obtained by supplying
consulting services to SEC audit clients and all other clients. It is apparent that the proportion of
consulting services supplied to SEC audit clients has been fairly constant. Therefore, the growth
in the consulting revenues of the Big Six firms has not been the result of a disproportionate
growth in the consulting services consumed by their SEC clients. This suggests that the growth
in consulting revenues has been driven by the value of those services in the market, and not by
increasing attempts to undermine the independence of auditors by tying lucrative consulting
contracts to audit outcomes.
In the next subsection, we discuss the ties between auditing and non-audit services,
particularly consulting. From a policy perspective, it is very important that we understand as
much as possible about why auditing and consulting services are linked. The most cynical view
is that clients demand consulting from their accounting firms as a way of creating additional
means through which to influence the audit. If true, we would expect to see a relation between
audit failures and the supply of non-audit services. We would also expect to see a tie between
audit-practice protection costs and the supply of non-audit services. We find in subsection 5.3
that neither is in fact the case.
An alternative perspective is that accounting firms supply consulting services because
they have a comparative advantage at doing so. The validity of this view turns on the existence

41The percentages are stated in terms of percentages of total consulting revenues.
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of economies of scope between audit and non-audit services. The evidence supporting this view
is currently mostly of a suggestive nature, and is discussed in the next subsection.
5.2. Economies of Scope with Audit Services
5.2.1. Potential Sources of Economies of Scope
Cost advantages obtained by producing different products or delivering different services
within one firm are economies of scope. There has never been much debate about whether there
are economies of scope linking tax and audit services.42 The relation between auditing and
consulting is another matter. One problem in this area is that consulting services are varied and
hard to categorize. But regardless of the nature of the consulting services they provide, the
success of accounting firms in establishing rapidly growing consulting operations is itself
testimony to the comparative advantage these firms have in this arena.
Ideally, we would like to have rigorous, econometric measures of the economies of scope
among various types of services offered by accounting firms. Lacking this quantitative evidence,
we identified two possible sources of economies of scope and sought to understand whether the
practices of accounting firms were consistent with economies arising from these sources.
One potential economy of scope is the use in consulting and auditing of the same
information. Both auditing and consulting involve learning about the client, and it might be the
case that this learning can be done once and applied to both areas. The Big Six firms have
described to us their practices of sharing information across auditing and consulting teams.43
Therefore, it is possible that the accounting firms' enjoy learning-based economies of scope by
doing both auditing and consulting, as opposed to doing only one or the other.44

42Audits invariably involve issues of taxation, as taxes are important factors in calculating net income. Good tax
advice depends on an intimate knowledge of financial affairs, a great deal of which is acquired in the process of
doing an audit. A thorough understanding of the client's records is important in supplying both auditing and tax
services.
43Some of the firms have formally organized client service teams that are charged with the responsibility of making
sure there is full communication among auditors and non-auditors. Others have a partner who is the "point person"
for a given client. All described ways in which they sought to make sure information obtained in consulting was
used in doing the audit.
44There are some examples that are quite suggestive of economies of scope from learning about the client. One
accounting firm related an interesting experience about one client's warranty costs. Because of its efforts in auditing
warranty reserves, the client asked the audit team to assist with a project aimed at improving and distributing
information about product quality within the client company. The audit team, by virtue of its work in auditing the
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Another possible source of economies of scope is information about the value of
consulting projects that is obtained in the course of doing an audit. The audit team, in its study of
client business practices and systems, might learn that the client could benefit from a certain type
of consulting service. The audit team could create value, then, by informing its firm's consulting
practice and the client of this potential for the profitable performance of the service. Accounting
firms' policies stress the use of audit information to deliver value to clients by pointing out
possible improvements in their business practices, some of which can be obtained by employing
the accounting firms' own consulting experts.
5.2.2. Social Cost of Foregone Economies of Scope
Economic welfare is enhanced when the most efficient supplier of a good or service is
allowed to fulfill the demand for that good or service. To the extent that there are economies of
scope between audit and non-audit services, a social cost is imposed when an accounting firm is
not allowed to supply consulting services. The magnitude of the social cost depends on the extent
of the economies of scope. If the most efficient supplier is prohibited from fulfilling demand, the
next most efficient supplier has a profit opportunity. That next most efficient supplier will use
more of society's resources to fulfill demand, imposing a social loss. It is also likely that demand
will drop. Projects that are profitable when done by the most efficient supplier may be
unprofitable when done less efficiently. The social loss in this case is the net value of the
foregone project.
In a free market system, the market participants themselves judge which projects add net
value and how the gains to that added value are to be split. Because they can capture the value
produced, the market participants have incentives to seek out profit opportunities and agree on
how to divide the gains. Accounting firms and audit clients have incentives to find opportunities
to profit by economies of scope and to exploit those opportunities. This creates social value.
Accounting firms also have incentives to weigh the gains derived from exploiting
economies of scope against any the costs of independence safeguards, and to craft their
organizations to minimize these costs. In a competitive market for audit services, accounting
firms have appropriate incentives, from a social point of view, to make the proper tradeoffs
between exploiting economies of scope and the costs of designing and maintaining
organizational structures to safeguard independence. Restricting accounting firms' ability to take
consulting assignments will only improve social welfare if there are social costs not weighed in
warranty reserves, understood the drivers of product quality and the specific information that would be of use in
assessing those drivers. Further, the development of information about quality by the client led to improvements and
efficiencies in future audits of warranty reserves.
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the firms' cost-benefit calculus. This seems unlikely. The market for audit services is by all
accounts active and competitive. The identity and quality of service of the larger accounting
firms is well-understood, as are their incentives to protect their reputations and minimize their
exposure to liability.
At the individual level, however, a given CPA might well not make an appropriate
tradeoff between independence costs and other benefits. The reason is simply that an individual
participant in an accounting firm can impose externalities on other members of the firm.
Misdeeds by one individual can impair the reputation of an entire firm, so monitoring of
individual behavior by the firm is warranted and routinely done.45 It is difficult to tell directly,
however, whether this monitoring is sufficient to curb systemic independence violations. In the
next subsection, we examine the practice protection costs of the Big Six firms for evidence that
they are incorrectly assessing potential independence costs in their supply of non-audit services.
5.3. Relation between Non-audit Services and Audit Practice Protection Costs
This subsection examines the relation between the costs of protecting audit practices and
the supply of non-audit services. We explore two facets of this issue: losses from litigation and
the costs of liability insurance.
5.3.1. Non-audit Services and Losses from Litigation
The first striking fact about the relation between the supply of non-audit services and
losses from litigation is the paucity of specific examples in which the supply of non-audit
services was shown to cause damages. In Minet’s risk management database46 of 610 claims
against auditors, there are only 24 claims in which the claim mentions that the auditor also
supplied consulting services. In 19 of those cases, it does not appear that independence was an
issue. In two of the remaining five cases, there were allegations of a lack of independence, but
the allegations were not directed at the supply of consulting services. This leaves us with only
three out of 610 cases in which there were allegations that independence was somehow impaired
by the supply of consulting services.

45Professional organizations like the AICPA also have an interest in monitoring and disciplining their members.
46The following data were supplied by Minet.
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We supplemented the Minet database with informal queries of attorneys whose practices
involve knowledge of claims against the Big Six. We again failed to uncover any specific
instances in which the supply of non-audit services led to an audit failure.
For a more quantitative picture of the relation between the supply of non-audit services
and audit failures, Table 5.3 reports the consulting fees of the Big Six firms, broken down into
SEC clients, other clients and total fees, against the number of claims against Big Six firms from
the Minet statistical database. Clearly, consulting fees have been going up while the number of
claims and/or suits has been declining. Figure 5.1 contains a graph of these data, which reveal
that the effects of consulting fees on claims, if they exist and if they are positive, are heavily
outweighed by the main factors that drive litigation and consulting fees.

Table 5.3
Number of Claims/Suits against Big Six Firms and Consulting Fees47
1990-1996
Policy Year

Number of
Claims/Suits

1995-96
1994-95
1993-94
1992-93
1991-92
1990-91

109
124
126
145
140
203

Total Big Six
Consulting Fees
from SEC audit
clients
1,169
875
720
595
490
452

Total Big Six
Consulting Fees
from all other
clients
4,165
3,184
2,401
2,068
1,996
1,863

Total Big Six
Consulting Fees

5,334
4,059
3,121
2,663
2,486
2,315

The lack of specific instances in which the supply of non-audit services undermined
independence and the opposing time trends of consulting fees and the number of claims against
Big Six firms, are evidence that the supply of non-audit services has not compromised auditor
independence. There are two more sources of evidence on this issue. One is the pricing of
auditors' liability insurance. The other is the reaction to the SEC's requirement in Accounting
Series Release (ASR) 250 that firms disclose information about fees for auditor-supplied, non
audit services. These disclosures were made in their proxy statements from September 30, 1978
through February 1982, when the requirement was removed. We examine this evidence in the
next two subsections.
47The fees are averages of the fees in the two years indicated in the "Policy Year" column. Fees are measured in
millions of constant 1996 dollars.
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5.3.2. Non-audit Services and the Pricing of Liability Insurance
To facilitate their purchase of liability insurance, Minet develops risk profiles of the Big
Six firms. Minet stated that it does not consider the supply of non-audit services to be a relevant
factor in the development of these risk profiles. Further, Minet does not use the supply of non
audit services, either to audit clients or others, as a predictive variable in estimating the Big Six
firms' litigation losses. Their loss estimation is based on the experience of the individual firms,48
tempered with general economic variables on a judgmental basis. There are no known covenants
in existing liability insurance contracts which restrict an accounting firm's ability to offer non
audit services.
Auditors' insurers have obvious incentives to assess properly the factors that are
associated with audit failures. They have incentives to find the most diagnostic predictors
possible of future losses in litigation. They have the ability to write insurance contracts which
restrict the amount of loss reimbursement whenever specified types of non-audit services are
provided. At the least, this is evidence that existing safeguards of auditor independence operate
to ensure that accounting firms protect their independence when providing non-audit services. It
is also consistent with the view that the firms themselves have taken adequate steps to protect
their independence, insofar as the insurers are concerned. Because the insurers have such an
obvious and direct monetary interest in such matters, this is evidence that the supply of non-audit
services has not damaged auditor independence.
5.3.3. Reaction to ASR 250
ASR 250 required firms to disclose the percentage of fees for auditor-supplied, non-audit
services to audit fees in proxy statements. It also required separate disclosure of the percentage of
fees for each auditor-supplied, non-audit service to audit fees whenever it exceeded 3%, and
whether the board of directors or the audit committee had to approve auditor-supplied, non-audit
services. To underscore the dangers to independence that it perceived, the SEC stated in ASR
264, which proposed guidance for auditors and boards of directors in assessing whether auditors
should supply non-audit services:49

48Minet's use of the experience of the individual firms is consistent with the importance of the firms' reputations.
49As quoted in Scheiner, J., "An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of SEC Nonaudit Service Disclosure
Requirements on Independent Auditors and Their Clients," Journal o f Accounting Research, Autumn 1984, p. 790.
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The Commission believes that public confidence is significantly lessened if
auditors engage in activities and services that the public perceives as foreign to the
expected role of the auditor.

With the disclosures required by ASR 250 and the official concern about non-audit
services expressed in ASR 264, one might expect that firms would alter their purchases of non
audit services from their auditors. Yet in his study of firms' purchases of non-audit services from
auditors after ASR 250, James Scheiner found "no significant changes in the quantity of specific
nonaudit services among CPA firms or categories of clients occurred subsequent to ASR No.
250."50
It is conceivable that managers and auditors were disregarding adverse effects on
shareholders in continuing the non-audit services. If that were true, one would expect that
shareholders would be more likely to vote against retention of the auditor. Yet William Glezen
and James Millar, in their study of shareholder votes to select an independent auditor, found no
significant difference in auditor approval ratios before and after the disclosures required by ASR
250.5051 If the shareholders' interests were being compromised, they did not employ an obvious
and inexpensive way to express their displeasure.
As a final gauge of reactions to the ASR 250 disclosures, we read the letters sent to the
SEC by interested parties when the SEC was considering withdrawal of ASR 250 and ASR 264.
Without going into undue detail, it was clear to us that the letters fell neatly into two categories:
competing suppliers of consulting services, and everyone else, including accounting firms and
their clients. The accounting firms and clients argued that the disclosures were not providing
useful information to the investing public. Firms that were competing suppliers of consulting
services argued that auditor provision of such services constituted a serious threat to auditor
independence. With no evidence of such a threat, ASR 250 and ASR 264 were rescinded.
5.4. Concluding Remarks about Non-audit Services
Auditors' supply of non-audit services to audit clients has been the most consistent,
troublesome target for those critical of the independence of auditors. The fees from non-audit
services are significant, both as a percentage of the total fees of the accounting firms and in an
absolute sense. The delivery of non-audit services often requires a close relationship with
management, and with taxation advice, may place the firm in the position of articulating clients'
50Ibid., p. 790.
51Glezen, G. William, and James A. Millar, "An Empirical Investigation of Stockholder Reaction to Disclosures
Required by ASR No. 250," Journal o f Accounting Research, Autumn 1985, pp. 859-870.
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positions before regulators.52 Viewed in isolation, it is easy to understand how critics can
perceive that the supply of non-audit services to audit clients impairs independence.
A much different picture emerges when we consider the totality of auditors' incentives.
Legal liability and the value of reputations provide incentives for accounting firms to maintain
their independence. Auditors are seen, at both the firm and the professional level, to regulate,
monitor and protect their independence. Still, we might question whether the incentives and
safeguards that exist are enough. To settle this, we must look at the evidence.
The evidence provides no support for the position that the supply of non-audit services
has impaired independence to the point that costs have been imposed on any constituency. There
are very few instances in which the supply of non-audit services is even alleged to have damaged
independence. Insurers do not constrain the supply of non-audit services in their liability
contracts with auditors, and insurers do not use the supply of non-audit services either as a risk
factor or in estimating losses. The number of claims and/or suits against the Big Six is unrelated
to fees from non-audit services. Managers and auditors did not alter their behavior when the SEC
required disclosure of information about non-audit fees, even though this information was
supplied directly to shareholders in proxy statements. Shareholders did not change their voting
behavior in auditor selection as a function of disclosures about non-audit fees. When the SEC
withdrew ASR 250 and ASR 264, the only audible protest came from the auditors' competitors in
the market for non-audit services.
While we find no evidence that the supply of non-audit services damages independence,
we find a lot of evidence that the supply of non-audit services adds value. Accounting firms have
been very successful in supplying non-audit services, as measured by the fees they generate. In
assessing value created, it is important to consider more than just the fees received for non-audit
services. The buyers of these services are also getting value from them. In classical economic
terms, we must consider consumer, as well as producer, surplus in assessing the social value of
non-audit services.
The extreme step of prohibiting auditors from supplying non-audit services to audit
clients would not destroy the entire social value of the non-audit services. It would open a profit
opportunity for other suppliers of these services. However, because these suppliers cannot
currently wrest the market away from accounting firms, they must be less efficient than the
accounting firms, perhaps due to economies of scope with audits. The difference in efficiencies
and the accompanying change in the amount of services purchased would represent a social cost
of banning auditors from non-audit activities with their clients. In view of our economic analysis

520 f course, accounting firms perform similar functions in their capacities as auditors. See Section 921.12 of the
AICPA Bylaws.
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and the evidence, we believe this social cost outweighs any realistic view of the possible
benefits.
These remarks pertain primarily to the past. The evidence can only reflect actual
experience, and there are environmental changes and developing trends that could effect auditor
independence. We make a few brief comments on these trends in the next section.

6. Trends Affecting the Auditing Industry
We confine our remarks to two major trends, which we view as related: the increasing
scale of some economic organizations associated with globalization, and the impact of rapid
changes in information technology.
6.1. Globalization and Scale
Major economic organizations today operate on a global scale. In the absence of serious,
widespread political conflict, they are likely to continue to do so. Clearly, organizations with a
global reach require auditors with a global reach. Audit clients have been operating
internationally for some time now, and all of the Big Six and many other accounting firms
operate worldwide. However, improvements in information technology and low transportation
costs make possible levels of consistency, communication and operational harmony in clients'
international operations never before possible. Organizations are crafting structures that allow
them to reap the benefits of economies of scale on a new plane. The most efficient and effective
ways to audit them will very likely be through accounting firms that take advantage of the same
economies of scale.
Just as our major stock exchanges have felt the presence of international competition, so
too are efforts increasing to harmonize, or at least coordinate, accounting standards at an
international level. Extrapolating this trend, we can expect some pressures on accounting firms to
harmonize their international practices. The increasingly global nature of reputations will
reinforce these pressures, because a major audit failure in one country could impact an
accounting firm's worldwide reputation.
Increasing globalization and scale have implications for auditor independence. They
expand the scope of understanding necessary to assess the totality of the incentives faced by a
global accounting firm. The environment that provides institutional incentives through client
relationships, competition, and governmental regulations is increasingly a global environment.
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There are likely to be differences across jurisdictions that must be identified and weighed. The
institutional incentives provided by the accounting firm's governance structure also operate on a
global scale. This complicates the task of understanding the economic organization of accounting
firms by encompassing issues such as how revenues are shared internationally, how much
standardization is applied in the approach to audits, and how a worldwide audit staff is selected
and trained. The individual factors in auditors' incentives, such as personal relationships,
economic situation, and family situation are also likely to be more varied in accounting firms
comprised of personnel that are truly drawn internationally.
Increasing globalization creates pressure to view auditor independence on a worldwide
scale. For example, developing economies often lack the institutional infra-structure (government
oversight, legal systems, organized financial markets, an active and forceful auditing function,
etc.) that is necessary for modem economic activity.53 The development of a clear, conceptsbased approach to auditor independence that is founded on a solid understanding of the demands
of the economic environment, economies of scope and scale, and the expectations of society
about the auditors' functions would facilitate the application of independence rules to such
jurisdictions.
6.2. Information Technology
Clients' rapidly increasing use of sophisticated information technology continues to place
great demands on auditors. Recent announcements of two breakthroughs in microprocessors that
portend acceleration of the historical pace of a doubling of computing power every eighteen
months (Moore's Law) imply even faster rates of change in information technology.54 There are
many ways in which changes in information technology affect auditing.
Changes in information technology change the ways an organization captures, processes
and communicates the data that underlie the financial statements subject to audit. In turn, these
changes place new demands on the audit process. For example, as clients' information processing
becomes more automated, integrated, and distributed in a client-server environment, auditing
becomes more a process of monitoring and relying on controls within the information processing
system, rather than on controls of users of the system. Many accounting firms now pride
themselves in their proprietary software, which makes auditing of client controls much more
53See Khanna, Tarun and Krishna Palepu, "Why Focused Strategies May Be Wrong for Emerging Markets," ,
Harvard Business Review, July-August 1997, pp. 41-51.
54See Markoff, John, "Innovation to Double Chip Power May Cut Life Span of Computers," The New York Times,
Section A: Business/Financial Desk, Sept. 17, 1997, p. 1, and Zuckerman, L., "I.B.M. to Make Smaller and Faster
Chips," The New York Times, Section D: Business/Financial Desk, Sept. 22, 1997.
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efficient than earlier approaches which sampled transactions. Proper application of this audit
technique, however, is dependent on a deep understanding of the audit client's organization and
business processes. The demands on auditors to keep up with increasingly sophisticated client
software are likely to be high.
Changes in information technology have impacted and likely will continue to impact the
way organizations are crafted. For example, relationships between customers and suppliers are
being radically altered by integration of their information systems. Customers now place orders
directly through suppliers' information systems, blurring our traditional concepts of
organizational boundaries. This has extended to the physical location of suppliers in
manufacturers' facilities. These changes may require that audit effort be integrated across
supplier-manufacturer clients. They are likely to place new demands on our thinking about
auditor independence.
Dramatic improvements in information technology may also cause fundamental changes
in the approach to accounting. For example, there would seem a real possibility that some form
of continual access to information will at least partially replace periodic reporting. Given access
to instant information on the World Wide Web, it will likely not be long before investors are
demanding to look at a constantly updated picture of financial performance over the last twelve
months, rather than rely on an even mildly dated annual or quarterly report. Providing requisite
assurance services on such systems will likely necessitate further continual involvement of
auditors with their clients, and raise a host of unforeseen issues about auditor independence.
6.3. Concluding Remarks about Trends
Just as the trends toward globalization and the use of increasingly sophisticated
information technology are changing the business practices of audit clients, we also expect them
to change the business practices of accounting firms. Already we see accounting firms wishing
to engage a variety of innovative business relationships, including joint ventures and strategic
alliances. It is in accounting firms' interests to engage in these opportunities to create value. It is
also in their interest to structure their relationships in ways that protect their independence. We
believe that whatever independence rules are ultimately adopted, they should be open to the
efforts of accounting firms and their clients to design innovative relationships that create value
and assure audit independence.
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7. Conclusion
Taking a holistic view, we have found that auditors have many incentives to protect their
independence. Legal liability is significant, and any firm that would damage its independence
risks an avalanche of litigation. Auditors' have substantial investments in reputations, audit
technology and methodology, and directly in their financial stakes in accounting firms. We have
found no evidence that the supply of non-audit services threatens auditor independence, and there
is a strong intuitive case that accounting firms create value by capturing economies of scope
between audit and non-audit services.
We have approached our analysis of auditor independence with the view that accounting
firms and their clients have every incentive to devise organizational structures that take
advantage of economies and create economic value. This contrasts with the skepticism we
perceive is embodied in many critical views of auditor independence. This skepticism is
reminiscent of the inhospitality tradition in antitrust regulation, which presumed that nonstandard
modes of contracting were anticompetitive.55 Further, we believe that the emphasis that has often
been placed on perceptions invites adoption of a piecemeal view that does not give full
recognition to all of auditors' incentives. Effective auditor independence rules should give
auditors and their clients the opportunity and incentive to be innovative in structuring
relationships that protect the independence of auditors, yet take advantage of economies to
deliver value.

55See Williamson, Oliver, The Economic Institutions o f Capitalism, The Free Press: New York, 1985.
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Educational Policy and Curriculum Committee, Chair, 1982-1983, 1983-1984, 1987-1995
Graduate Advisor, 1996-present
Recruitment Committee, Chair, 1981-1982, 1985-1986
Recruitment Committee, Member, 1982-present
Personnel Committee, Chair, 1981-1982, 1983-1984
Personnel Committee, Member, 1988-1993
Ph.D. Program Advisory Committee, Chair, 1992-1994
Other University Service

Chancellor’s Advisory Panel to Executive Vice Chancellor’s Search Committee, 1984-1985
Chancellor’s Future Directions for UC Davis Task Force, 1989-1990
Chancellor’s Search Committee for Dean of Graduate School of Management, 1988-1989
Co-Director, UC Davis Extension, CPA Review Program, 1984-1985
President’s Office, Academic Hearing Committee for Non-Senate Appointee, 1987-1988
University Senate Committee on Academic Planning, 1996-present
Vice Chancellor’s Phase III Committee on Self-Supporting Operations, 1992-1993
AWARDS AND HONORS

McMaster University, Canada, Distinguished Lecturer, 1988
American Accounting Association, Director, Doctoral Consortium, 1988
American Accounting Association, Doctoral Consortium Faculty, 1986-1987
California State University, Sacramento, Distinguished Lecturer, 1984
Texas A&M, Thomas H. Leland Distinguished Lecturer, 1983
American Institute of Decision Sciences Outstanding Achievement Award, November 1978
Mellon Foundation, Stanford University Faculty Research Fellow, 1977-1978
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Beta Gamma Sigma, Business Honorary, 1974
Beta Alpha Psi, Accounting Honorary, 1974
Arthur Andersen & Co., Doctoral Fellowship, 1973-1974
American Accounting Association, Doctoral Consortium Fellow, 1973-1974
Deloitte Haskins & Sells Fellow, 1973-1974
Pacesetter, The Ohio State University, 1973
Qantas Airlines Traveling Scholarship, 1971
M EM BERSHIP

Chartered Public Accountant, New Zealand Society of Accountants
PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Consultative Service to National and State Government Agencies

State of California, Department of Toxic Substances Control, 1995: Member, Task Force for Site
Mitigation Costs
Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, DC, 1976: Consultant to SEC Advisory
Committee on Corporate Disclosure
Financial Accounting Standards Board, Norwalk, CT
Principal Investigator, Research on Accounting for the Translation of Foreign Currencies: Impact
of Statement 52 on Financial Analysts, 1984-1987
Consultant to Research Project on Financial Reporting and Changing Prices, 1981-1982
Consultant to Research Project on Funds Flow and Liquidity, 1979-1980
Advisory Committee for Research Project on the Economic Effects of FASB Statement No. 13,
1979-1981
Am erican Accounting Association

Deloite & Touche Wilman Medal Selection Committee, Member, 1994; Chair, 1995-present
International Faculty Exchange Committee, 1988-1989, 1989-1990
Doctoral Consortium, Director, 1988; Faculty Member 1986, 1987
Advisory Committee to Respond to the Issue of the Size of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board, 1982-1983
Advisory Committee to Research Project on Time Series Research in Accounting: Examination of
Some Unresolved Issues, 1982-1984
Advisory Committee on Notable Contributions to Accounting Literature, 1981-1983
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Research Advisory Committee, 1977-1978, 1978-1979, 1979-1980
Advisory Committee for Technical Program for National Meetings, 1976-1977
Committee on Professional Examinations, 1975-1976
EDITORIAL

Abacus, Editorial Board, 1979-present
Journal o f Financial Statement Analysis, Editorial Board, 1995-present
Pacific Accounting Review, Editorial Board, 1988-1994
The Accounting Review, Editorial Board, 1980-1983; reviewer, 1984-present
FASB Research Reports, Editor, Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1978-1979
Financial Analysts Journal, reviewer
Journal o f Accounting, Auditing and Finance, reviewer
Journal o f Accounting and Economics, reviewer
Journal o f Financial and Quantitative Analysis, reviewer
International Journal o f Forecasting, co-editor, Special Issue, 1983
Journal o f Money, Credit and Banking, reviewer
PUBLICATIONS
Books

1) Cases in Corporate Financial Reporting, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984.
2) Cases in Corporate Financial Reporting: Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, Inc. 1991.
Chapters in Books

1) “Sensitive Foreign Payment Disclosures: The Securities Market Impact,” in Report o f the
Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure in the Securities and Exchange Commission, US
Government Printing Office, Chapter 22, 694-723, 1977.
2) “Energy Company Financial Reporting: Conceptual Framework for an Energy Information
System, in Energy Information: Description, Diagnosis and Design, Stanford, CA: SUIES,
Chapter 10,235-290 (with David J. Teece).
Research M onographs

1) Usefulness to Investors and Creditors o f Information Provided by Financial Reporting,
Stamford, CT: Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1982.
2) Accounting fo r the Translation o f Foreign Currencies: The Effects o f Statement 52 on Equity
Analysts, Stamford, CT: Financial Accounting Standards Board (with Richard P. Castanias,
II), 1987.
3) Usefulness to Investors and Creditors o f Information Provided by Financial Reporting:
Second Edition, Stamford, CT: Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1987.
Edited Proceedings

1) Financial Reporting and Changing Prices: The Conference, Stamford, CT: Financial
Accounting Standards Board, 1979.
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2) Symposium on Forecasting Research in Accounting and Finance, Chichester, UK: John Wiley
and Sons, a special issue of Journal of Forecasting, 2,4, October-December (with Lawrence D.
Brown), 1983.
Articles in Refereed Journals

1) “Income Tax Allocation,” The Accountants’ Journal, 48, 1 , 8-10, 1969.
2) “Management Services and Audit Independence, Part 1,” The Accountants’ Journal, 50, 4,
114-118, 1971.
3) “Management Services and Audit Independence, Part II,” The Accountants’ Journal, 50, 5,
168-171, 1971.
4) “Competitive Information in the Stock Market: An Empirical Study of Earnings, Dividends
and Analysts’ Forecasts,” The Journal o f Finance, 31,2, 631-650, 1976. Also abstracted in
The CFA Digest, Winter 1977.
5) “The Association Between Relative Risk and Risk Estimates Derived from Quarterly Earnings
and Dividends,” The Accounting Review, 5 1 , 3, 449-515, 1976.
6) “The Time-Series Behavior of Quarterly Earnings: Preliminary Evidence,” Journal of
Accounting Research, 15, 1,71-83, 1977.
7) “What Harm has FASB-8 Actually Done?” Harvard Business Review, 57, 4, 1-6, 1979.
8) “Discussion of Policy Models in Accounting: A Critical Commentary,” Accounting
Organizations and Society, 5, 1,65-69, 1980.
9) “The Information Content of SEC Accounting Series Release No. 190,” Journal of Accounting
and Economics, 2, 127-157 (with William H. Beaver and Andrew A. Christie), 1980.
10) “Common Stock Returns and Rating Changes: A Methodological Comparison,” The Journal
o f Finance, 37, 1, 103-119, (with Antonio Z. Sanvicente), 1982. Also abstracted in The CFA
Digest, Summer 1982.
11) “Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses: Impact on Reported Earnings,” Abacus, 18, 1, 50-69,
1982.
12) “The Incremental Information Content of Replacement Cost Earnings,” Journal o f Accounting
and Economics, 4, 15-39 (with William H. Beaver and Wayne R. Landsman), 1982.
13) “How Well Does Replacement Cost Income Explain Stock Return?” Financial Analysts
Journal, March/April, 3-8 (with William H. Beaver and Wayne R. Landsman), 1983.
14) “Management Preferences and Accounting Choices,” Abacus, 19, 2, 130-138, 1983.
15) “Perspectives on Forecasting Research in Accounting and Finance,” Journal o f Forecasting, 2,
4, 324-330 (with Lawrence D. Brown), 1984.
16) “Research on Changing Prices Information: Implications for Forecasting Future Cash Flows,”
Journal o f Business Forecasting, 2 ,4, 19-21, (with Robert N. Freeman), 1984.
17) “Testing for Incremental Information Content in the Presence of Collinearity,” Journal o f
Accounting and Economics, 6, 219-223 (with William H. Beaver and Wayne R. Landsman),
1984.
18) “The Effects of Foreign Currency Translation Accounting on Sensitivity Analysts’ Forecasts,”
Managerial and Decision Economics, 7, 1,3-10 (with Richard P. Castanias, II), 1985.
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19) “An Evaluation of Alternative Proxies for the Market’s Assessment of Unexpected Earnings,”
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 9, 159-193 (with Lawrence D. Brown, Robert M.
Hagerman, and Mark E. Zmijewski), 1987.
20) “Security Analyst Superiority Relative to Univariate Time-Series Models in Forecasting
Quarterly Earnings,” Journal o f Accounting and Economics, 9, 61-87, (with Lawrence D.
Brown, Robert M. Hageman and Mark E. Zmijewski), 1987.
21) “Latin American Lending by Major US Banks: The Effects of Disclosure About Nonaccrual
Loans and Loan Loss Provisions,” The Accounting Review, 66, 4, 830-846 (with Samoa J.
Wallach), 1991.
22) “Discussion of ‘Noisy Accounting Earnings Signals and Earnings Response Coefficients: The
Case of Foreign Currency Accounting,” Contemporary Accounting Research, 10, 1, 167-178,
1993.
23) “The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Determinants of Common Stocks’ Efficiency,”
Journal o f Corporation Law, 19, 285-312 (with Brad M. Barber and Baruch Lev), 1994.
24) “How Useful are Wall Street Week Stock Recommendations,” Journal o f Financial Statement
Analysis, 1,1, Fall, 33-52 (with Jennifer J. Jones and Mark E. Zmijewski), 1995.
25) “Bank Financial Statements and Shareholder Value: A Forecasted Cash Flow Approach,”
Journal o f Financial Statement Analysis, 1, 2, Winter, 48-62 (with Kenneth S. Eisen).
26) “Financial and Stock Price Performance Following Shareholder Litigation,” Journal o f
Financial Statement Analysis, 2, 1, Winter, 5-22.
Proceedings

1) Competitive Information Sources and Capital Market Behavior: Theory and Empirical Tests in
10thAnnual Conference American Institute for Decision Sciences Proceedings (with David S.
Ng), 1, 7-9, November 1978. Winner of Outstanding Achievement Award.
2) The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Determinants of Common Stocks’ Efficiency (with
Brad M. Barber and Baruch Lev), Proceedings o f the National Meeting of the American
Accounting Association, San Francisco, August 1993.
3) A Comparison of Wall Street Week Stock Recommendations to Academic Anomaly Metrics
(with Jennifer J. Jones and Mark E. Zmijewski), Proceedings o f the National Meeting o f the
American Accounting Association, New York, August, 1994.
Reviews

1) Souder, William E. “A Scoring Methodology for Assessing the Suitability of Management
Science Models,” in Management Advisor, March-April 1974.
2) Benston, George J., Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and USA. Westmead: Saxon
House, 1976, in The Accounting Review, October 1978.
3) Zeff, Stephen A., Forging Accounting Principals in New Zealand, Victoria University Press,
1989, in the Accounting Review, July 1980.
4) Horwitz, Bertrand and Richard Kolodny, Financial Reporting Rules and Corporate Decisions:
A Study o f Public Policy, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, Inc., 1982, in The Accounting Review,
July 1983.
5) VanBreda, Michael F., The Prediction o f Corporate Earnings, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research
Press, 1981, in Journal o f Forecasting, 1984.
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Working Papers

1) Loan Loss Provisions and Bank Share Prices: How UK Banks Fared During 1987-1991; April
1995.
2) Further Evidence on the Economic Effects of Changes in Loan Loss Provisions on Bank
Stocks; August 1996.
TEACHING AND ADVISING
Graduate School of Management

Elementary Accounting (undergraduate)
Introduction to Financial Accounting (undergraduate and graduate)
Accounting and Financial Reporting
Business Taxation
Corporate Financial Reporting
Evaluation of Financial Information
Ph.D. Seminar in Financial Accounting Research
Economics of Taxation
Graduate School of Management Executive Program
Graduate School of Management Working Professional Program
Ph.D. Dissertations

Ferguson, Richard. The Economic Effects o f the Securities Acts o f 1933 and 1934, Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University: Committee Member, 1977.
Manegold, James G. Time Series Properties o f the Components o f Earnings. Graduate School of
Business, Stanford University: Committee Member, 1982.
Sanvicente, Antonio Z. Corporate Bond Prices in An Option-Pricing Framework, Graduate
School of Business, Stanford University: Committee Member, 1982.
Cerf, Douglas C. FASB Statement No. 87 on Pension Accounting and Disclosures: A Study o f
Intertemporal Earnings Response Coefficients, Graduate School of Management, University of
California at Davis, Chair; 1991.

August 1997
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DAVID J. TEECE

Law & Economics Consulting Group
2000 Powell Street, Suite 600
Emeryville, CA 94608
Tel. (510) 653-9800
Fax (510) 653-9898
E-Mail: david_teece@lecg.com
Home: 227 Tunnel Road
Berkeley, CA 94705
Tel. (510) 486-0733
Fax (510) 848-2727

Institute of Management, Innovation
& Organization (IMIO)
F402 Haas School of Business #1930
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1930
Tel. (510)642-1075
Fax (510) 642-2826
E-Mail: teece@haas.berkeley.edu

EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1975.
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, 1973.
M.Comm. (Honors I), UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, 1971.
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, 1970.
PRESENT POSITION

WALTER A. HAAS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Berkeley, CA,
1982 - present.
Professor of Business Administration
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Berkeley, CA, 1989 - present.
Holder, Mitsubishi Bank Chair
INSTITUTE OF MANAGEMENT, INNOVATION AND ORGANIZATION (IMIO),
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, Berkeley, CA, 1994 - present.
Director
CENTER FOR RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT (CRM)), UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA,
Berkeley, CA, 1983 - 1994.
Director
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

ST. CATHERINE'S COLLEGE, Oxford University, and Oxford Institute for Energy Studies,
Spring 1989.
Visiting Fellow
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STANFORD UNIVERSITY, Graduate School of Business, 1975 - 1982.
Associate Professor of Business Economics, 1978- 1982.
Assistant Professor of Business Economics, 1975- 1978.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA, Department of Economics, 1978- 1979.
Visiting Associate Professor of Economics
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY, 1971.
Assistant Lecturer in Economics
EXTERNAL GRANTS AND PROFESSIONAL AWARDS

1973-1974

Penfield Traveling Fellowship in Diplomacy, International Affairs, and
Belles-Lettres

1978

Mellon Foundation Junior Faculty Fellowship

1978-1981

National Science Foundation Grant

June 1982

Esmee Fairbairn Senior Research Fellow, University of Reading, England

1984-1987

National Science Foundation Grant

1986-1992

Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Grant

1987- 1988

Sloan Foundation Grants

1987- 1988

Japan-U.S. Friendship Commission Grant

1988-1991

Pew Foundation Grant

1989

Enterprise Oil Fellowship in Energy Economics, St. Catherine's College,
Oxford University

1989-1991

Smith Richardson Foundation Grant

1989-1992

Sasakawa Peace Foundation Grant

1990-1995

Sloan Foundation Grant

1992

Distinguished Visitor, Policy Studies Group, Tokyo

1992-

U.S.-Japan Industry Technology Management Training Program
Grant, U.S. Department of Defense/Air Force Office of Scientific Research
(DOD/AFOSR)

1994-

Ameritech Foundation Grant - Consortium for Research on
Telecommunications Policy

1994-

United States Information Agency Grant

1994-

Eurasia Foundation Grant

1997

Distinguished Speakee, Academy of Management Technology and
Innovation Management Division, Boston

AFFILIATIONS
Prior

Editorial Board, California Management Review.
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Editorial Board, Strategic Management Journal.
Editorial Board, Human Relations.
Co-director, Management of Technology Program, University of California at Berkeley.
Co-director, Nomura School of Advanced Management, Nomura-Berkeley Strategic Management
of Innovation Program.
Member, Royal Economic Society.
Present

Co-editor and co-founder, Industrial and Corporate Change (Oxford University Press).
Member, American Economic Association.
Member, American Bar Association.
Member, Licensing Executives Society.
Member, Council on Foreign Relations.
Member, Pacific Council on International Policy.
Member, International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society.
Chairman, Consortium on Competitiveness and Cooperation.
Director, Consortium for Research on Telecommunications Policy.
Member, The Benjamin Franklin Society
BUSINESS AFFILIATIONS

Member, Board of Directors, The Atlas Funds, 1989- .
Chairman, Board of Directors, Law and Economics Consulting Group, 1988- .
Member, Board of Directors, Giltronix, Inc., 1985-1990.
Member, Board of Directors, Innovative Concepts, Inc., 1989-1992.
Member, Board of Trustees, Atlas Insurance Trust, 1997-.
PUBLICATIONS
Articles

1)

"The Determination of Residential Section Prices in Some South Island Centres" (with R. E.
Falvev). New Zealand Economic Papers, 1972.

2)

"Time-Cost Tradeoffs: Elasticity Estimates and Determinants for International Technology
Transfer Projects," Management Science, 23:8 (April 1977), 830-837.

3)

"Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of Transferring
Technological Know-How," The Economic Journal, 87 (June 1977), 242-261. Reprinted in E.
Mansfield and E. Mansfield (eds.), The Economics of Technical Change (London: Edward
Elgar, 1993). Reprinted in M. Casson (ed.), Multinational Corporations, The International
Library of Critical Writings in Economics 1 (England: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1990), 185204.

4)

"Organizational Structure and Economic Performance: A Test of the Multidivisional
Hypothesis" (with Henry Armour). The Bell Journal of Economics. 9:1 (Spring 1978), 106122. Reprinted in J. Barney and W. Ouchi (eds.), Organizational Economics: Toward a New
Paradigm for Studying and Understanding Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1986).
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5)

"Overseas Research and Development by U.S.-Based Firms" (with E. Mansfield and A.
Romeo), Economica, 46 (May 1979), 187-196. Reprinted in Wortzel and Wortzel (eds.),
Strategic Management of Multinational Corporations (New York: John Wiley, 1985).

6)

"The Diffusion of an Administrative Innovation," Management Science, 26:5 (May 1980), 464470.

7)

"Vertical Integration and Technological Innovation" (with Henry Armour), The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 62:3 (August 1980), 470-474.

8)

"Economies of Scope and the Scope of the Enterprise," Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 1:3 (1980), 223-247. Republished as "La Diversificazione Strategica:
Condizioni di Efficienza," a cura de Raoul C. D. Nacamulli e Andrea Rugiadini,
Organizzazione e Mercato (Bologna. Italy: Mulino, 1985), 447-476.

9)

"The Multinational Enterprise: Market Failure and Market Power Considerations," Sloan
Management Review, 22:3 (Spring 1981), 3-17. Republished as "Riflessioni Sull'impresa
Multinazionale: Potere de Mercato o Crisi del Mercato," a cura de Raoul C. D. Nacamulli e
Andrea Rugiandini, Organizzazione e Mercato (Bologna, Italy: Mulino, 1985), 477-498.

10)

"The Market for Know-How and the Efficient International Transfer of Technology," The
Annals of the Academy of Political and Social Science. November 1981, 81-96.

11)

"Internal Organization and Economic Performance: An Empirical Analysis of the Profitability
of Principal Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, 30:2 (December 1981), 173-199.

12)

"A Tariff on Imported Oil" (with James Griffin), Journal of Contemporary Studies (Winter
1982), 89-92.

13)

"An Exchange on Oil Tariffs" (with Milton Friedman and James Griffin), Journal of
Contemporary Studies (Summer 1982), 55-60.

14)

"Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry" (with Kirk
Monteverde). The Bell Journal of Economics, 13:1 (Spring 1982), 206-213. Reprinted in
Steven G. Medema (ed.), The Legacy of Ronald Coase in Economic Analysis (London:
Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995); in Oliver E. Williamson and S. E. Masten (eds.), Transaction
Cost Economics, Volume II: Policy and Applications (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar
Publishing, 1995), 66-73. Also reprinted in S.E. Masten (ed.), Case Studies in Contracting and
Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Reprinted in Transaction Cost
Economics, Oliver E. Williamson and S. E. Masten (eds.), for The International Library of
Critical Writings in Economics, Mark Blaug (ed.) (Cheltenham, United Kingdom: Edward
Elgar Publishing Ltd., 1995).

15)

"Appropriable Rents and Quasi-Vertical Integration" (with Kirk Monteverde), The Journal of
Law and Economics, Vol. XXV (October 1982), 321-328.

16)

"A Behavioral Analysis of OPEC: An Economic and Political Synthesis," Journal of Business
Administration, 13(1982), 127-159.

17)

"Towards an Economic Theory of the Multiproduct Firm," Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 3 (1982), 39-63. Reprinted in Louis Putterman (ed.), The Economic Nature of
the Firm: A Reader (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Reprinted in Oliver E.
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Williamson and Scott E. Masten (eds.), Transaction Cost Economics, Vol. 1: Theory and
Concepts (London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 1995), 153-177.
18)

"Assessing OPEC's Pricing Policies," California Management Review. 26:1 (Fall 1983), 69-87.

19)

"The Limits of Neoclassical Theory in Management Education" (with Sidney G. Winter),
American Economic Review, 74:2 (May 1984), 116-121.

20)

"Economic Analysis and Strategic Management," California Management Review, 26:3
(Spring 1984), 87-110; reprinted in J. Pennings (ed.), Organizational Strategy and Change (San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1985); and in D. Vogel and G. Carroll (eds.), Strategy and
Organization: A West Coast Perspective (New York: Pitman, 1984).

21)

"Multinational Enterprise, Internal Governance, and Industrial Organization," American
Economic Review. 75:2 (May 1985), 233-238.

22)

"Transactions Cost Economics and the Multinational Enterprise: An Assessment," Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 7 (1986), 21-45.

23)

"Assessing the Competition Faced by Oil Pipelines," Contemporary Policy Issues. IV, 4
(October 1986), 65-78.

24)

"Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration,
Licensing and Public Policy," Research Policy, 15:6 (1986), 285-305. (Selected by the editors
as one of the best papers published by Research Policy over the period 1971 -1991.)
Republished in Ricerche Economiche, 4 (October/December 1986), 607-643, and as
"Innovazione Technologica e Successo Imprenditoriale," L'Industria, 7:4 (October/December
1986), 605-643; translated into Russian and published at St. Petersburg University. Abstracted
in The Journal of Product Innovation Management, 5:1 (March 1988). Reprinted in C.
Freeman (ed.L The Economics of Innovation (U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing), 1990
hardback; 1998 paperback.

25)

"Vertical Integration and Risk Reduction" (with C. Helfat), Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 3:1 (Spring 1987), 47-67.

26)

"Acceptable Cooperation among Competitors in the Face of Growing International
Competition" (with Thomas M. Jorde), Antitrust Law Journal, 58:2, (37th Annual Meeting,
Honolulu, Hawaii, August 1989), 529-556.

27)

"Capturing Value from Technological Innovation: Integration, Strategic Partnering, and
Licensing Decisions," Interfaces, 18:3 (May/June 1988), 46-61. Reprinted in Bruce R. Guile
and H. Brooks (eds.), Technology and Global Industry (Washington, DC: National Academy
Press, 1987), 65-95; and in F. Arcangeli, P.A. David, and G. Dosi (eds.), Modem Patterns in
Introducing and Adopting Innovations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); and in E.
Rhodes and D. Wield (eds.), Implementing New Technologies: Innovation and the
Management of Technology (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1994), 129-140;
and in Michael L. Tushman and Philip Anderson, Managing Strategic Innovation and Change
(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 287-306.

28)

"Competing Through Innovation: Implications for Market Definition" (with Thomas M.
Jorde), Chicago-Kent Law Review, 64:3 (1989), 741-744. (Symposium on Antitrust Law and
the Internationalization of Markets).
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29)

"Competition and Cooperation: Striking the Right Balance" (with Thomas M. Jorde),
California Management Review, 31:3 (Spring 1989), 25-37. Reprinted as "Concorrenza e
Cooperazione Nelle Strategie di Sviluppo Technologico," Economia e Politica Industriale, n.
64(1989), 17-45.

30)

"Competition and Cooperation in Technology Strategy," Business Review, 36:4 (March 1989)
(Tokyo: The Institute of Business Research, Hitotsubashi University).

31)

"Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust: Balancing Competition and Cooperation" (with
Thomas M. Jorde), High Technology Law Journal, 4:1 (Spring 1989), 1-113.

32)

"Inter-organizational Requirements of the Innovation Process," Managerial and Decision
Economics, Special Issue, 1989, pp. 35-42.

33)

"Struktur und Organisation der Deutschen und der US-Gaswirtschaft im Vergleich:
Folgerungen fur den Status der Gasversorgungsunternehmen" (with Manfred J. Dirrheimer),
Zeitschrift fur Energiewirtschaft, 1 (1989), 36-50.

34)

"Structure and Organization of the Natural Gas Industry: Differences between the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany and Implications for the Carrier Status of
Pipelines," The Energy Journal, 11:3 (1990), 1-35.

35)

"Strategies for Capturing Value from Technological Innovation," Thai-American Business,
May-June 1990, 30-38. Reprinted as "Capturing Value from Innovation," Les Nouvelles, 26:1
(March 1991), 21-26.

36)

"Les Frontieres des Entreprises: Vers une Theorie de la Coherence de la Grande Entreprise”
(with G. Dosi and S. Winter), Revue d'Economie Industrielle, 51. ler trimestre 1990, 238-254.

37)

"Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust" (with Thomas M.
Jorde), Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4:3 (Summer 1990), 75-96.

38)

"Innovation, Dynamic Competition, and Antitrust Policy" (with Thomas M. Jorde), Regulation,
13:3 (Fall 1990), 35-44.

39)

"Product Emulation Strategies in the Presence of Reputation Effects and Network
Externalities: Some Evidence from the Minicomputer Industry" (with Raymond S. Hartman),
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1 (1990), 157-182.

40)

"Antitrust Policy and Innovation: Taking Account of Performance Competition and
Competitor Cooperation" (with Thomas M. Jorde), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics, 147 (1991), 118-144.

41)

"Capturing and Retaining Value from Innovation," Technology Strategies (August 1991), 8-10.

42)

"Innovation, Trade, and Economic Welfare: Contrasts between Petrochemicals and
Semiconductors," North American Review of Economics & Finance, 2(2) (1991), 143-155.

43)

"Strategic Management and Economics" (with Richard P. Rumelt and Dan Schendel), Strategic
Management Journal, 12 (1991), 5-29.

44)

"Foreign Investment and Technological Development in Silicon Valley," California
Management Review, 34:2 (Winter 1992), 88-106. Translated into Russian and published at
St. Petersburg University.
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45)

"Competition, Cooperation, and Innovation: Organizational Arrangements for Regimes of
Rapid Technological Progress," Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 18, (1992),
1-25. Reprinted in Industrial Policy and Competitive Advantage, David B. Audretsch (ed.), for
The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Mark Blaug (ed.) (Cheltenham,
United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, forthcoming).

46)

"The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism: Perspectives on Alfred Chandler's Scale and Scope
(1990)." Journal of Economic Literature. 31 (March 1993), 199-225. Reprinted in Patrick
O’Brien (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the World Economy (London: Routledge, 1997/1998).

47)

"Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal Arrangements: Agreements Designed to Advance
Innovation and Commercialize Technology" (with Thomas M. Jorde), Antitrust Law Journal,
61:2(1993), 576-619.

48)

"Trans-Pacific Competitive Challenges for Innovation and Renewal,” Technology Rivalries
and Synergies between North America and Japan, Symposium III, Licensing Executives
Society (March 28-30, 1993), 7-22.

49)

"Assessing Market Power in Regimes of Rapid Technological Change" (with Raymond S.
Hartman, Will Mitchell and Thomas M. Jorde), Industrial and Corporate Change, 2:3 (1993),
317-350.

50)

"Understanding Corporate Coherence: Theory and Evidence" (with R. Rumelt, G. Dosi and S.
Winter). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 23:1 (1994), 1-30.

51)

"Information Sharing, Innovation, and Antitrust," Antitrust Law Journal, 62:2 (Winter 1994),
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I.

Introduction

This study considers auditor independence from the perspective of organizational
psychology. In that connection, particular attention was given to:
•

understanding in general how the auditing process is conducted today -- The
“father” of social-organizational psychology, Kurt Lewin, pointed out many years
ago that to understand behavior, one must simultaneously take into account the
individual's personality (in this study, we concentrated primarily on one important
facet of personality-motivation) and the individual's environment, especially his
or her perception of that environment (Lewin, 1951). Understanding, therefore,
the context—the audit itself and the engagement team, i.e., what surrounds and
influences the auditor's behavior, particularly independence-related behavior—was
central to the study;

•

the behavior of auditors, especially with respect to factors that affect individual
motivation and in what ways — While Freudian theory, psychoanalysis, remains
alive, it is not well. Psychoanalytic theory requires a diagnosis of what is “going
on inside one's head.” The more accepted approach in psychology today is to
study behavior, what the researcher can actually see and record. Attributions are
made about cognition (i.e., thought processes), but usually on the basis of
observations. (See, for example, Dennett, 1991);

•

the auditor's relationships with his/her
- supervisor
- peers
- managing partner
- clients

•

as a member of the “engagement team.” As noted above, these relationships are
key to understanding the auditor's environment;
organizational context, especially the firm's
- culture
- reward system
- safeguards
- performance evaluation system/process
- recruitment and training processes
- process of professional development for auditors
With the exception of safeguards (which are of particular pertinence to this study,
of course), this list of variables comprises some of the more basic fundamentals of
study in organizational psychology (Schein, 1980); and

•

understanding external safeguards, i.e., the broader context.

II.

Methodology
In addition to reviewing existing literature addressing issues of auditor independence (for
example, such articles as the ones by Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewemstein, 1997; Jeter and
Shaw 1995; Nichols and Price, 1976; Pearson, 1985; and Wallman, 1996) and related documents

provided by the "Big 6" accounting firms (e.g., excerpts from policy manuals), interviews were
conducted with senior auditing partners from each of those firms. In addition, my associate,
Miriam Javitch, Ph.D., also conducted interviews with auditors in those firms who were less
senior, but on the "front line" with respect to the active practice of auditing clients today.
The analysis conducted was to extract information that relates to what we know from
social and organizational psychology about such variables as motivation, organizational reward
systems, leadership and management, group dynamics, and organizational culture from (1) the
interviews, (2) articles about auditor independence, and (3) the documents provided by the Big 6
accounting firms These psychological variables were deemed to be the most relevant for
purposes of this study. In other words, I focused on what can be explained via social and
organizational psychology about auditor behavior that is pertinent to an auditor's independence.
The following sections provide such an explanation and analysis.
III.

Discussion and Analysis
A.
Motivational Factors Affecting Independence and Audit Quality
People are motivated by the potential for both positive and negative rewards

(Vroom, 1964). Positive rewards are outcomes that an individual values and desires to obtain.
The potential for gaining these positive rewards motivates a person to perform in a way that
increases the likelihood that he or she will attain these desired rewards. Auditors’ commitment to
maintaining independence and objectivity in carrying out the audit is based, in large part, on the
positive rewards they associate with achieving this performance standard. In contrast, negative
rewards are outcomes that the individual desires to avoid. In the case of auditing, these are the
negative consequences that may result if the auditor does not maintain objectivity and
independence during the audit process. Auditors' compliance with the rules set forth by the SEC
and the AICPA, as well as firm policies, is, in large part, motivated by their desire to avoid these
potential negative consequences.
The psychologist who has provided the most definitive research in this domain of
motivation linked to rewards and punishments was B. F. Skinner. See, for example, one of his
major works (Skinner, 1953). Skinner was perhaps the supreme behaviorist, measuring what
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could be observed, rather than surmising what went on inside people's heads. He led the way for
us to understand the fundamental difference between compliant behavior and commitment.
The following three sections discuss in greater detail the motivators and inhibitors
associated with (1) the potential for positive rewards if independence is maintained, (2) the
potential for negative rewards if independence is not maintained and (3) the role of self-serving
biases.
1.
What motivates auditors to strive to achieve the positive rewards
associated with maintaining independence and objectivity?
There are both positive intrinsic and positive extrinsic motivators that affect an
auditor’s desire and effort to maintain independence. Intrinsic motivators concern performing
work in such a way that one achieves a greater sense of personal competence, control, and pride
in what one has accomplished (Deci, 1976; 1975). For professionals this often has to do with
adhering to a set of professional standards in order to maintain a sense of professional integrity
and pride. Our interviews with auditors indicate that these intrinsic motivators are central to their
commitment to maintain an objective and independent approach when working with audit
clients.

As members of the auditing profession, these individuals expressed a sense of

commitment and obligation to uphold the responsibility of “doing the right thing” on behalf of
their profession. Their desire to maintain a high level of professional integrity is consistent with
the theoretical work and empirical research that has been done in the area of psychology known
as role motivation theory (Javitch, 1997; Miner, 1993, 1980). We generally find this
characteristic among most professionals, including physicians, scientists, lawyers, and
academicians, to name a few (Harrison, 1974).
Role motivation theory proposes four distinct inducement systems that motivate different
types of employees to perform (Miner, 1980). They are hierarchic, professional, group, and task
inducement systems. The theory proposes that professional role prescriptions will more
effectively predict professional accomplishments than hierarchical role prescriptions. One of the
major role prescriptions for professionals is professional commitment. Professional commitment
keeps members of the profession responsive to ethical norms through their sense of personal
identification with the tenets and values of the profession (Vollner, 1966). Thus professionals
who have a high level of value-based identification with and commitment to their profession will
perform more effectively.
In comparison with intrinsic motivators, positive; extrinsic motivators are provided from
external sources, and include such things as pay, promotion, and recognition by peers, clients,
professional associations, and others (Saal and Knight, 1988). The auditors we interviewed
provided us with the following descriptions of the audit profession. They pointed out, for
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example, that they do not get more pay or other types of monetary incentives for maintaining
independence because this is simply a standard that must be maintained (essentially a minimum
standard). Indeed, partner compensation is related to firmwide results, not tied to revenue from a
“partner’s clients.” From the descriptions of how auditors advance in their firms, however, it
does seem that, over the longer term, they are promoted and remunerated based on the quality of
the audits they manage. There are differences in how skilled and adept auditors are at managing
the totality of the client relationship. Those who are better at identifying and alerting the client
to financial and accounting issues as soon as they emerge, and then helping the client to deal with
these issues before they become so significant that they adversely affect the auditor’s report, are
recognized as more skilled and adept auditors. Over time, with increasing experience, they are
likely to be promoted to manage larger and more complex audit engagements.

As they

successfully manage these larger and more complex matters, their positions in the firm become
more secure and, as they build up seniority, they are remunerated more highly. So while, in the
short run, auditors reportedly do not receive additional financial incentives directly attributable to
maintaining independence, as they learn to apply their skills, with objectivity and independence,
to helping clients deal with specific accounting issues, they are apparently rewarded by receiving
opportunities to audit more substantial clients. Over the long run, these types of promotions
enhance their status in the firm which, in turn, translates into higher levels of remuneration.
For a comprehensive and highly objective description of how the process that these
auditors discussed works in a variety of organizational contexts, see the work of Virginia Boehm
(e.g., Boehm, 1991). The work of David Maister (1993) on professional service firms is also
relevant here. His book is not science, yet it is thorough and illuminating with respect to
professional service firms. See especially Part Five of Maister's book, where he discusses partner
compensation. These chapters by Maister help to explain in more depth (and confirm) what the
auditors we interviewed were telling us.
Another form of extrinsic motivation comes from within the client system. The CEO and
the audit committee will all recognize and value the quality of the auditor’s work as they gain
confidence in his or her ability to maintain independence, while at the same time providing the
client with sound advice on accounting issues. The client’s satisfaction with the auditor’s
performance helps to ensure that the client will want to maintain the auditor on the engagement.
It also means that, when auditors rotate off one client and are recommended as potential new
auditors for another client, their reputation with the old client will make them more attractive to
the new client.
It could be argued that this process would be highly seductive for the ambitious auditor,
that is, it would bias him or her in favor of what a client may want and lead to dependence rather
than independence. There are, however, two factors affecting this process that actually help
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instead to further promote and ensure auditor independence. First, within the client system, one
role of the audit committee is to ensure that neither the client management nor the auditor engage
in any activities that may jeopardize independence. Our interviews indicate that their efforts are,
by and large, successful in this regard. Audit committees are reportedly extremely conservative
and cautious about what they perceive to be correct conduct. Thus, in a sense, the audit
committee acts as yet another form of safeguard within the client system. Second, we must bear
in mind that the recognition an auditor receives from the client is extrinsic — external to the
person. Without intrinsic motivation (which provides a greater assurance of commitment to
independence), the auditor is more susceptible to bias. This difference and comparison of
extrinsic and intrinsic motivations, as well as compliance and commitment, are explored in more
depth below.
Finally, while it was not explicitly discussed in the interviews, there appears to be a
strong norm both within these firms, and throughout the profession, for maintaining
independence as a means of providing clients with the best possible audit service and, in the
larger scheme, providing financial statement users with the most accurate information with
which they can make decisions. It would seem, then, that auditors who uphold the norms of
objectivity and independence will be recognized, to a large extent, informally by their peers and
their supervisors, and to a somewhat lesser extent, perhaps, by their profession, for their
contribution to supporting what are the underpinnings of our free market economy.
2.
What motivates auditors to avoid the negative rewards associated with not
maintaining independence?
While the potential for positive rewards engender a strong sense of
commitment to maintaining independence, the potential negative rewards, or punishments,
associated with not maintaining independence ensure a high level of compliance with the
profession’s rules and the firm’s policies and procedures established to promote auditor
independence. There are both intrinsic and extrinsic motivators associated with the negative
rewards that may result if it becomes apparent that an auditor either intentionally did not
maintain independence or failed affirmatively to maintain due care in assuring objectivity.
The intrinsic motivators are related to experiencing a sense of guilt, remorse, and
humiliation for either having done, or considering doing, something that fundamentally violates
professionalism and independence. Auditors recognize that violating standards of objectivity and
independence has ramifications beyond their own personal careers. It can create a whole host of
problems for their firm, their profession, and the financial statement users who rely on the
veracity of the statements they audit. So if an auditor contemplates violating professionalism and
independence, either by commission or omission, in order to gain promotion, status, or profit, he
5

or she must weigh the emotional and psychological consequences of such action. Because
auditors have such a strong sense of integrity and personal and professional pride in what they
do, the possibility of experiencing so much negative emotion is actually a very strong deterrent —
one which motivates them to comply with what sometimes appear to be excessively minute and
harsh rules and requirements. The psychological literature that helps to explain this aspect of
motivation comes from cognitive choice research. The assumption underlying this line of
research and theory is that people are, for the most part, rational beings and, therefore, weigh the
consequences of certain acts (choices) before actually behaving. When the weight of choice is
imbalanced (e.g., potentially too much punishment), the more rational choice is to avoid such an
imbalance. This assumption is no doubt synonymous with common sense; in any case, there is
empirical evidence to support it (which is not always true in psychological research). For a
comprehensive review of motivation theory and research in organizational settings, including
cognitive choice research, see Kanfer (1990).
Extrinsic motivators that foster compliance among auditors fall into two primary
categories. They include negative consequences for the auditor and negative consequences for
the firm. These negative consequences generally come in the form of disciplinary and other
sanctions. The individual auditor who is found to be actively violating the tenets of objectivity
and independence may experience a host of sanctions, ranging from reprimands to significant
liabilities, loss of job, and even loss of one's professional license. These severe personal negative
consequences are effective in motivating auditors not to violate their professional independence
and to comply with the rules and regulations set forth by the SEC, the AICPA and, in the future,
the ISB, as well as the firm’s policies. (See, again, the chapter by Kanfer, 1990.)
Based on our interviews and other research, we believe that auditors are also extremely
aware and concerned about the negative consequences to their firm if it is charged with a breach
of independence. Not only may the firm incur huge liabilities that could jeopardize its financial
viability, it may also lose its status and reputation in the industry, making it more difficult to
maintain current clients and to gain new clients. The auditors we interviewed were extremely
cognizant of the potential damage they could create to their colleagues and their firm, as well as
to the reputation of the profession as a whole. They expressed, with strong conviction, that in
weighing the potential personal gains against the potential negative consequences of violating the
standards of independence, the scale clearly tips in favor of maintaining independence —a code
of professional conduct that they all seem to believe in very strongly.
Related to these negative consequences flowing from a violation of independence is the
problem of the so-called "free rider" (i.e., one who, having derived benefit from his or her firm's
good reputation, nonetheless places that reputation in jeopardy by violating the principle of
independence). Such violators have, of course, surfaced in the past. It is likely that, on occasion,
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they will appear again. After all, to take an extreme parallel, the death penalty does not seem to
diminish the murder rate in this country.
The price to be paid for compromising one's
independence, while not death, is severe nevertheless. The most effective forces for reducing the
occurrence of free riders are the intrinsic motivators (see the next section for a list of these
factors that contribute to a positive commitment to independence).
3.

Self-serving Bias in Favor o f Objectivity and Independence

There is an additional psychological phenomenon that helps to explain
why auditors are motivated to maintain independence. The concept of "self-serving bias"
(Wetzel, 1982) referred to by Bazerman, Morgan, and Loewenstein (1997) helps to explain how
people who are called upon to make impartial judgments are likely to be biased by their own
self-interest.

Bazerman and his co-authors suggest that such bias may render auditor

independence effectively impossible. Their conclusion is based on research that was conducted
in a different context from our study of auditors. One study they refer to, for example, was
conducted with jurors. The reward process of desired juror behavior is very different from that
that of auditors.

Moreover, as stated in our Introduction, to understand human behavior

adequately, one must consider both individual personality and the person’s environment, i.e.,
context. Auditors, in contrast to the jurors who are referred to in the Bazerman et al. article, have
a strong self-serving bias for maintaining objectivity and independence (which can be viewed as
a form of impartial judgment) because of the potential for both positive rewards and negative
rewards. Thus, our own findings, which are consistent with theory and other literature in the
field (see below) indicate that auditors are quite capable of maintaining independence.
Auditors’ self-serving bias for maintaining independence, which is fundamentally
grounded in their sense of professional commitment (Miner, 1993), supports the outcomes
auditors most want to achieve. These include (1) providing the best possible audit service to
their clients, (2) feeling that they have upheld their professional responsibility with integrity, (3)
performing the audit in a manner that their firm recognizes by giving them future opportunities to
manage larger audit engagements, and (4) avoiding the negative consequences of not maintaining
independence (e.g., damaging their sense of personal pride, losing their careers, and negatively
affecting their firm's success). Both the positive consequences of maintaining independence and
the negative consequences of not doing so create a strong self-serving bias for upholding
independence. Especially if coupled with the right culture in the firm and the right climate on the
engagement team (factors discussed below), these factors will tend to create a strong "selfserving bias" in favor of maintaining objectivity and independence. This is also corroborated by
the interviews we conducted with audit partners who are currently managing client audit
engagements.
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B.

Safeguards
From our perspective, the number and comprehensive character of the safeguards
that exist today are more than adequate. We would not recommend the addition of safeguards, at
least not those categorized as external. The practices of firms of (a) keeping a ’’best practices"
database and providing all auditors in their firms with easy access to these data, and (b)
publishing occasional updates about auditing practices that are not addressed in manuals are
adequate reinforcements for safeguarding independence. Our focus, therefore, is more heavily
oriented toward safeguards that are personally internal.
1.

Comparison o f External and Internal Safeguards
As noted earlier, what is important here is the distinction behaviorally

between compliance and commitment, especially with respect to group norms. One can comply
with a norm yet not be committed to its achievement. Commitment to a norm is a function of an
individual’s attitude and belief that the mode of behavior (conformity) that the norm dictates is
the right and proper thing to do. In other words, when there is congruence between normspecified behavior and one’s personal attitudes, beliefs, and behavioral disposition, compliance
and commitment are automatic. Compliance can occur without an individual’s personal
disposition to do so, however. In the latter situation, rewards and punishments must be clearly
specified and directly related to the conforming behavior desired. With respect to commitment,
intrinsic motivation is key. Commitment is internally and personally driven. Extrinsic rewards
have little to do with commitment. In fact, heavy use of extrinsic rewards and/or punishments
may ensure compliance, but simultaneously decrease commitment. (Deci, 1975; for more recent
support for these statements, see Bandura, 1986; Lepper, 1985; and Malone & Lepper, 1987.)
What follows is a taxonomy of independence safeguards organized according to
compliance and commitment. The stronger safeguards for purposes of auditor motivation are by
far the commitment column. Some external safeguards may be internalized, especially if the
individual auditor considers the source of those safeguards to have values and interests identical
to, or congruent with, his or her own.
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External Safeguards
(External to the Individual Auditor)

Internal Safeguards
(Internal and Personal to the Individual Auditor)

- COMPLIANCE -

- COMMITMENT -

Promulgated Rules (SEC, AICPA, and the
firm's own policy manuals).

•

Desire to be a professional, to be a part of a
special if not elite group in society; a group
that protects the public by adhering to a
code of ethics and practice.

Professional
practice
letters/memos •
occasional updates about specific audit
situations that provide guidance not
addressed in current manuals).

Desire to be respected as an expert; to be
sought out and asked for one's objective,
independent opinion and judgment.

Investment tracking

•

For younger auditors, desire to rise in the
firm; to be promoted; to be recognized as a
good risk manager; to one day be partner; to
be recognized for strong, high quality
performance.

Internal inspection review

•

Being supported by fellow team members,
senior executives, and partners; i.e.,
knowing that one (a) does not have to
confront tough client issues alone and (b) is
expected to seek help.

Annual confirmation/affidavits

•

The need to be technically competent', to
maintain and improve this competence; and
to strive to avoid a re-statement process, i.e.,
done right the first time.

Concurring partner review

•

Desire to be a key player in helping to
maintain and improve the firm's reputation.

Peer review

•

Desire to be a key player in helping to grow
the firm's business.

Consultation requirements

•

Desire to be a team player, respected by
peers as a contributing member with value
to add to the engagement team process.
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External Safeguards
(External to the Individual Auditor)

Internal Safeguards
(Internal and Personal to the Individual Auditor)

- COMPLIANCE -

- COMMITMENT -

To avoid litigation; to keep one’s job; to •
remain in the profession.

Pride in being a professional (as above) but
also in being a contributing member of a
prestigious firm.

Compensation methods

•

Compensation methods—being competitive
in the marketplace to attract and retain
talent, yet have in place a system that
provides long-term growth financially for
the individual auditor; i.e., the auditor can
"see” the value of staying with the firm.

Training

•

Training inculcates techniques for both
competent work and the underlying values
of audit work and the firm's culture; the
value and importance of objectivity and
independence is "drilled" into the auditor to
the degree that eventually this aspect of
behavior becomes "second nature."

Partner rotation

•

Partner rotation can be internally motivating
when coupled with broader, more
challenging assignments; in other words, a
rotation resulting in a more challenging or
prestigious assignment is an important
reward.

Note'. Safeguards number 10, 11, and 12 can begin as external but gradually become internal.
Other safeguards, such as firm manuals and internal safeguards, might also be internalized over
time.
In summary, the most effective compliance-oriented rules will be those that reinforce or
lead to commitment. Safeguards that depend on compliance are external to the individual and
thereby less motivating. Their motivation and focus concern more what to avoid, or what not to
do, with little emphasis on what to do, what one needs to learn to do things right and with high
quality. Yes, there may be guidelines and instructions for what to do, and these are, of course,
crucial. Psychologically, however, they are mandates that eventually may be internalized for the
individual auditor. What facilitates internalization are processes that focus on and emphasize
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positive qualities of human behavior--the desire to be professional, to be recognized as such, to
learn and grow in the profession, to have peer and senior partner support, etc. Strengthening the
independence process, therefore, should rely more on professional growth and development, on
learning, and the appeal to one's integrity. External safeguards should be viewed as "givens" that
are necessary and, of course, provide guidance. But strictly speaking, for such factors as fear of
litigation, of being banished from the profession, and failing as an auditor, as powerful as these
may be in obtaining compliance, they are not internally motivating. This conclusion is supported
by the work of Herzberg (1974; 1966; Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman, 1959) where he
distinguishes between motivating factors, e.g., recognition, autonomy on the job, opportunity to
achieve, etc., and maintenance or physical hygiene factors, e.g., fringe benefits, disciplinary
actions, safe and clean working conditions, etc. The latter simply reduce dissatisfaction; they do
not motivate, i.e., contribute to job satisfaction.
2.

Command-and-Control vs. Enforced Self-Regulation
Three main points can be made that are relevant to the effectiveness of any

command and control approach. While these points are set forth in the context of organizational
psychology and address relationships at the leader-follower, supervisor-subordinate level rather
than at the regulatory agency-firm relationship, the principles in both contexts are essentially the
same and, in any case, are of general applicability.
1.

Due to the fact that people in the workplace today are more educated if not

more sophisticated than in decades past about matters of (a) good management, (b)
organizational efficiency and effectiveness, and (c) how work can be improved (without always
being told), they are less tolerant of (1) the arbitrary use of power and authority, (2) managers
and leaders who are technically incompetent, and (3) managers'and leaders who have little or no
sense of direction, purpose, and goal clarity. When faced with conditions like those listed
above, people in the workplace are likely to find ways to "beat the system," resist if not sabotage
what they believe to be inept leadership and management, or become apathetic and, as a
consequence, nonproductive (Burke, 1982; see especially, Chapter 7). In other words, a
command-and-control system is simply considerably out of touch with the times. The future will
only continue in this direction, not return to the past (see, for example, Hornstein, 1996; Lawler,
1996, 1992; and Pfeffer, 1994).
2.
The general point made in #1 does not mean that people in the workplace
have no desire for leadership. Quite to the contrary. Leadership today is desired as much as
ever, if not more so. But not just any form of leadership will be tolerated. People want a voice
and to be involved. The point is as follows:
For every given goal there are a myriad of paths that can be taken to accomplish the goal.
Thus, people are more tolerant, if not desirous, of leadership with respect to the determination of
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goals, and less tolerant, if not rebellious, about leaders' direction regarding the determination of
paths to the goals. Since any given goal can be achieved in more than one way, the odds of
disagreement about one particular mandated path increase. An organizational leader can
therefore "take command" about direction, but (if prudent) will be highly participative and
delegatory about implementation, i.e., how to achieve a given direction or goal. The application
to auditor independence is obvious. The SEC, AICPA, and ISB can be directional regarding
policy, concepts, and general goals, but should promote and support self-regulation when it
comes to implementation of policy and goals.
3.
In psychology there are precious few scientific principles of behavior.
Individual differences are so great that it is difficult to declare "truths" about people that hold
across a variety of situations. One of the few principles that we can rely on is that people will do
in the future what they have been rewarded for doing in the past, and will do what they expect to
be rewarded for in the future. Another behavioral “truth” that is highly related to the issue under
discussion here is the principle that involvement leads to commitment (Lewin, 1958). At least in
Western cultures, we can count on the veracity of the following statement: The extent to which
people will be committed to a decision is a direct function of the degree to which they have been
involved in making the decision. By contrast, rules imposed by some distant authority without
“local” involvement (especially if of dubious justification or complex or burdensome to
implement) will secure, at best, a grudging compliance. Thus, there is strong empirical evidence
to support the approach of self-regulation (Lawler, 1992; Sashkin, 1984).
C.

The Importance o f Peers and Group Dynamics
To a great extent, auditors' strong commitment to maintaining objectivity and
independence stems from and is fostered by the support they receive from their peers in the firm
and, more specifically, through the support they receive from members of their audit engagement
team. Similarly, however, strong, but misguided, peer pressure at the firm level and at the
engagement unit level could also place the auditor at more risk for violating independence. This
means that it is vitally important for audit firms to create a firm-wide culture as well as
engagement team climates that support, encourage, and demand high levels of integrity of their
members.
1.

Comments from Auditor Interviews

Our interviews revealed that, at the engagement team level, the
engagement partner’s approach to managing the engagement team is vitally important to creating
a climate of independence -- one where members feel a strong sense of personal commitment to
maintaining their independence and where they feel safe asking for help from team members and
the engagement leader when dealing with specific and especially tough issues. Engagement
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leaders who create this type of supportive environment are described as taking an active interest
in getting to know their team members both professionally and personally. They are aware of
their subordinates' needs and know how to respond to them in a supportive fashion.
These team leaders (usually partners in the audit context) are also described as ’’zealots”
when it comes to their personal sense of integrity and commitment to objectivity and
independence. They pass along their commitment to their team members with a passion. They
also engage with their team members in spirited dialogue about issues surrounding specific
professional standards and interpretations. Through this type of dialogue they are able to
strengthen the whole team’s focus on and commitment to independence. In our own research,
these engagement leaders are what we refer to as transformational leaders. They are leaders who,
while they have legitimate authority over their subordinates, will engage team members in a
higher level relationship — one that fosters a sense of commitment among team members to
strive to achieve a common goal, in this case, independence, that goes beyond each individual
member’s need to succeed (Bass, 1990; Burke, 1986; Van Eron and Burke, 1992).
Another interesting point raised in the interviews concerned the effect that the physical
location of the engagement team could have on creating an environment that supported and
fostered independence. When the engagement team is on-site in the client’s organization on an
extended basis, team members develop a sense of unity. Furthermore, because of their physical
proximity to each other, it is easier for members to engage informally in substantive discussions
about specific professional standards issues as they arise. Thus, the physical location of
members together at the client site creates a more open and supportive atmosphere. It also makes
it much easier for the engagement leader to deal with issues as they surface and before they may
become more difficult to resolve.
Both these factors, the engagement leader’s behavior with the team and the physical
proximity of team members, have been shown in the behavioral psychology literature to be
related to the overall performance of the team (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Steiner, 1972;
Zander, 1994). Our interviews indicate that auditors recognize the importance of these factors in
maintaining a strong climate of independence. All engagement leaders should work actively to
create this type of work environment with their audit team members.
Related to these factors of leadership and physical proximity of engagement team
members, another important issue was raised in the interviews. There was a common concern
among several interviewees that auditors who work in offices where they have little access to
more senior partners or to a supportive work environment of the type we described above need
the support structure and leadership which are desirable to develop and maintain a high level of
objectivity and independence, especially in the face of client pressures and their own desire to
advance their careers. The firms endeavor to create this structure through regular meetings with
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peers, periodic visits by leaders from larger offices and, increasingly, the use of e-mail and other
technologies which reduce the sense of isolation which may be caused by geographical
separation.
2.

Summary o f Relevant Psychology Literature on Group Level Dynamics.
What follows is a more theoretical and research-based discussion of the
impact of group dynamics on individual behavior. This summary of the literature has direct
relevance to the audit engagement team.
According to a recently-published chapter by J. Richard Hackman (1992), two general
factors or types of stimuli that have an impact are:
•

indirect

•

direct

Indirect factors (referred to as ambient stimuli) are typically not readily apparent or in
one’s conscious awareness. Ambient stimuli are therefore background, cultural, and usually not
discussed; just taken for granted.
Direct factors (discretionary stimuli) are typically messages, often in the form of feedback
to an individual, that are sent to guide or correct specific behavior. If an individual has violated a
group norm that is highly important to the group, the person will soon hear about it. This
“hearing about it” is the direct stimulus.
a.
Evidence about ambient or indirectfactors
1.
Ambient stimuli are rarely noticed and discussed. The group member is usually
unaware of their continuing impact, e.g., knowledge about and norms associated with conducting
an audit. For example, when asked, an auditor might respond with, “It’s just the way we do it.”
Implication: Since the general process and procedure for conducting an audit becomes
“second nature” and the original stimuli for how to do it are not typically in one’s conscious
awareness, it is therefore critical that the auditor's training (i.e., instilling the methodology of and
rationale for audits) be conducted according to clear and appropriate standards. Consideration
might be given by the profession to making more public the nature of training and how it
contributes to the norms and standards of independence. More to the point, the profession might
demonstrate how the training makes independence “second nature.”
2.
The diversity of indirect or ambient stimuli impinging on group members
becomes narrowed and restricted over time. Just sticking to the task at hand with little or no
distraction increases the efficiency and effectiveness of a work group—up to a point. There is
some evidence that ignoring all “distractions” can actually decrease effectiveness. Thus, it is a
matter of selectively allowing in outside, potentially distracting stimuli.
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Implication: Separating the audit function (“Chinese Walls”) from other aspects of the
firm’s business may work against audit effectiveness. Learning more about the client
organization, beyond merely the numbers from accounting, can potentially increase work
effectiveness.
3.
Group members tend not to test publicly the private inferences they make from
indirect or ambient stimuli. In a highly task-oriented group, observations about process, how the
group is going about its business, are considered bad form and are negatively valued. Yet
evidence shows quite clearly that questioning assumptions, particularly about the way we do
things, rarely, if ever, adversely affects the group's effectiveness. Nonetheless, because of this
indirect or ambient norm, many work group members develop an expectancy that making such
comments (i.e., about the group’s process) will lead to unpleasant consequences.
Implication: This point may appear to contradict point #1 above. The distinction can be
made, however, that in this case it is not the audit procedure itself, but the group process or
interpersonal relationships that is the focus. Audit groups should be encouraged to speak openly
about and question on occasion, the process of their work. Process observations can not only
lead to improved group effectiveness, but can also increase individual commitment to the work.
Having a chance to influence the “way we do things” typically strengthens commitment to the
group and to the task. Moreover, feeling free to be open and to question occasionally “the way
we do things” in the group can increase a sense of empowerment for members of the audit
engagement team. This empowered freedom to speak up can then lead team members to
challenge potential compromise that could reduce audit independence.
b.

Evidence about direct factors and group norms
First, some important concepts, and second some evidence.
Three important classes of variables are critical to understanding

conformity—the group norm itself, the person, and the person’s role in the group.
The norm:
Norms that are both well crystallized (group consensus and clarity about
the range of approved vs. disapproved behaviors) and highly intense (overall strength of approval
and disapproval is clearly linked with norm-regulated behavior) have the greatest likelihood of
engendering compliance.
The person: People differ with respect to their degree of conformity to most any norm.
For those who lean in the direction of nonconformity, compliance is even more dependent on
rewards and punishments.
The role: Some role occupants have more behavioral latitude (or “idiosyncrasy credit,” to
use Hollander’s (1958) words) than do others—consider Dennis Rodman of the Chicago Bulls.
Some group members:
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•

•
•

bring with them high external status, e.g., joined the group from another
prestigious firm, daughter of a managing partner within the firm, advanced
academic degrees, etc.;
are assigned to a high-status role, e.g., team leader; or
earn idiosyncrasy credit over time by being “good group citizens.”

These individuals, potentially at least, can strengthen the norm of independence because they can
more easily “afford” to be independent. Thus, these kinds of role occupants should indeed be
tolerated.
c.
1.

Evidence about direct group norms and conformity

Groups have more influence on the individual when other members are physically

present as opposed to when they are absent (i.e., when the individual member is working alone).
Implication: Audit teams are likely to be more effective than individuals working alone,
since conformity to important norms regarding the audit such as independence is more likely to
occur.
2.

Groups generate and maintain normative structures that efficiently and powerfully

shape and constrain behavior. Strong norms (well crystallized and intense) indeed shape and
control behavior, but they can also suppress innovation and perspective. With persistence, two
or more members in the minority can alter majority enforced norms or at least get the majority to
review and reconsider what is being reinforced. A member acting alone as a deviant is more
likely to conform eventually to the overwhelming majority or become “institutionalized” as the
group deviant.
Implication: Since bucking a norm is so difficult, support from at least one other person
is imperative. When a member believes that a particular norm is ineffective or even wrong, e.g.,
compromising objectivity and independence, he or she must gain support for change to occur.
3.
Groups directly and contingently reinforce specific individual behaviors. As an
individual member’s behavior strays from the norm, the group will typically be more direct and
specific about the desired compliance. Getting the member back into line requires time and
energy on the part of the group, however. Also, too much pressure on the group member to
conform can result in behavior that is the opposite to what is desired, even if the action is not in
the individual’s best interest. When a person believes that his or her freedom o f choice is at
stake, the person will often reassert control by behaving perversely. Brehm referred to this
seemingly odd behavior as “psychological reactance.”
Implication: Too much group pressure to conform can result in behavior opposite from
what is desired. Freedom of choice is an extremely powerful human motive. Too much external
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pressure on the auditor to conform to standards of independence could be counterproductive in
terms of his or her level of commitment.
4.
Groups affect behavior indirectly as well by shaping members’ beliefs and
attitudes. As Hackman put it, “If as a result of group influence a person comes to believe that a
certain set of outcomes will be obtained if he or she exhibits a given behavior and if these
outcomes come to be highly valued by the person, then he or she is likely to engage in the
behavior spontaneously” (1992; p. 251). This process is more subtle than the direct use of
pressure to manage behavior. It is also more likely to engender commitment with little or no risk
of psychological reactance. As the individual connects the valued outcomes with the need to
conform to certain norms, the required and desired behavior is likely to persist over time, to
generalize across differing situations, and to occur whether or not other group members are
present.
Implication: As expectancy theory predicts (Vroom, 1964; Porter and Lawler, 1968), the
more an individual values certain outcomes (e.g., doing a superb audit) and sees a direct linkage
between his or her behavior and the achievement of the valued outcome, the more likely the
individual will be committed to the process (norm) that leads to such achievement. What is
critical to the process of optimum commitment is that the individual figures all of this out for
himself or herself (which should not be too difficult) and experiences the least necessary external
pressure to conform. Moreover, the further (in terms of relationships) from the individual such
pressure is sourced, the more risk of psychological reactance and reduced commitment.
D.

The Significance o f the Firm's Culture
All organizations that have existed for at least a few years and as a result of

growth have become more complex (not the mom-and-pop food market on the comer, although
arguably a culture exists there as well) have a culture, defined simply as “the way we do things
around here.” (See, for example, Kotter and Heskett, 1992; and Schein, 1985.) The “way” means
that there are key norms to which organizational members conform. Underlying these norms are
organizational values--the right and wrong way of doing things. Culture also includes the
organization's history (especially what former leaders and founders stood for), legends, and even
myths. The culture perpetuates itself through hiring, selection, and promotion processes as well
as via ceremonies, rituals, systems, e.g., performance appraisals, and policies.
It is important that all organizations pay attention to their respective cultures (i.e., to
understand them, particularly in terms of how the culture perpetuates certain organizational
behaviors). It is even more important for organizations on which outsiders may rely, such as
hospitals, law firms, public accounting firms, and pharmaceutical companies to understand and
attempt to manage their cultures, because they are involved in highly "ethical" businesses. The
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Johnson & Johnson credo, for example, is an extremely important document in this regard. By
the same token, the public accounting firms must attend to their organizational cultures. Their
cultures' values undergird the standards of independence. Thus, the way things are done in an
audit firm needs to be constantly monitored to make certain that those factors which perpetuate
and reinforce auditor independence (see especially the commitment list) are maintained.
Culture is also maintained, and at times changed, by what the firm chooses to measure,
especially regarding performance (Kotter and Heskett, 1992). As one senior audit partner put it,
"It is very important for audit partners to be clear about what they are being measured on."
Understanding what the performance criteria are is perhaps just as important as the performance
itself. The point is that what is rewarded and what is measured are direct reflections of culture.
Monitoring these variables helps to ensure understanding of what affects (and maybe does not
affect) auditor independence.

A classic article by Steve Kerr (1975)—"On the Folly of

Rewarding A, While Hoping for B"—illustrates the importance of this understanding.
IV.

Conclusion
It is my opinion that the safeguards for independence, especially those classified as

external, are adequate, perhaps more than adequate. The measures instituted by those audit firms
whose partners we interviewed, with their professional policies and manuals, their training and
development programs, their modes of reward, performance measurement criteria, and the like,
are impressive as steps to ensure independence.
The profession's continued attention should be focused on the commitment side of the
ledger, because emphasis there will not only reinforce auditor independence most effectively, but
will undergird self-regulatory behavior as well. Each firm should continuously assess its culture,
the climate of its engagement teams, and the leadership practices of its engagement leaders to
assure that they foster an environment of independence. Based on this type of assessment, firms
can then refine and perfect their training programs to enhance among their auditors behaviors
that foster the highest commitment to independence.
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Fellow of the National Training Laboratories (former)
University Associates Award for "Outstanding Contribution to the Field of
Human Resource Development," 1986
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NASA Public Service Medal, 1989
Distinguished Contribution to Human Resource Development Award, American
Society for Training and Development, 1990
Lippitt Memorial Award for Excellence in Organization Development, American
Society for Training and Development, 1993
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Board of Directors, ETHOS AB, Sweden, 1987-present
Council of Governors, American Society for Training and Development, 19951997
Committee on Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance,
National Research Council, National Academy of Science, 1994-1996
Board of Directors, Academy of Human Resource Development, 1994-1996
Board of Governors, Academy of Management, 1986-1989
Board of Governors, American Society for Training and Development, 19871990; National Nominating Committee, 1983
First General Chairman, Organization Development Division, American Society
for Training and Development
Program Chairperson, Organization Development Division, Academy of
Management, 1978-79.
Chairperson, Organization Development Division, Academy of Management,
1979-80.
Elected Representative at Large, Board of Governors, Academy of Management,
1981-83.
Consulting Editor, Review o f Business and Economic Research, 1985-1991.
Editorial Board, Professional Practice Series, Society for Industrial and
Organizational Psychology, 1989-1995.
Editorial Board, Human Resource Management
Editorial Advisory Board, Journal o f Organizational Change Management
Editorial Board, Organizational Dynamics
Editorial Board, Journal of Management Inquiry
International Editorial Panel, Human Relations'
Editorial Board, Gestalt Review
Editorial Board, Training and Development Journal
Consulting Editor, Organizational Psychology Series, Teachers College Press.
Advisory Board, Positive Employee Practices Institute, 1990-1994.

PUBLICATIONS: BOOKS
1971

H. A. Homstein, B. B. Bunker, W. W. Burke, M. G. Gindes, and R. J. Lewicki, Social
Intervention: A Behavioral Science Approach, New York, NY: The Free
Press, 1971.
1972

W. W. Burke and H. A. Homstein (Eds.), The Social Technology o f Organization
Development, La Jolla, CA: NTL Learning Resources Corporation, 1972.
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W. W. Burke and R. Beckhard (Eds.), Conference Planning (Revised Edition), La Jolla,
CA: NTL Learning Resources Corp., 1972.
W. W. Burke (Ed.), New Technologies in Organization Development: I, La Jolla, CA:
University Associates, 1972.
1977

W. W. Burke (Ed.), Current Issues and Strategies in Organization Development, New
York, NY: Human Sciences Press, 1977. (A selection for the Presidents
Association, American Management Association.)
1978

W. W. Burke (Ed.), The Cutting Edge: Current Theory and Practice in Organization
Development, La Jolla, CA: University Associates, 1978.
1980

W. B. Eddy and W. W. Burke (Eds.), Behavioral Science and the Manager's Role (Rev.
Ed.), San Diego, CA: University Associates, 1980.
W. W. Burke and L. D. Goodstein (Eds.), Trends and Issues in Organization
Development: Current Theory and Practice, San Diego, CA: University
Associates, 1980.
1982

M. S. Plovnick, R. E. Fry, and W. W. Burke, Organization Development: Exercises,
Cases, and Readings, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982.
W. W. Burke, Organization Development: Principles and Practices, Glenview, IL:
Scott, Foresman and Company, 1982. Also published in Japanese and
Spanish.
1983

S. R. Michael, F. Luthans, G. S. Odiome, W. W. Burke, and S. Hayden, Techniques o f
Organizational Change, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1981. Also published
in Spanish: Tecnicas Para el Cambio Organizational, 1983.
1987

W. W. Burke, Organization Development: A Normative View, Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley, 1987. Also published in Spanish.
1994

W. W. Burke, Organization Development: A Process o f Learning and Changing,
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1994.
1995

W. W. Burke (Ed.), Managing Organizational Change, New York: American
Management Association, 1995.
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PUBLICATIONS: ARTICLES
1965

W. W. Burke, "Leadership Behavior as a Function of the Leader, the Follower and the
Situation," Journal o f Personality, 1965, 33, 60-81.
1966

W. W. Burke, "Social Perception as a Function of Dogmatism," Perceptual and Motor
Skills, 1966,23, 863-868.
1967

W. W. Burke and H. A. Homstein, "Conceptual vs. Experiential Management Training,"
Training and Development Journal, 1967,21(12), 12-17.
B. R. Ellis and W. W. Burke, "A Design for Training Group Discussion Leaders,"
Training News, 1967, 11(2). Also a chapter in W. W. Burke and R.
Beckhard (Eds.), Conference Planning (2nd Ed.), La Jolla, CA: University
Associates, 1970, pp. 169-174.
1968

W. W. Burke, "A Conference Can Be a Problem-Solver—If Well Handled," Sales
Meetings, May 1968, 15, 91-96.
1969

W. W. Burke, "A Seven-Hour Workshop in Interpersonal Communication," Training and
Development Journal, 1969, 23(7), 4-10.
1970

W. W. Burke and B. R. Ellis, "Designing a Work Conference on Change and Problem
Solving," Adult Leadership, 1969, 17,410-412; 435-437. Also a chapter in W.
W. Burke and R. Beckhard (Eds.), Conference Planning (2nd. Ed.), La Jolla,
CA: University Associates, 1970, pp. 117-130.
F. I. Steele and W. W. Burke, "Integrating Theory with Experiential Learning in a
Training of Trainers Seminar," Religious Education, 1969.
W. W. Burke, "An Examination for Training Effectiveness in Interpersonal
Communication," Training News, 1970, 14(1).
W. W. Burke, "Training Organization Development Specialists," Professional
Psychology, 1970,1(4), 354-358.
W. W. Burke, "An Orientation to Organization Development," Canadian Training
Methods, May-June 1970, 18-21.
1971

W. W. Burke, "So You Think You Know OD," OD Practitioner, 1971,4(2), 6-9.
W. W. Burke, "A Comparison of Management Development and Organization
Development," Journal o f Applied Behavioral Science, 1971, 7(7), 569579. Also a chapter in D. S. Beach (Ed.), Managing People at Work, 2nd Ed.,
New York, NY: Macmillan, 1975.
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W. W. Burke, "Organization Development: Here to Stay?" Proceedings of Academy of
Management Annual Meeting, August 1971.
W. W. Burke and W. H. Schmidt, "Management and Organization Development,"
Personnel Management, March-April 1971, 34, 44-56. Also a chapter in W.
French, C. Bell, and R. Zawacki (Eds.), Organization Development: Theory,
Practice, and Research, Cincinnati, OH: South-Western, 1978. And in C. R.
Bell and L. Nadler (Eds.), The Client-Consultant Handbook, Houston, TX: Gulf
Publishing Company, 1979.
1972

W. W. Burke, "Organization Development: Current Prospects," Industrial Training
International, 1972, 7(2), 49-52. London: MGS Publications, Ltd.
W. W. Burke, "The Demise of Organization Development," Journal o f Contemporary
Business, 1972, 1(3), 57-63.
W. W. Burke, "The Role of Training in Organization Development," Training and
Development Journal, 1972, 26(9), 30-34.
W. W. Burke, "Organization Development Revisited," Innovation, 1972, 29, 62.
1973

W. W. Burke, "Organization Development Pro and Con," Professional Psychology,
1973,4, 194-200; 207-208. Also a chapter in W. French, C. Bell, and R.
Zawacki (Eds.), Organization Development: Theory, Practice, and Research,
Cincinnati, OH: South-Western, 1978.
1974

W. W. Burke, "One More Time: So You Think You Know OD," OD Practitioner, 1974,
6(4), 8-12. Also published in Varney, G. H., Organization Development fo r
Managers, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977, pp. 37-48.
1976

W. W. Burke, "Organization Development in Transition," Journal o f Applied Behavioral
Science, 1976, 12, 22-43.
M. D. Kobayashi and W. W. Burke, "Organization Development in Japan," Columbia
Journal o f World Business, 1976,11(2), 112-123. Also published in Pakistan
Management Review, 1977, 18(1), 57-71, and a chapter in Kobayashi, M. K.,
Japan: The Most Misunderstood Country, Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd., 1984,
pp. 21-41.
1977

W. W. Burke, "Organization Development Japanese Style," Group & Organization
Studies, 1977,2, 395-398.
1978

M. S. Plovnick and W. W. Burke, "Perspectives on Teaching OD in an MBA Program,"
Exchange: The Organizational Behavior Teaching Journal, 1978, 3(4), 812.
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1979
W. W. Burke, "Leaders and Their Development," Group & Organization Studies, 1979,
4(3), 273-280.
1980
W. W. Burke, "Organization Development and Bureaucracies in the 1980's," Journal o f
Applied Behavioral Science, 1980, 16(3), 423-437. Also published in
International Political Science Abstracts, Paris: 1981, and in B. Bozeman and J.
Straussman (Eds.), New Directions in Public Administration, Monterey, CA:
Brooks/Cole, 1984, pp. 92-100.
W. W. Burke, Interview with (by J. E. Jones), Group & Organization Studies, 1980,
5(3), 272-294.
W. W. Burke, "Leadership: One Best Way?" Management Review, 1980, 69(11), 5458.
1981

W. W. Burke, "Conversation with Richard D. Wood," Organizational Dynamics, 1981,
9(4), 22-35.
1982

W. W. Burke, "Who Is the Client? A Different Perspective," OD Practitioner, 1982,
14(1), 1-6. Also chapter in Van Eynde, D. F., Hoy, J. C., & Van Enyde, D. C.
(Eds.), Organization Development Classics, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997,
pp. 93-106.
W. W. Burke, "The OD Consultant: What Is the Right Stuff?" Journal fo r Specialists in
Group Work, 1982, 7(11), 56-64.
1983

W. W. Burke, "Should School Administrators Be Leaders or Managers?" Curriculum in
Context, 1983, 11(2), 19-24.
W. W. Burke, J. Margolis, and L. McDermott, "What in the Name of OD Do We Do?"
Training and Development Journal, 1983, 37(4), 42-48.
1984

W. W. Burke, "Knowledge and Understanding of Organization Development,"
Organization Development Journal, 1984, 2(3), 28-30.
W. W. Burke, "Conversation with Harold K. Sperlich," Organizational Dynamics, 1984,
12(4), 23-36.
W. W. Burke, "Assessment Questionnaire for Knowledge and Understanding of
Organization Development," Organization Development Journal, 1984, 2(4),
37-42.
W. W. Burke, L. P. Clark, and C. Koopman, "Improve Your OD Project's Chances of
Success," Training and Development Journal, 1984, 38(4), 62-68.
L. P. Clark and W. W. Burke, "Successful OD: A Matter of Execution," OD
Practitioner, 1984, 16(3), 1-5.
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1985
W. W. Burke, E. A. Richley, and L. DeAngelis, "Changing Leadership and Planning
Processes at the Lewis Research Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration," Human Resource Management, 1985, 24(11), 81-90.
B. J. Mohr, "OD Institute with Warner Burke," Organization Development Journal,
1985, 3(1), 52-57.
W. W. Burke, Review of Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge, by Warren Bennis
and Burt Nanus, Human Resource Management, 1985, 24(4), 503-508.
W. W. Burke, "NASA's Partnership with Industry" (Interview with Andrew Stofan,
Director, Lewis Research Center, NASA), Management Review, 1985, 74(12),
30-32.
1987

M. Sashkin and W. W. Burke, "Organization Development in the 1980s," Journal o f
Management, 1987, 13(2), 393-417. Also published in W. L. French,
C. H. Bell, Jr., & R. A. Zawacki (Eds.), Organization Development and
Transformation: Managing Effective Change," 4th Ed. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin,
1994, pp. 41-62.
W. W. Burke and C. A. Coruzzi, "Competence in Managing Lateral Relations," The
1987 Annual: Developing Human Resources, San Diego, CA: University
Associates, 1987, pp. 151-156.
W. W. Burke, "A Conversation with John Carter," Academy of Management Executive,
August 1987, 1(3), 335-337.
1989

W. W. Burke and G. H. Litwin, "A Causal Model of Organizational Performance," The
1989 Annual: Developing Human Resources, San Diego, CA: University
Associates, 1989, pp. 277-288.
1990

E. A. Fagenson and W. W. Burke, "The Activities of Organization Development
Practitioners at the Turn of the Decade of the 1990s: A Study of Their
Predictions," Group & Organization Studies, 1990, 15(4), 366-380.
E. A. Fagenson and W. W. Burke, "Organization Development Practitioners' Activities
and Interventions in Organizations During the 1980s," Journal o f Applied
Behavioral Sciences, 1990, 26(3), 285-297.
M. Sashkin and W. W. Burke, "An End-of-the-Eighties Retrospective: A Commentary
Appended to Organization Development in the 1980s," Advances in
Organization Development, 1990, 1, 347-349. Also published in W. L. French,
C. H. Bell, Jr., & R. A. Zawacki (Eds.), Organization Development and
Transformation: Managing Effective Change," 4th Ed. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin,
1994, pp. 63-64.
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1991
L. D. Goodstein and W. W. Burke, "Creating Successful Organization Change,"
Organizational Dynamics, 1991, 19(4), 5-17. Also published in R. S. Schuler
(Ed.) Strategic Human Resource Management: New York: American
Management Association, 1993, pp. 49-61; W. L. French, C. H. Bell, Jr., & R. A.
Zawacki (Eds.), Organization Development and Transformation: Managing
Effective Change," 4th Ed. Burr Ridge, IL: Irwin, 1994, pp. 46-61; and in W.
W. Burke (Ed.), Managing Organizational Change, New York: American
Management Association, 1995, pp. 7-19.
W. W. Burke, J. L. Spencer, L. P. Clark, and C. A. Coruzzi, "Managers Get a 'C' in
Managing Change," Training and Development Development, 1991,45(5), 8792.
W. W. Burke and P. Jackson, "Making the SmithKline Beecham Merger Work," Human
Resource Management, 1991, 30(1), 69-87.
1992

W. W. Burke and G. H. Litwin, "A Causal Model of Organizational Performance and
Change," Journal o f Management, 1992, 18(3), 523-545.
D. F. Van Eynde, A. H. Church, R. F. Hurley, and W. W. Burke, "What OD Practitioners
Believe," Training and Development Journal, 1992, 46(4), 41-46.
A. H. Church and W. W. Burke, "Assessing the Activities and Values of Organization
Development Practitioners," The Industrial-Organizational Psychologist, July
1992, 59-66.
R. F. Hurley, A. H. Church, W. W. Burke, and D. F. Van Eynde, "Tension, Change, and
Values in OD," OD Practitioner, 1992,24(3), 1-5. Also chapter in Van Eynde,
D. F., Hoy, J. C., & Van Enyde, D. C. (Eds.), Organization Development
Classics, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1997, pp. 93-106.
W. W. Burke, "Metaphors to Consult By," Group and Organization Management, 1992,
17(3), 255-259.
W. W. Burke and A. H. Church, "Managing Change, Leadership Style, and Intolerance
to Ambiguity: A Survey of Organization Development Practitioners," Human
Resource Management, 1992, 31(4), 301-318.
W. W. Burke, "The Future of OD," Organization Development Newsletter, American
Society for Training and Development, Winter 1992, 1-4.
A. H. Church, R. F. Hurley and W. W. Burke, "Evolution or Revolution in the Values
of Organization Development: Commentary on the State of the Field," Journal
of Organizational Change Management, 1992, 5(4), 6-23.
1993
A. H. Church and W. W. Burke, "What Are the Basic Values of OD?" Academy o f
Management ODC Newsletter, Winter 1993, 7-11.
W. W. Burke, "The Changing World of Organization Change," Consulting Psychology
Journal, 1993, 45(1), 9-17.
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W. W. Burke, A. H. Church, and J. Waclawski, "What Do OD Practitioners Know About
Managing Change?" Leadership and Organization Development Journal, 1993,
14(6), 3-11. Paper won the "1993 Outstanding Authors Award" for this journal.
J. Waclawski, A. H. Church, and W. W. Burke, "The En-gendering of OD," OD
Practitioner, 1993, 25(4), 2-10.
A. H. Church and W. W. Burke, "Exploring Practitioner Differences in Consulting
Style and Knowledge of Change Management by Professional Association
Membership," Consulting Psychology Journal: Practice and Research, 1993,
45(3), 7-24.
1994

A. H. Church, W. W. Burke, and D. F. Van Eynde, "Values, Motives, and Interventions
of Organization Development Practitioners," Group & Organization
Management, 1994, 19(1), 5-50. Winner of the "George and Sara McCune Best
Paper Award."
A. H. Church and W. W. Burke, "Reflections on Research: An Introspective Look Into
the Process and Outcome of Studying Values," Organization Development
Journal, 12(3), 49-61.
1995

W. W. Burke, "Organization Change: What We Know, What We Need to Know,"
Journal o f Management Inquiry, 4(2), 158-171. Brief version also published in
Academy of Management ODC Newsletter, 1995, Winter, 1 , 9-11.
W. W. Burke, "Organization Development: Then, Now and Tomorrow," Organization
Development Journal, 1995, 13(4), 7-18. Also published in a slightly different
version in Organization Development Practitioner, 1995, 27(2&3), 5-11.
J. Waclawski, A. H. Church, and W. W. Burke, "Women in Organization Development:
A Profile of the Intervention Styles and Values of Today's Practitioners,"
Journal o f Organization Change Management, 1995, 8(1), 12-22.
J. Waclawski, A. H. Church, and W. W. Burke, "Women and Men OD Practitioners:
An Analysis of Differences and Similarities," Consulting Psychology Journal:
Practice and Research, Spring 1995,47(2), 89-107.
W. W. Burke, "Leadership and Empowerment," OD Practitioner, 1995, 27(1), 8-16
D. F. Van Eynde, A. H. Church, and W. W. Burke, "Internal or External: Which Way to
Go? A Research Report on the Practice of Organization Development,"
Organization Development Journal, 1995, 13(2), 51-58.
A. H. Church, M. W. Javitch, and W. W. Burke, "Enhancing Professional Service
Quality: Feedback Is the Way to Go," Managing Service Quality, 1995, 5(3),
29-33.
1996

B. Trahant and W. W. Burke, "Traveling Through Transitions," Training &
Development, 1996, 50(2), 37-41.
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W. Siegal, A. H. Church, M. Javitch, J. Waclawski, S. Burd, M. Bazigos, T. F. Yang, K.
Anderson-Rudolph, and W. W. Burke, "Understanding the Management of
Change: An Overview of Managers' Perspectives and Assumptions in the
1990s," Journal o f Organizational Change Management, 1996, 9(6), 54-80.
A. H. Church, J. Waclawski, and W. W. Burke, "OD Practitioners as Facilitators of
Change: An Analysis of Survey Results," Group and Organization
Management, 1996, 21(1), 22-67.
B. Trahant and W. W. Burke, "Creating a Change Reaction: How Understanding
Organizational Dynamics Can Ease Reengineering," National Productivity
Review, 1996, 15(4), 37-46.
A. H. Church, W. E. Siegal, M. W. Javitch, J. Waclawski, and W. W. Burke, "Managing
Organizational Change: What You Don't Know Might Hurt You," Career
Development International, 1996, 1(2), 25-30.
1997

M. N. Bazigos and W. W. Burke, "Theory Orientations of Organization Development
Practitioners," Group & Organization Management, 1997, 22, 384-408.
W. W. Burke, "What Human Resource Practitioners Need to Know for the Twenty-first
Century," Human Resource Management, 1997, 36(1), 71-79. Also published in
D. Ulrich, M. R. Losey & G. Lake (Eds.), Tomorrow’s HR Management, New
York: Wiley, 1997, pp. 96-110.
W. W. Burke, "Walking the Tightrope of Organization Development Consulting,"
Organization Development Journal, 1997, 15(2), 49-54.
W. W. Burke, "The New Agenda for Organization Development," Organizational
Dynamics, 1997, 26(1), 7-20.
W. W. Burke (Interview With), "Creating Change Reactions: How Organizations
Continually Renew Themselves in Today's Tough Environment," Knowledge
Knowhow: A Journal on Management Leadership, 1997, 2(4), 22-27.
B. Trahant, W. W. Burke, and R. Koonce, "12 Principles of Organizational
Transformation," Management Review, 1997, 86(8), 17-23.
PUBLICATIONS: CHAPTERS IN BOOKS
1970

W. W. Burke and W. H. Schmidt, "What Should Be the Primary Target for Change: The
Manager or the Organization?" in W. H. Schmidt (Ed.), Organizational
Frontiers and Human Values, San Francisco, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co.,
1970, pp. 151-169.
1973

W. W. Burke, W. Schmidt, and R. Tannenbaum, "The Future of Organization
Development," in M. G. Bruce (Ed.), Practicing Organization Development,
San Jose, CA: Institute for Business and Economic Research, California State
University, 1973, pp. 13-25.
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1974
W. W. Burke, "Managing Conflict Between Groups," in J. D. Adams (Ed.), Theory and
Method in Organization Development: An Evolutionary Process, Arlington,
VA: NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, 1974, pp. 255-268.
1979

W. W. Burke, "One Consultant's Trip: From Technique to Theory," in D. P. Sinha (Ed.),
Consultants and Consulting Styles, New Delhi, India: Vision Books, 1979, pp.
101-117.
1980

W. W. Burke, "Systems Theory, Gestalt Therapy, and Organization Development," in T.
G. Cummings (Ed.), System Theory fo r Organization Development, Sussex,
England: Wiley and Sons, Ltd., pp. 209-222.
W. W. Burke, "Interpersonal Communication" and "Developing and Selecting Leaders:
What We Know," Chapters in W. B. Eddy and W. W. Burke (Eds.), Behavioral
Science and the Manager's Role (Rev. Ed.), San Diego, CA: University
Associates, 1980, pp. 69-74, 173-186.
W. W. Burke, "Characteristics of a Top Management Team: Process Is Just as
Important as Personalities and Individual Competencies," in S. G. Cort (Ed.),
Productivity in General Merchandise Retailing: Proceedings of a Symposium
for Top Management in Retailing, New York, NY: National Retail Merchants
Association, 1980, pp. 96-99.
1981

W. W. Burke, "Management and the Behavioral Sciences," in D. G. Lake (Ed.),
Managing a State's Education, Washington, DC: The Council of Chief State
School Officers, 1981, pp. 133-153.
1982

W. W. Burke, "Leaders: Their Behavior and Development," in D. A. Nadler, M. L.
Tushman, and N. G. Hatvany (Eds.), Managing Organizations: Readings and
Cases, Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982, pp. 237-245.
W. W. Burke, "On the Future of OD: Renewing the Magic," in E. J. Pavlock (Ed.),
Organization Development: Managing Transitions, Washington, DC: American
Society for Training and Development, 1982, pp. 5-9.
1983

W. W. Burke, "Organization Development and Bureaucracy," in W. B. Littrell, G.
Sjoberg, and L. A. Zurcher (Eds.), Bureaucracy as a Social Problem,
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1983, pp. 131-143.
W. W. Burke, Editor, Part I, "General Management," and Author, section on
"Organization Development," in W. K. Fallon (General Editor), AMA
Management Handbook, 2nd Ed., New York, NY: AMACOM, 1983, pp. 1-78.
1986

W. W. Burke, "Leadership as Empowering Others," in S. Srivastva and Associates'
Executive Power: How Executives Influence People and Organizations, San
Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1986, pp. 51-77. Also reprinted in Armed Forces
Comptroller, 1987, 32(3), 15-25.
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1988
W. W. Burke, "Team Building," in W. B. Ready and K. Jamison (Eds.) Team Building:
Blueprints for Productivity and Satisfaction, Alexandria, VA: NTL Institute,
1988, pp. 3-14.
E. A. Fagenson and W. W. Burke, "The Current Activities and Skills of Organization
Development Practitioners," in F. Hoy (Ed.), Academy o f Management Best
Papers Proceedings, 49th Annual Meeting, Washington, DC: Academy of
Management, 1988, pp. 251-254.
1989

W. M. Bernstein and W. W. Burke, "Modeling Organizational Meaning Systems," in R.
W. Woodman and W. A. Pasmore (Eds.), Research in Organizational Change
and Development, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1989, pp. 117-159.
1990

M. Sashkin and W. W. Burke, "Organization Development in the 1980s," in F.
Massarik (Ed.), Advances in Organization Development, Vol. 1, Norwood, NJ:
Ablex Publishing Company, 1990, pp. 315-349.
M. Sashkin and W. W. Burke, "Understanding and Assessing Organizational
Leadership," in K. E. Clark and M. B. Clark (Eds.), Measures o f
Leadership, West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of America, Inc., 1990, pp.
297-325.
1991

W. W. Burke, "Engineered Materials," in A. M. Glassman and T. G. Cummings (Eds.),
Cases in Organizational Development, Homewood, IL: Irwin, Inc., 1991, pp.
68-77.
W. W. Burke, "Practicing Organization Development," in D. W. Bray (Ed.), Working
with Organizations and Their People: A Guide to Human Resources Practices,
New York, NY: Guilford Press, 1991, pp. 95-130.
1992

A. M. Van Eron and W. W. Burke, "The Tranformational/Transactional Leadership
Model: A Study of Critical Components," in K. E. Clark, M. B. Clark, and D. P.
Campbell (Eds.) Impact o f Leadership, West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of
America, Inc., 1994, pp. 149-167.
1994

W. W. Burke, "Critical Elements in Organizational Culture Change," in L. A. Berger and
M. Sikora (Eds.), The Change Management Handbook: A Roadmap to
Corporate Transformation, Homewood, IL: Business One Irwin, 1994, pp. 285295.
W. W. Burke, "Diagnostic Models for Organization Development," in A. Howard (Ed.)
Diagnosis for Organizational Change: Methods and Models, Guilford, CT:
Guilford Press, 1994, pp.53-84.
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1995
A. H. Church and W. W. Burke, "Practitioners' Attitudes About the Field of Organization
Development," in W. A. Pasmore and R. W. Woodman (Eds.), Research in
Organizational Change and Development, Vol. 8, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press,
1995, pp. 1-46.
A. Van Eron and W. W. Burke, "Separation," in W. J. Rothwell, R. Sullivan, and G. N.
McLean (Eds.), Practicing Organization Development, San Diego, CA: Pfeiffer
& Co., 1995, pp. 395-418.
W. W. Burke (contributor), Encyclopedic Dictionary o f Organizational Behavior, N.
Nicholson (Ed.), Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1995, pp. 33-34; 189-190;
346-348.
1996

W. W. Burke, C. A. Coruzzi, and A. H. Church, "The Organizational Survey as an
Intervention for Change," in A. I. Kraut (Ed.), Organizational Surveys: Tools
for Assessment and Change, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1996, pp. 41-66.
1997

W. W. Burke and N. W. Biggart, "Interorganizational Relations," in D. Druckman, J. E.
Singer, and H. Van Colt (Eds.) Enhancing Organizational Performance,
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1997, pp. 120-149.

PROFESSIONAL PRESENTATIONS
1969

"Humanizing Trends in Industry Using Organization Development Techniques."
Presentation at annual convention of the American Association of Humanistic
Psychology, Washington, DC, August 29, 1969.
"Training Organization Development Specialists." Presentation at annual convention of
the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, September 4, 1969.
1970

"Reflections on Organization Development as a Field." NTL Institute Professional
Seminar, Washington, DC, November 5, 1970.
1971

"Organization Development: Here to Stay?" Paper presented at annual convention of
the Academy of Management, Atlanta, GA, August 17, 1971.
1972

Presentation to the U.S. Department of Defense, Industrial College of the Armed Forces
for their "Interdisciplinary Seminar in Management," Washington, DC, February
24, 1972 and September 2 7 , 1973.
Participation in the joint Johnson Foundation and the University of Wisconsin Graduate
School of Business "Symposium on Productivity in the Public Sector," to
examine work motivation and employee productivity, Racine, WI, May 15-16,
1972.
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"Organization Development: A Process of Planned Change," presentation at the
American Society for Training and Development 29th Annual Institute, Detroit,
MI, May 25, 1972.
"Managing Intergroup Conflict," presentation at the Second Annual NTL Institute
Technology in Organization Development Conference, Washington, DC,
November 29, 1972.
1973
Panel Presentation on "Organization Development in Public Institutions" for the
American Society of Public Administrators Meeting, Washington, DC, October
4, 1973.
1974

"Organizational Change: Evolution or Revolution?" presentation at the Society for
Humanistic Management, Third Annual Conference, Washington, DC, October
19, 1974.
1976

Presentation for "Dialogue with Practitioners" program, an organization behavior
seminar, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Boston, MA,
October 20, 1976.
1977

"Basic Concepts and Theories of Organization Development," a series of four cassette
tapes published by Development Digest, Credr Corporation, 1977.
"Uses and Abuses of the Systems Paradigm in Organization Development," presentation
at 37th Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Kissimmee, FL,
August 15, 1977.
"Some Perspectives on Leadership, Power, Management and Organization
Development," presentation for "Executive Update '77,” sponsored by The
Acushnet Foundation and the College of Business, Southeastern Massachusetts
University, New Bedford, MA, October 19, 1977.
1978

Conceived, organized, and gave the opening address for "OD '78," a national conference
on organization development sponsored by University Associates, San
Francisco, CA, March 16-17, 1978.
Chair and Discussant for "Some Overlooked Issues in Organization Diagnosis," 38th
Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, San Francisco, CA, August 11,
1978.
"Some Perspectives on Multi-National Organization Development," Keynote Address,
First International Conference on International Organization Development,
Toronto, ON, Canada, October 18, 1978.
1979
Chair, "Mr. Inside and Mr. Outside of Organization Development," Chair, Symposium:
"The OD Consultant-Superman or Flunky?" 39th Annual Meeting, Academy of
Management, Atlanta, GA, August 9-11, 1979.
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"Organization Development: Current Approaches," Pre-convention workshop,
Massachusetts Psychological Association Annual Meeting, Boston, MA, May 3,
1979.
1980
Co-Chair, "OD ’80," University Associates. New York, NY, March 16-18; San Diego,
CA, March 19-21; London, March 31-April 2.
Faculty for the organizational behavior curriculum, Inaugural Smith Management
Program for Women Executives, Smith College, North Hampton, MA, August
1980.
"Organization Development: Current State of the Art," Michigan Association of
Industrial-Organizational Psychologists, Southfield, MI, September 16, 1980.
1981

"Organization Change and Leadership," The Harpur Forum, State University of New
York, Binghamton, NY, March 19, 1981.
"Systems Theory, Gestalt Therapy, and Organization Development," Conference on
Complex Systems, Gestalt Institute of Cleveland, Cleveland, OH, April 11-12,
1981.
Co-Chair, Doctoral Consortium in Organization Behavior, Organization Development,
and Organization and Management Theory; Chair and Discussant for
Symposium: "Establishing a Competency Based Model of Management:
Implications for Change," 41st Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, San
Diego, CA, August 2-5, 1981.
1982

Co-Chair, "OD 82," University Associates, San Francisco, CA, March 10-12,1982.
Co-Chair, Doctoral Consortium in Organization Behavior, Organization Development,
and Organization Management and Theory; Discussant "OD Theory" session;
Panelist, symposium on "Contemporary OD Texts: A Conceptual and Pedagogic
Comparison;" Panelist, Symposium on "Techniques for Teaching Organization
Development," 42nd Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, New York,
NY, August 13-18, 1982.
1983

Colloquium Speaker, I/O Psychology & DBA Strategic Management Program,
University of Tennessee, February 26, 1983.
"Evaluating Managerial Competence: Implications for Management Development,"
HRD '83 Conference, University Associates, San Francisco, CA, March 23-25,
1983.
Speaker, Annual Convention, American Society of Personnel Administration, June 3,
1983.
Speaker, Workshop on "Teaching Organization Development," Annual Meeting,
Academy of Management, Dallas, TX, August 14, 1983.
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1984
Co-Chair, "OD ’84" and presenter, "OD: Current Strategies for Future Prospects,"
University Associates, San Francisco, CA, March 21-23, 1984.
Paper with L. P. Clark and C. Koopman, "Successful OD vs. Nonsuccessful OD: What
Is the Difference?" Paper presented at Annual Convention, American Society
for Training and Development, Dallas, TX, May 21, 1984.
Symposium speaker, "Human Resource Leadership Challenge," University of Michigan
Graduate School of Business Administration, Ann Arbor, MI, September
11-12, 1984.
Speaker, "Leadership in Management," Mid-Atlantic Regional Users Group (HewlettPackard) meeting, Myrtle Beach, SC, October 19, 1984.
Symposium presenter, "On Empowerment," for symposium on "Functioning of
Executive Power," Case Western Reserve University, Graduate School of
Management, Cleveland, OH, October 10-12, 1984.
Keynote speaker, Annual Meeting, Organization Development Network, Washington,
DC, November 2, 1984.
1985

"Leaders and Managers Empower Differently," UA '85 Conference, University
Associates, San Francisco, CA, March 27-29, and New York, NY, October 30,
1985.
"Measuring Managerial Competencies: Implications for Management Development,"
HRD '85 Conference, University Associates, New York, NY, October 30,
November 1, 1985.
1986

"Competencies in Managing Lateral Relations," UA '86 Conference, University
Associates, San Francisco, CA, March 19-21, 1986.
Keynote Speaker, MED Division, Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Chicago,
IL, 1986.
1987

Panel Speaker, "Disseminating Findings From Consultation Projects: Publication in
Journals," Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, New Orleans, LA, August
10, 1987.
1988

Panel Speaker, All Academy Symposium, "Publishing Trends," Annual Meeting,
Academy of Management, Anaheim, CA, August 6, 1988.
Discussant, Symposium on "Strategic Change Management: OD Interventions Within
Digital Equipment Corporation, Inc., and General Electric Company," Annual
Meeting, Academy of Management, Anaheim, CA, August 9, 1988.
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"Understanding and Assessing Organizational Leadership" (with Marshall Sashkin),
Conference on Psychological Measures and Leadership, Center for Creative
Leadership and the Psychological Corporation, San Antonio, TX, October 23-26,
1988.
1989
Invited Panel Speaker, "Getting Published," Annual Meeting, Academy of Management,
Washington, DC, August 12, 1989.
Symposium Speaker (with W. M. Bernstein), "Modeling Organizational Meaning
Systems," Research in Organizational Change and Development Symposium,
Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Washington, DC, August 15, 1989.
Symposium Speaker, "Academics and the Practice of Consultancy," Annual Meeting,
Academy of Management, Washington, DC, August 16, 1989.
Keynote Speaker, Annual Meeting, Organization Development Network, San Diego,
CA, October 8, 1989.
1990

Invited Address, "Changing Corporate Culture to Improve Customer Service," Institute
of Personnel Management, London, England, April 24, 1990.
Invited Speaker, "Human Resource Professional Competencies," Annual Meeting, Senior
Executive Roundtable, Society for Human Resource Management, Atlanta,
GA, June 26, 1990.
Keynote Speaker, "Empowering Subordinates," Second Annual National Conference,
Positive Employee Practices Institute, Atlanta, GA, October 23, 1990.
1991

Invited speaker, "The SmithKline Beecham Merger," Symposium on Building
Competitive Organizations for the 21st Century: The CEO Agenda for the
1990s," Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, MI, January 23, 1991.
Invited panel speaker, "Working with the Organizations of the Future," Society for
Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Sixth Annual Conference, St. Louis,
MO, April 28, 1991.
1992

Invited address, "The Changing World of Organization Change." Annual Convention,
American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, August 1992.
1993

Symposium Speaker (with C. A. Coruzzi), "The Many Facets of Empowerment," Annual
Meeting, Academy of Management, Atlanta, GA, August 9, 1993.
1994

Distinguished Speaker, "Organization Change: What We Know, What We Need to
Know," Organization Development and Change Division, Annual Meeting,
Academy of Management, Dallas, TX, August 15, 1994.
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Invited panel Speaker, "Integrated Organizational Diagnosis: Can We Bring 'I' and 'O'
Together?" Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Ninth Annual
Conference, Nashville, TN, April 8, 1994.
1995
Keynote Address, "Organization Development: Then, Now and Tomorrow," Conference
on Best Practices in Organization Development, sponsored by Bowling Green
State University in celebration of the 20th anniversary of the Master of
Organization Development Program, Bowling Green, OH, March 9, 1995.
Symposium Speaker, "What If We Took Teamwork Seriously?" Managerial Consulting
Division, Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Vancouver, BC, Canada,
August 1995.
Symposium Speaker (with A. H. Church), "Practitioners' Attitudes About the Field of
Organization Development," Organization Development and Change Division,
Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Vancouver, BC, Canada, August
1995.
M. N. Bazigos and W. W. Burke, "Theory Orientations of Organization Development
(OD) Practitioners: A Preliminary Exploration." Poster Session, Seventh
Annual Convention, American Psychological Society, New York, NY, June
1995.
M. W. Javitch, A. H. Church, J. Waclawski, and W. W. Burke, "Linking
Personality, Leadership Style, and Client Satisfaction in Professional Service
Firms." Poster Session, Seventh Annual Convention, American Psychological
Society, New York, NY, June 1995.
1996

Symposium Speaker, "Guns and Butter: What Would You Advise the Military?" AllAcademy Symposium, Annual Meeting, Academy of Management, Cincinatti,
OH: August, 1996.
Keynote Address: "The Agenda for Organization Development," Organization
Development Network Special Event, "Restructuring, Reengineering, and
Downsizing: Crossroads for Society," October 5, 1996.
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Appendix D

Auditor Independence Through Self-Regulation
and Professional Ethics

by
Gary Edwards
President, Meritas Consulting Inc.

A Report Prepared in Connection with a
Presentation to the Independence Standards Board
on behalf of the AICPA of “Serving the Public Interest:
A New Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence”

October 2 0 , 1997

Executive Summary
For eighteen years, I have served as a consultant on business and professional
ethics for over 150 major corporations and associations and two Presidential
Commissions. My consulting perspective has been informed by graduate education in
moral philosophy and the law.
I have examined the accounting profession’s self-regulatory efforts to assure
auditor independence at both the AICPA and accounting firm level. I have examined also
the role that professional ethics play in informing the judgment and conduct of
accountants engaged in providing audit and attestation services to public companies.
Based on my experience and training, I conclude that the accounting profession’s
self-regulatory program meets all the criteria for successful self-regulation and that the
activities and safeguards that are a part of that self-regulation are strengthened by the
professional ethics and judgment that auditors should possess as a result of training, firm
leadership and culture.

I conclude, as well, that self-regulation to preserve auditor

independence will be further enhanced by the ISB principles-based independence
standards, the ISB’s consultative function and the emerging issues identification and best
practices responsibilities of the IIC. Finally, I have examined the issue of appearances as
it pertains to the independence of auditors and compared that to the appearance of
impropriety issues that face law and government service. I conclude that assuring the
appearance of independence is best treated as an aspiration, rather than an enforceable
regulation.

Introduction
Independence is one of the hallmarks of any true profession. What professional
independence entails, the risks of its compromise, and the most effective means of
preserving it are subjects of continual reflection within each profession.1 They are also
appropriate subjects for examination by those whose lives are affected by the decisions
and conduct of professionals, especially their clients, but also the public and its
representatives in government.
The independence of public accountants who provide audit and attestation
services for public companies is presumed by the capital markets and is a necessary
condition for their efficient functioning.

In addition to millions of individual and

institutional investors, the audited companies themselves, their suppliers, customers, and
business partners all place importance on the representations of public accountants for
their assurances on the financial statements of participants in the capital markets.2 The
quality of those representations by public accountants is directly related to the
independence of the auditors from the companies for whom they provide the audit and
attestation services.
The requirement of public accountants’ independence, and particularly the
independence of those engaged in auditing of public companies, has been addressed by
the Congress, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section. Both the

1

R onald C. H om , O n Professionals, P rofessionals and P rofessional Ethics.
A m erican Institute for P roperty and Liability U nderw riters, 1978, p. 29.

2

Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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M alvern, P.A.:

SEC and the AICPA have expressed concerns about preserving the “appearance of
independence,” as well as “independence in fact.”
This report has been prepared in connection with a presentation to the
Independence Standards Board (the “ISB”) on behalf of the AICPA to address the
relevance of self-regulation and professional ethics to the preservation of auditor
independence.

The report contrasts self-regulation in the accounting profession with

seven key features of self-regulatory activities by other organizations with a focus on how
mechanisms that have been developed to protect auditor independence compare with
features of other self-regulatory initiatives. My analysis lends to the conclusion that the
self-regulatory efforts of the AICPA already reflect the key features of other successful
self-regulatory programs, but that a significant opportunity exists to strengthen further the
self-regulation of auditor independence by utilizing the ISB to articulate principle-based
standards that accounting firms can use to develop or improve their own independent
policies and procedures. My report also examines the concept of a profession and the
role of professional ethics in assuring the independence of accountants who provide audit
and other attestation services to clients. The report sets forth my conclusion that the
professional status of accounting and the professional ethics of auditors provide the
public with assurance that auditor independence will be protected.

Auditor

professionalism is reinforced, and independence further ensured, by the safeguards that
the AICPA and public accounting firms have developed.
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The Relevance of Self-Regulation to Auditor Independence
Self-regulation encompasses the various activities of professional associations and
societies (hereafter, referred to as professional societies), trade associations, corporations,
firms and other organizations designed to ensure compliance with laws, regulations, and
high standards of business and professional ethics.

Self-regulation accepts the

performance standards set by Congress or the regulatory agencies and utilizes appropriate
and familiar private sector systems and mechanisms to ensure compliance.
The goal of self-regulation, however, is not simply compliance, but the cultivation
and preservation of the public’s trust, because a free society and its institutions—
government, as well as business and the professions—are based on an assumption of
honesty, mutual trust and responsibility.3 To the extent that regulation has developed due
to actions that have called into question those assumptions, self-regulatory initiatives
themselves must be transparent and accountable.
The basis for self-regulation is ethics, understood not simply as the discipline or
science of moral philosophy but, in the words of Dr. Albert Schweitzer:
Ethics is the name we give to our concern for good
behavior. We feel an obligation to consider not
only our own personal well-being, but also that of
others and of human society as a whole.4
The concern for good behavior and sense of obligation for others permit
cooperation to displace adversarialism and suspicion in the pursuit of regulatory

3

R obert V. K rikorian. “The Tim e for Self-R egulation is N ow .” In Self-R egulation: C onference
P roceeding. W ashington, DC: Ethics R esource Center, Inc., 1982, p. 65.

4

A lbert Schw eitzer, Paris lecture, quoted in Ivan Hill, C om m on Sense an d E veryday Ethics.
W ashington, DC: A m erican V iew point, 1980, p. 5.
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objectives. Moreover, they permit a presumption of intent to violate regulations to be
replaced by a presumption of intent to comply.5
Former SEC chairman Harold Williams described self-regulation in terms of
enhanced accountability, as a consequence of ethics:
The most attractive attribute of self-regulation is
that it enhances, rather than displaces, traditional
private sector processes and accountability
mechanisms. Self-regulation leaves the private
sector with the opportunity to apply its own ethical
values and judgment to its decision making, as well
as the responsibility—if challenged— to justify the
basis upon which these decisions are made.6
The success of self-regulation turns on the effectiveness of those “processes and
accountability mechanisms” and the quality of the “ethical values and judgment” that are
cultivated within an industry, profession, company or firm.

Although there is no

comprehensive check-list of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a successful selfregulatory program, there are many common factors among effective programs.

Key Features of Effective Self-Regulatory Programs
1.

The Public Interest
Common among the self-regulatory initiatives of professional societies and

associations,7 trade associations,8 industry groups9 and corporations10 as the foundation

5

K rikorian, op. cit., p. 66.

6

K rikorian, quoting H arold W illiam s speech, Ibid.

7

R onald C. H om , op. Cit. pp. 9-11.
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for their efforts is a stated commitment to serve the public interest through enhanced
compliance with laws, regulations and high standards of ethical conduct.
2.

Codes of Ethics
Codes of ethics have a long history as the principle mechanism for organizations’

self-regulatory efforts. Codes typically commit those who adopt them to obey the law
and to adhere to ethical standards that may be stricter than the law.11
3.

Ethics Training
Training in ethical principles and standards is relatively new for corporations,12

but has enjoyed a longer history in some of the “learned professions” (medicine, law and
theology).13
4.

Reporting Systems for Violations of the Code of Ethics
While many organizations require that allegations of misconduct be reported to

one’s direct supervisor, an increasing number of organizations provide additional

8

Jerald A. Jacobs, “Vehicles for Self-Regulation: Codes of Ethics, Credentialing and Standards.”
Self-Regulation: Conference Proceedings, Washington, DC: Ethics Resource Center, 1982 pp.
83-85.

9

Conduct and Accountability: A Report to the President, Washington, DC: 1986, pp. 42-44.

10

Kirkorian, op. Cit. p. 3. And see Codes of Ethics in Corporations and Trade Associations and the
Teaching of Ethics in Graduate Schools of Business, Washington, DC: Ethics Resource Center,
1979.

11

Codes of Ethics in Corporations and Trade Associations and the Teaching of Ethics in Graduate
Schools of Business, op. cit.

12

A

13

E .g ., S e e

1984 study by Bentley College’s Center for Business Ethics found that 35% of responding
corporations provided training in business ethics. An Ethics Resource Center study in 1988 found
that 47% of large corporations (50,000 or more employees) provided such training.
Teaching Ethics in Medical Colleges and Universities, Washington, DC:
Resource Center, 1984.
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Ethics

channels of communication to ensure that matters are brought to the attention of senior
management.14
5.

Voluntary Disclosure
When misconduct involves serious breaches of the law or where the public

interest or safety is implicated, as in product tampering or compromised services,
organizations adopt policies for timely reporting to affected parties in order to prevent or
limit harm.15
6.

Process of Continuing Improvement for Self-Regulation
When violations of the code of ethics are discovered through internal reporting

mechanisms or peer review programs, organizations can use that information to
strengthen the self-regulatory program through actions such as clarifications or
interpretations of the code of ethics, improvement in the quality or frequency of ethics
training, or revisions in compliance protocol, or other mechanisms.16

14

In professional firms, direct access may be made to senior partners or to a code administrator. In
corporations, communication vehicles range from “open door” and “skip-level” policies that
permit employees to take concerns directly to higher levels of management to ethics and
compliance officers charged with code enforcement responsibility. See Ethics in American
Business, Washington, DC: Ethics Resource Center, 1995.

15

The US Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations encourage voluntary disclosure of illegal
conduct by considering such disclosure as a mitigating factor in determination of penalties. See
US Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, chapter 8, “Sentencing Organizations.”

16

See id. The US Sentencing Commission identified seven minimum steps to develop an effective
compliance program to “prevent and detect” violations of law. The seventh step requires: “After
an offense has been detected, the organization must have taken all reasonable steps to prevent
further similar offenses, including necessary modifications to its programs to prevent and detect
violations of law. Ibid.
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7.

Public Accountability
External communication, and sometimes verification,17 of an organization’s

self-regulatory initiatives increases the credibility of such efforts and can strengthen
public trust.

Accounting Self-Regulation and Auditor Independence
The accounting industry benefits from a long history of self-regulation.18 The
formation of the Independence Standards Board (ISB) provides an opportunity to build
on those past efforts, maintain public confidence and secure that confidence for the future
in auditor independence.
On May 21, 1997, the SEC and the AICPA jointly announced the creation of the
ISB to establish independence standards for the auditors of public companies. The ISB’s
operations will be overseen by the SEC.19
In my opinion, the contemplated functions of the ISB, taken together with the
existing self-regulatory mechanisms within the AICPA and the public accounting firms,
should satisfy the criteria for an effective program of self-regulation that will assure the
independence of accountants who provide audit and other attestation services to public
companies.

17

Conduct and Accountability: A Report to the President,

18

For an account of the evolution of self-regulation by the accounting profession, see Dale L.
Fleisher, Paul J. Maranti and Gary John Previts, “The First Century of the CPA,” Journal of
Accountancy, October 1996.

19

“Accounting Today,” June 2, 1997.
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op. cit.

p. 44.

1.

The Public Interest
Accounting addresses this criterion directly in the Code of Professional Conduct

of the AICPA, Article II -- “The Public Interest”:
Members should accept the obligation to act in a
way that will serve the public interest, honor the
public trust, and demonstrate commitment to
professionalism.20

The Code clarifies this responsibility and defines the public interest:
The accounting profession’s public consists of
clients, credit grantors, governments, employers,
investors, the business and financial community,
and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity
of certified public accountants to maintain the
orderly functioning of commerce. This reliance
imposes a public interest responsibility on certified
public accountants. The public interest is defined as
the collective well-being of the community of
people and institutions the profession serves.21

2.

Codes of Ethics
In addition to the AICPA Code, many of the public accounting firms have

developed their own codes of ethics. More significantly, for the narrower purpose of
self-regulation of auditor independence, firms have written policies on independence.22
The scope of these policies varies, as does the degree to which they address issues that
might impair independence.

The proposed principles to be promulgated by the ISB

20

AICPA Professional Standards ET § 53.

21

Ibid. § 53.01.

22

In preparation o f this report, the author has exam ined independence policies o f several large
public accounting firm s, internal m echanism s developed by the firm s to com m unicate and
interpret those policies, and other safeguards to ensure com pliance w ith the policies.
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would afford the opportunity for improving firm policies and developing codes of
independence that might at once be more comprehensive and still tailored to each firm’s
culture and needs.
3.

Ethics Training
Training related to the AICPA Code is integral to the preparation for the CPA

exam. Training with respect to each firm’s code of ethics, their policies and procedures
pertaining to auditor independence and related aspects of their quality control programs is
the responsibility of the firms and is carried out on a basis which varies from firm to firm.
New independence codes, under the ISB principles, should occasion the integration or
coordination of these efforts within each firm.
4.

Systems for Reporting Violations of the Code
Firms encourage a free and open atmosphere for questions or concerns about

independence through auditors’ access to the audit partner, as well as, if necessary, other
senior members of the firm not involved in the audit.

Additionally, firms staff

professional practice offices to answer questions and provide advice and counsel on
matters of proper conduct and independence and provide formal mechanisms for
consultation on differences of professional opinion. SECPS member firms also must
provide a concurring review of the audit report and its financial statements by a partner
other than the audit partner-in-charge of the engagement before the audit report is issued.
That safeguard provides another opportunity for discovery and deterrence of any threat to
auditor independence.23

23

AICPA SECPS “Requirements of Members.”
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5.

Voluntary Disclosure
An auditing firm would have disclosure obligations upon discovery that it had not

conducted an “independent audit,” as envisioned by federal securities laws, and that
reliance upon its previously issued report would not be proper.

These disclosure

obligations of an auditing firm derive not from a particular firm policy, but rather from
the entire set of firm-wide policies and procedures designed to ensure the accuracy of
each audit report, taken together with auditors’ professional obligations.
In particular, if an auditing firm subsequently discovered facts bearing on its
independence and concluded that steps must be taken to prevent reliance upon a
previously issued audit report (because its independence actually had been impaired
during the course of the audit), there would be an obligation to disclose the existence of
the problem under AICPA standards. An auditing firm’s disclosure may be mandatory
under the auditing standards and, depending upon the precise circumstances, under the
federal securities laws.

Auditors normally will ask the audit client to disclose the

problem before the audit firm itself would or should approach a government regulator.
When an auditor’s report can no longer be relied upon, the general public also becomes
aware of this fact through the release of revised financial statements and a new audit
report.24
6.

Process of Continuous Improvement for Self-Regulation
Public accounting firms have in place a process for continuous improvement in

assuring independence. The AICPA’s SECPS peer review program contributes to such

24

A IC PA P rofessional Standards, A U §1561, “ Subsequent D iscovery o f Facts Existing at the D ate
o f the A uditor’s R eport.”
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improvements on a regular basis, and the Quality Control Inquiry Committee examines
alleged audit failures and evaluates whether there is a need for improvement in a firm’s
system or quality control.25
In addition, the ISB and its Independence Issues Committee present an
opportunity for stimulating further improvements in the firms’ self-regulation of auditor
independence. A May 7, 1997 discussion paper would direct the ISB to “[d]evelop a
process, including the IIC, by which emerging issues affecting independence can be
referred for guidance and resolution” and to “[p]rovide a consultative function for
practitioners who have questions about independence standards.” Additionally, the IIC
mission would require that it “[p]erform other duties, such as conducting research, that
are assigned to it by the Board.”26 Identifying and referring emerging issues would allow
firms to update their independence codes or safeguard mechanisms, thus improving their
self-regulation. The research responsibilities of the IIC should permit it to identify, and
share among the firms, best practices in preserving independence. IIC findings could be
communicated to the profession in any number of ways, including periodic forums,
“website” postings and publications. This information on best practices might prove to
be of great practical value, not only in improving safeguards for auditor independence
among the larger firms, but also in assisting small and mid-size firms whose resources are
not as great, in more efficiently developing and upgrading independence policies and

25

W illiam L. Felix, Jr. and D ouglas F. Pravitt, “ Q uality C ontrol Practices in th e SEC PS,” M ay 3,
1993. M onograph reports survey o f m em ber firm s com m issioned by the A IC PA SECPS.

26

M ay 7, 1997 discussion paper, “E stablishm ent o f the Independence Standards B oard” attached to
M ay 13, 1997 letter from Barry C. M elancon, P resident and CEO , A IC PA to SEC C hairm an
A rthur Levitt.
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mechanisms by modeling other firms’ efforts. Such research would likely be useful to
the ISB as well in its consultative function serving practitioners. Moreover, the emerging
issues guidance and resolution process should itself be a force to generate new best
practices that could then be disseminated through IIC’s best practices communication
media.
7.

Public Accountability
The principle

element

of public

accountability for accounting

firms’

self-regulatory efforts is the SECPS QCIC “closed-case summaries,” which examine
alleged audit failures and corrective action taken. These summaries are not released to
the general public, but to the Public Oversight Board, which includes public members,
and to the SEC.27
With establishment of the ISB, increased public accountability could be effected if
auditing firms’ independence policies were collected by ISB and made available to the
public.
In summary, public accounting self-regulatory activities and mechanisms to
assure auditor independence reflect each of the criteria for effective self-regulation. In a
number of instances, however, the ISB principles and consultative functions, together
with the potential research by the IIC, could improve the self-regulation efforts.
Specifically, the ISB principles would strengthen the independence policies and practices
of accounting firms and make possible firm-specific independence codes that take
cognizance of significant independence issues and the ISB’s guidance in addressing them

27

W illiam L. Felix, Jr. and D ouglas F. Pravitt, op. cit. pp. 13-14.
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(criterion two); independence training could be strengthened by virtue of strong, focused
independence codes and the IIC’s research on best practices could stimulate further
improvements of training (criterion three); the process of continual improvement of
self-regulation would be advanced by IIC research, and the needs of small and mid-sized
firms could be more efficiently met (criterion six); and public accountability would be
enhanced by the public filing and transparency of firms’ independence codes (criterion
seven).
Professional Ethics and Auditor Independence
Key features of an effective self-regulatory program to ensure audit independence
are well established by the policies and safeguards of the AICPA and public accounting
firms. With new initiatives by the ISB and IIC, there is opportunity to enhance certain
aspects of the program. But the profession need not, and in fact does not, rely solely on
policies and mechanisms to preserve auditor independence. It has a powerful resource
unavailable to businesses or industry groups in their self-regulation.
Like other organization of professionals, accounting has the added strength of
professional ethics.

Professions and Professional Ethics
The term “profession” derives from Latin and Middle English terms which
refer to the public declaration or vow made by one entering a religious order. By the
sixteenth century, law and medicine had joined divinity as the three “learned
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professions.”28 Common to these early acknowledged professions was the public
recognition of the special knowledge, skill and power possessed by the professionals and
concomitant privileges and responsibilities that devolved upon them. Chief among these
responsibilities has been an expectation that professionals would hold themselves to a
high standard of care and ethical conduct.

The self-discipline that was expected of

individual professionals evolved into the concept of self-regulation by the profession,
where those of comparable knowledge, skill and power were recognized as most
competent to police and regulate their peers.
In some areas, the knowledge and skill of accountants may be matched by that of
their clients, but accountants bring a special value to clients and to the public when they
perform audit services. The value of those services derives from the objectivity, integrity
and independence of the auditors.29
Professional ethics are distinguished from the self-regulatory activities of a
profession. Professional ethics may be thought of in terms of the principles, guidelines
and rules for fulfilling one’s professional responsibilities. As such, professional ethics
are closely associated with a profession’s standards of conduct or code of ethics.
Promulgation and enforcement of the standards are among the principle self-regulatory
responsibilities of a professional society.
The conduct of certified public accountants is governed by “The Code of
Professional Conduct of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.” The
28

O xford E nglish D ictionary. N ew York: O xford U niversity Press, 1971, pp. P1426-1428.

29

C lifford E. G raese, “H onesty and Professional Ethics: F ocus on A cco u n tin g .” In The Ethical
B asis o f E conom ic Freedom . Ivan Hill, ed. Chapel Hill, NC: A m erican V iew point, 1976, pp.
198-199.
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current Code, as adopted in 1988 and amended in 1992, calls for “an unswerving
commitment to honorable behavior, even at the sacrifice of personal advantage” and
requires of AICPA members “an obligation of self-discipline above and beyond the
requirements of law and regulations.”30
Personal and Professional Ethics
Aristotle instructed his own son that if he wished to acquire the virtue of courage,
he should find a courageous man and do the things that man did. He understood the
essential function both of moral exemplars and of practice in developing the moral habits
that we call virtues and, collectively, character.
The pedagogy of moral development utilizes moral exemplars and the practice of
moral behavior. It also involves making moral demands and teaching one to make moral
demands of oneself, to be a certain kind of person even when no one is observing.
Stories are commonly used to exemplify the functioning and reasoning behind moral
precepts, and rituals and ceremonies are used both to cultivate the moral affects and to
signify their achievement.
Morality and ethics are not the same thing; although related, they are
distinguishable. Morality is concerned with personal virtue, specifically the cultivation,
through moral pedagogy, of a range of affective capacities (honor, shame, indignation,
courage, compassion, etc.); the development and exercise of moral judgment; and, as a
consequence of personal virtue and moral judgment, moral action.

30
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Ethics has been called “the science of morality.” 31 Among its chief concerns is the
principled resolution of moral conflicts. Moral conflicts arise when the actions required
by moral virtues, obligations or rules are inconsistent.

Ethics strives to articulate

principles on the basis of which such conflicts can be resolved.

How well moral

principles are articulated and understood and the skill with which they are used determine
their utility in resolving moral conflicts or dilemmas.
The moral capacities of a professional can be understood as refinements or
extensions of one’s personal moral virtues. The compassion of a physician is grounded in
the same moral attributes that he or she possessed before becoming a physician. The
difference, which is learned in the course of medical education and practice, lies in what
behavior the compassion of a physician may permit or require of the physician, but not of
one who is not a member of the profession.
Similarly, discretion and trustworthiness are moral virtues achievable by all. But
the protection of client confidences, which utilizes and extends these moral capacities in
the medical, religious, and legal professions, requires different conduct of a professional
than of one who is not. Indeed, the requirements differ from one profession to another.
Personal and professional morality are distinguishable.

Even though personal

morality may inform and provide much of the basis for professional morality, personal
morality alone may be inadequate to ensure professional conduct.
The objective of professional education and training is not only the imparting of
special knowledge and skills for the competent practice of the profession, but also the

31
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development of the professional character, judgment and conduct necessary for the
responsible practice of the profession.
In addition to developing in professionals the moral attributes requisite of the
profession, educational preparation and training should also prepare professionals for the
analysis and resolution of difficult ethical issues that may be encountered in practice.
Although the skills involved in resolving issues of professional ethics are not
different in kind than those used in resolving moral conflicts outside a profession, the
principles of professional ethics may be different and the facts often will be not only
different but more complex. Learning the fundamental ethical principles of a profession
and their application in situations common and extraordinary begins in the classroom, but
it continues in practice and in reflection on practice. It is thus most appropriate that
professional ethics be a specific focus of the formal preparatory training of professionals,
as well as of their continuing education, where the most difficult, novel and emerging
issues of professional practice can be subjected to the analysis and consideration of one’s
peers and more experienced professionals, and can contribute to a more refined
understanding of the principles.
For auditors, their professional ethics involve more than the mastery of the
AICPA Code of Professional Conduct.

The development of professional virtues, of

professional character, is not a course of study so much as a career-long process of
refinement. And, the test of those virtues is not an examination that can be taken once,
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but a process of continual self-examination to achieve and maintain a state of mind —
independence.32
Professional and Ethical Influences on Auditors’ Independence
Professional character and the exercise of the ethical skills and judgment of the
professional auditor do not occur in a vacuum. They are deployed in the context of a
profession and in the practice of a public accounting firm.
Auditors, like all professionals, find their conduct and decision-making informed
and constrained by professionalism and ethics. Mandatory obligations and prohibited
actions under the AICPA Code of Professional Conduct limn the boundaries of
professional conduct. When confronted by issues of independence, the auditor can turn
to Ethics Rules that have been developed under the conceptual framework of Principles to
foster reflection on the spirit and intent, and not just compliance with the letter, of
proscriptions and requirements.

AICPA Interpretations and Rulings provide added

guidance in particular situations.
The public accounting firms have typically developed statements of their own
firm’s mission, values and standards of professional conduct and ethics. These are meant
to build on, and in some cases may be more restrictive than, the AICPA Code.
Additionally, firms provide formal consultations on differences of professional opinion,
and they staff Offices of Professional Practice to answer questions and provide advice
and counsel on matters of proper conduct and independence.

32

John L. C arey, P rofessional E thics o f P ublic Accounting, N ew Y ork:
A ccountants, 1946, p. 7.

- 19-

A m erican Institute o f

Outside the firm, accountants can consult with AICPA’s Office of Professional
Ethics for clarification of the Code or concerns about proper conduct or independence.
On matters of auditor independence, public accounting firms and the AICPA have
gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure that the public’s interest in independence is
protected and that possible individual incentives to sacrifice independence for personal
benefit are appropriately managed.
The AICPA, through its SEC Practice Section, has established the Peer Review
Committee and the Quality Control Inquiry Committee.

Under the Peer Review

Committee, each member firm is required to have its quality controls and its compliance
with them reviewed every three years by auditors from outside its own firm.33 The
Quality Control Inquiry Committee examines a firm’s quality controls when there have
been allegations of audit failure in order to determine whether there exist inadequacies in
the firm’s quality control program.34
The AICPA, in addition to imposing penalties for violations of the Code of
Professional Conduct, may also penalize firms that fail to take corrective actions as a
result of peer review findings, or if the Quality Control Inquiry Committee confirms
violations of GAAP or GAAS in its examination of the member’s quality controls.
The public accounting firms themselves are well aware of the possibility that the
personal interests of an audit partner might diverge from the firm’s interest in ensuring
auditor independence. The structure of partner compensation, second partner review,
33
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audit practice review, firm policies on independence, self-inspection and written
attestation of compliance all function to reduce the risk that auditor independence might
be impaired in such a manner.
Audit team members are subject to a different risk than that of the audit partner
who might take advantage of the reputation of the firm and choose to act for his own
benefit and compromise independence. The audit team members, should they be working
under such a partner, might feel pressure from the partner to compromise independence.
They might perceive that failure to go along and to allow the partner’s directives to
override their own professional judgment could damage their careers in the firm or even
cost them their jobs.
Accounting firms, sensitive to this possibility, provide for members of the audit
team to take differences of professional opinion to other senior members of the firm. An
additional safeguard is provided by the fact that auditors typically will not work for just
one audit partner, and so are less likely to feel trapped in their position and more willing
to voice professional disagreements than might an employee working in a different type
of company where several years of one’s career might be spent reporting to the same
manager.
The accounting profession’s long attention to independence and the evolution of
both AICPA and firm safeguards seem to provide adequate opportunity for advice and
counsel on questions and professional differences of opinion relating to independence, as
well as safeguards, including auditor access to senior management.
The two greatest forces that firms can deploy to ensure audit independence,
however, may be the culture of the firms themselves and the quality of professionalism of
-21 -

their people. Both are, to be certain, shaped in part by the safeguards that have already
been mentioned. But both have a vitality that is nourished in other ways as well.
The professionals who enter a public accounting firm bring with them their
technical skills, but also their professional character. How well that has been formed by
professional education and experience may have more influence on auditor independence
than any management systems or safeguards. The culture of the firm, the quality and
integrity of its leadership, its traditions, stories and moral exemplars can support and
strengthen the professional character of its people and make safeguards but the final
evidence of an independence that has been internalized.
Independence and the Appearance of Independence
Auditors, like other professionals, do well to concern themselves not only with
independence but also with its appearance.
The AICPA Code of Professional Conduct Article IV states:
A member should maintain objectivity and be free
of conflicts of interest in discharging professional
responsibilities. A member in public practice
should be independent in fact and appearance when
providing auditing and other attestation services.35

The desirability of appearing to be independent is self-evident. Since the value of
auditing and other attestation services lies in the assurance that they provide investors and
the public, doubts about the independence of the auditor can erode that assurance and
weaken public confidence. Such doubts, however, might arise even when independence
has not been impaired, if the circumstances are such as to cause a reasonable person to

35
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believe that it has been impaired. If independence appears to be impaired, then the
damage to public trust and confidence may already be done.
Questions concerning potential conflicts of interest often touch upon the
“appearance of impropriety.” Whatever the merits of an appearance-based standard in a
particular professional context, concern about the open-ended quality of such a standard
typically leads to limits on its application. This is certainly true with regard to the legal
profession.

In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted its Model Code of

Professional Responsibility and chose to address the “appearance of impropriety,” not as
an enforceable rule, but rather as an ethical consideration to which a lawyer should
aspire,36 that is, lawyers should strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also
the appearance of impropriety.3637 Indeed, “[t]he ‘appearance of impropriety standard’ in
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility did not become part of the 1983
Model Rules of Professional Conduct because many courts and academic commentators
criticized the standard.38
Not only is it difficult to assess how particular conduct will be viewed by an
individual or group, but even the logically prior question of identifying the relevant
community of observers poses a formidable challenge. Whose opinion should count?
Even more to the point, whose opinion counts so heavily that society should tolerate the

36
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cost of “false positives,” that is, of barring situations that might appear to be ethical
problems but in fact are not?
Even in the context of government service, where the need to maintain public
confidence presumably is at its peak, commentators have criticized too great a focus upon
appearances and noted the need to appropriately limit the use of appearance-based ethics
rules for past and present government employees.39 Thus, for example, when the Office
of Government Ethics (OGE) promulgated Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees
of the Executive Branch in 1992, it explicitly chose to adopt a “reasonable person” test.
As OGE explained:
The test assumes that conduct will be judged by a
reasonable person having knowledge of the relevant
facts and does not depend upon the public’s actual
knowledge. We do not view that test as weakening
the appearance standard, but rather as appropriate
assurance to an employee that his or her conduct
will not be judged from the perspective of the
unreasonable, uninformed or overly zealous.40

The appearance of independence ought not be a mandatory requirement for any
profession, organization or industry, because the appearance of any phenomenon is a
product not only of the facts, but of the observer’s interpretation of the facts.
Appearances are inherently subjective and ultimately beyond the control of the
professional.

N olan, op cit., at 57-58.
57 F R 35006.
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But the fundamental problem with articulating and enforcing an “appearance”
standard is not the subjectivity of the observer, but the hortatory nature of the principle.
It should be viewed as essentially aspirational in nature, and it should function to increase
the sensitivity of auditors regarding how their conduct or relationships might be
misunderstood. Such professional sensitivity can and should be cultivated, but it can not
be mandated or regulated.
The profession, or individual firms of public accountants, may choose to educate
members about particular conduct or relationships that may be deemed to be especially
suspect or likely to be perceived as impairing independence. In doing so, the moral
judgment of members can be enhanced and the motivation to refrain from certain types of
activity increased.
Professional conduct is not motivated only by regulations or enforceable rules.
Ethical principles, internalized by the professional and supported by the systems and the
leadership of the firm, are a significant driver of professional decision-making and
conduct.

Until and unless there exists credible objective evidence concerning the

appearance of a lack of auditor independence, enforceable appearance-based requirements
should be abandoned and regulatory attention refocused on crafting fundamental
principles of independence which can be implemented by accounting firms through
standards and mechanisms appropriate to their experience and issues.
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